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Project full title:  **Migration and Temporary Agency Work in the EU welfare, tourist and agricultural sectors**

**PEOPLE**

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**Intra-European Fellowships (IEF)**

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**Final Report**¹

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¹ Please note that this Final Report draft is currently under review by the EC and might be subject to minor changes. The information contained herein is the sole responsibility of the author (Dr Maroukis), and the Commission declines all responsibility for the use that may be made of it.
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**Brief Overview of Research Project**

Migrants constitute the most significant pool of workers at the disposal of the EU Member States that wish to expand flexible forms of labour in order to meet the demands of their increasingly ageing population. Yet freedom of movement towards (and within) EU labour markets is restricted by inflexible migration policy regimes interacting with labour market policies and regulations.

This project systematically investigates the work- and worker-specific factors determining the forms of temporary agency work in specific branches of the healthcare, tourist and food industries.

The key contribution of the study from a *conceptual* perspective is that it analyses the social, economic, political and legal context of temporary agency work relationships, while it pays particular attention to the features of migrants taking up agency work. From an *empirical and policy-related* perspective, the significance of this research project consists in addressing the question of temporary agency work in a comparative political economy setting across labour markets with different settings of work and across two EU MS (Greece & UK) characterized by distinct industrial relations, welfare and migrant integration regimes.

**1. Introduction**

Migrants constitute the most significant pool of workers at the disposal of the European Union (EU) member states that wish to expand flexible forms of labour in order to meet the demands of their increasingly ageing population (Lyberaki 2009). They usually fit best the profile of the poor and vulnerable segments of society that would readily take the low status, low pay jobs, yet their freedom of movement towards (and within) the EU labour markets is restricted by inflexible migration policy regimes (Triandafyllidou ed 2010) leaving the space open to a wide array of social networks to construct pathways of entry. Labour rental agencies in host countries, at times with their transnational branches in origin countries, and other looser networks of mediators and agents constitute the ‘meso-structures’ (Castles & Miller 2003) facilitating the cross-border movement of migrants and/or their placement within labour markets. On the other hand, Member States have tried (some from very early
on, others more recently) to promote flexible forms of labour through various regulations on temporary work. The European Commission (EC) directives on Temporary Agency Work date as far back as 1982 (Arrowsmith 2006), with the more recent ones in 2002 which culminated in the EU Agency Worker Regulations 201. These intended to serve the dual aim of: liberalizing the outsourcing capacities of enterprises and supporting labour market inclusion by regulating the practices of labour rental agencies facilitating workers’ entry and mobility in the EU labour markets. Yet the legality of migrants’ work and the quality of their working conditions in the sectors that these agencies operate, remain largely ‘grey’ areas. The debate seems to oscillate between the bleak picture tinted by cases of labour trafficking next to labour exploitation and poor working conditions (Allan et al 2004; Anderson & Rogaly 2005; Ruhs & Anderson 2010; Anderson 2010; Smith & Mackintosh 2007; Puech 2007) and the positive impact of agency working for flexible work-life arrangements and for bringing people into employment. The latter position is often maintained by governments, employers and recruitment industry representatives (see for example, DoH 2000; Directive 2008/104/EC; Eurofound 2009; REC 2014) and statistical survey data (Voss et al 2013).

In a European economy that needs to restructure itself against high global economic competition and a rising debt, forms of employment like TAW seem to serve an undercurrent of matching (often) skilled labour with (often) unskilled wage rates and/or insecurity outside work. Indeed, research on working conditions indicates that temporary agency workers, along with workers in other atypical forms of employment, are more exposed to financial insecurity and risks at work than permanent workers (Benach et al 2002: 1-2; Pedersen, Hansen & Mahler 2004: 43). There are studies that analyze the situation of TAW working conditions in Europe based on statistical data from questionnaire based surveys on a national level (Storrie 2006; Pedersen, Hansen & Mahler 2004; Arrowsmith 2006; Voss et al 2013). However, the picture of the working conditions of TAW in the EU as is presented from these studies does not go deeper into the analysis of the several variables that influence the experience of TAW.

Furthermore, it is suggested that the distance created between employer and worker under a TAW employment relationship eventually challenges the sustainability of this organizational form of production. For Jamie Peck ‘‘workers, once hired must be prepared to cooperate in the workplace and be prepared not only to work today but to return to work tomorrow; the need to maintain this balance between control and consent conditions the hiring and firing behaviour of firms’’ (Peck 1996:23-4). However, in the case of agency employment, firms do not need to formally threaten labour with firing in order to get their consent to particular working conditions. Laying off workers is already institutionalized and part of the hiring process. Taking this argument to its extreme, one may state that the labour relations are taken out of the workplace and their negotiation is no longer necessarily based on performance at the workplace. Research on contingent forms of employment has supported the idea that the relationship between agent and employer (whether contractual or not) is critical in understanding the propensity to operate in breach of labour and/or immigration regulations (Peck and Theodore 1998; Forde 2001; Forde and Slater 2011). The agency may decrease
worker hourly remuneration in order to offer a more competitive price to the employer in a contract tendering process and this could happen regardless of the worker performance. This system of fragmented triangular labour relations seems to be reproducing itself. Jobs To Rent explores where and how. It discusses the sustainability of TAW relationships as they are bounded by formal and informal institutional arrangements and structures.

**Project Aims:**

The central aim of this project was to **analyze the different forms that the flexibility of migrant labour may take in certain niches of the European economy, focusing on the role, status, contribution and form of temporary agency work(ers).**

This is a crucial topic for the future of European employment that has not been systematically explored, and requires a theoretically coherent and policy-relevant analysis – the intended outcome of the proposed project. In order to achieve this, the following subsidiary objectives were developed:

- To construct an interdisciplinary and empirically-based typology of the factors related to the social, economic, political and legal context of temporary agency work and the social, legal and economic features of the migrant as well as additional factors identified during the study;
- to explain the different forms that TAW may take under this typology.
- to provide an empirically informed policy analysis, and what synergies it takes between different policy actors on an EU and national level in order to protect the fundamental employment rights of TAW.

The Jobs To Rent study first identifies and empirically examines the social, economic and political processes and structures framing the development of agency work relationships against **actual experiences of TAW** by different types of workers and businesses in the different economic sectors that the research looks into. Secondly, it discusses **the implications of TAW for workers and employers, national and international political economy, with a view to highlighting what synergies are needed between different policy actors on an EU and national level in order to protect the fundamental employment rights of TAW (see Policy Briefs in Annex).**

The following knowledge goals will enable me to meet the aforementioned project aims.

**Key Knowledge Goals:**

- In order to construct an interdisciplinary and empirically based typology of TAW, Jobs To Rent explores TAW in a comparative political economy setting across (local) labour markets with different settings of work, different skills and types of workers, and across two EU MS characterized by distinct industrial relations, welfare and migrant integration regimes.
  The project explains the forms of TAW identified by examining the ways in which the above factors interact and produce different forms and experiences of TAW in different sectors and countries.
• Framing the experiences of TAW against regulatory and policy regimes on a sectoral, national and EU level will enable the project to extend empirical knowledge and develop policy-relevant conclusions on a topic that is crucial for the future of employment and social cohesion in the EU.

1.1. Report Structure

This report first seeks to place the two countries studied against the framework of TAW regulation at the European Union level. Understanding the development of TAW regulation in UK and Greece against the different regulatory attempts at the EU level sets the background for the policy dimensions of my research findings. Next follows the empirical cross-country case study of TAW across three sectors with distinctive characteristics.

2. UK and Greece in the EU milieu of TAW regulation

The European Commission proposed directives on Temporary Agency Work, dating as far back as 1982, and made a breakthrough in 2008 under the EU Agency Workers Directive (2008/104/EC). This is a crucial component in the European Union’s employment law package to protect atypical working (the others being for part-time workers and fixed-term workers). However, the EU Agency Workers Directive seems to have had a rather differential impact across the EU Member States (MS). This is due to the significant variation in the national approaches regulating TAW. UK and Greece have been two Member States (MS) at the opposite ends of the legislative framework on TAW in Europe.

Voss et al (2013: 30) have grouped the EU MS according to the level of maturity in developing regulatory frameworks of TAW. The UK belongs to a small group of North-Western European countries with frameworks and systems of regulating TAW which date back to the mid 1960s and early 1970s. The Netherlands first introduced an agency licensing system in 1965. This was followed by Denmark’s law on the supervision of private employment agencies in 1968, Ireland’s licensing system in 1971, Germany’s act on TAW in 1972 and France’s legislation on licensing and other requirements in 1972. The United Kingdom introduced a licensing system in 1973 under the Employment Agencies Act, and Belgium established its first law on TAW in 1976. Finland (1985), Austria (1988), Portugal (1989), Sweden (1993), Spain (1994), Luxembourg (1994) and Italy (1997) were a second group of countries that either set legal frameworks for the use of TAW or licensed, monitored and regulated relevant contractual arrangements in the 1980s and 1990s. Greece belongs to the most numerous group of countries which introduced specific legislation of TAW only during the last decade: Greece (1999, 2001), Hungary, Slovakia (2001), Slovenia, Poland, Romania (2003), Czech Republic, Malta (2004), Latvia (2007), Estonia (2009), Bulgaria, Lithuania (2011) (Voss et al 2013: 30).

Although Britain drafted one of the earliest pieces of legislation on TAW in the EU, it has been characterised by a flexible regulatory approach as regards TAW’s legal status, the
governance of temporary workers’ employment and the activities of temporary work agencies (Forde and Slater 2011; Voss et al 2013). Unlike all other EU MS where the agency worker is defined as the employee of the agency working in the premises of the end-user company, agency workers do not have to be employed by the agency in the UK. According to the Conduct of Employment Agencies and Employment Business Regulations which amended the 1973 Employment Agencies Act in 2003, agency workers may be self-employed, have a contract with more than one agency and this contract may be a ‘contract for services’ rather than an ‘employment contract’. Thus agency employment can avoid giving rise to an employment relationship in law (Voss et al 2013: 32).

In some countries the law specifies the details of the contract between the agency worker and the agency. In France, for example, ‘each assignment must have its own written ‘assignment contract’ signed by the agency worker and the agency’. In other MS, the law regulates the contract between the temporary work agency and the end-user firm. In Italy this contract ‘must contain various details ‘including the start and finish dates of the workers’ assignment contract, the work tasks assigned to the agency workers; and the workplace, working hours, pay, and legal conditions of the leased workers’ (Voss et al 2013: 33-34). Greece belongs to the group of MS which take a stricter regulatory approach defining not only the relationship between the temporary agency, the hiring client and the worker but also the status of the temporary worker. A distinction needs to be made here between temporary employment firms and temporary employment agencies. The former are in a contractual relationship with the worker and ‘lease’ the worker to an end-user employer for a certain period of time that cannot exceed 36 months. Their conditions and terms of operation are regulated by laws 2956 of 2001, L.3846/2010 and L.4093/2012. The temporary employment agencies do not have to enter into a contract with a prospective worker but only broker his/her contract with an end-user employer. Their operation was first regulated by the Presidential Decree 160 of FEK 157/1999 and was recently updated with L. 4052/2012 (articles 98-109). The Jobs To Rent study focused on the latter case; the temporary employment agencies.

Law 3144/2003 introduced a licensing system for temporary work agencies in Greece. The UK, on the other hand, is one of the five EU MS that do not have agency licensing schemes. In 1995 it revoked its 1973 scheme. However, in response to a fatal incident of Chinese cockle pickers in 2004, the British government established licensing criteria for agencies in the agriculture, horticulture, shellfish and associated food processing industries under the Gangmaster Licensing Act of 2004. The other MS without a licensing scheme are Sweden (where a social partner scheme was established instead in 2004), the Netherlands, Finland and Estonia (Voss et al 2013: 168-171).

Since 2003 the UK poses no restrictions to the use of agency labour during strikes and industrial disputes unless these constitute ‘official’ disputes ‘i.e. the strike has been organised by a trade union and meets the legal requirements on balloting of members and provision of notice to the employer’’. Also, 8 more MS (Hungary, Germany, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Estonia, Ireland, Latvia, and Malta) have no such restrictions in the use of agency labour (Voss et al 2013: 35-36). In Italy, according to the new labour law reform of July 2012 (Law No. 92/2012) agencies may employ an agency worker for a maximum of 12 months.
without the obligation to indicate reasons for the use of a temporary agency work contract. In France, the law states that user enterprises may only use temporary agency work to replace an absent employee, to meet a temporary increase in activity, or for intrinsically time-limited posts and to provide better access to the labour market for the unemployed. Greece along with Luxembourg, Spain, Portugal, Romania, Slovenia and Poland define specific grounds for permitted temporary work assignment and often restrict the use of temporary agency work in the aftermath of collective redundancies (Voss et al 2013: 35). However, the recently voted Law No.4254/2014 in Greece lowers the threshold for collective labour redundancies and liberalises the substitution of permanent-contract workers by ‘leased’ or agency workers2. Taking a stricter stance on sector specific restrictions of TAW than other MS (see table below cited from Voss et al 2013), my research also indicates that Greece prohibits the use of temporary agency workers in public and private hospitals (Circular Directive, Ministry of Employment 2004) as well as in public administration.

The EU Agency Workers Directive aiming to establish equal employment conditions of temporary agency workers vis-a-vis permanent workers of end-user firms has exercised pressure on several MS to develop or negotiate schemes for the transition from temporary to permanent employment. Voss et al succinctly note that the pressure varied from country to country depending on the model of industrial relations applied and the, related prior existence of schemes of transition from temporary to permanent employment and other support provisions towards temporary agency workers. In countries where social partners in the temporary work sector have been involved in negotiations and collective bargaining on labour and working conditions above the micro/company level3 (Greece and the UK do not belong in this group of countries) (Voss et al 2013: 10), the EU regulations consolidated or promoted further the implementation of the equal treatment of agency workers and permanent workers in a user enterprise. Indicatively, in 7 of these countries social partners managed to establish bipartite bodies and funds to support agency workers and enhance their working and social conditions (Austria, Belgium, France, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands and Spain). Temporary agency workers in the Netherlands are entitled to equal pay when working more than 26 weeks at the user company, and a permanent contract after a maximum of 3.5 years under a 3-phase system providing pay between assignments and certain benefits in the second and third phase (Voss et al 2013: 40). Temporary agency workers are paid equally with permanent workers in end-user firms and are automatically transferred to permanent contracts after 36 months in Italy and 24 months in France. According to French law agency workers are also entitled to vocational training and an “end-of-assignment compensation” amounting to 10% of the gross wage that is paid in order to compensate for the inherent instability of their situation (Voss et al 2013: 38-9). In Germany the reform of the Temporary Employment Act of 1972 (Arbeitnehmerüberlassungsgesetz, AÜG), on the one hand, lifted any restrictions on agency work assignments in 2002 and, on the other, resembling the EU Agency Worker Directive, stipulated that all temporary employees should be employed under the same pay, working hours, holiday rights and special payments as regular employees of the end-user

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2 http://news247.gr/eidiseis/oikonomia/ergasia/olh_h_diataksh_gia_thn_enoikiazomenh_ergasia_allazei_o_ergasiakos_xarths ths_xwras.2705980.html

3 Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden
firm. This legal requirement has been abrogated, however, by various sectoral collective agreements between trade union structures and employer associations or temporary agencies which provided for a gradual implementation of equal pay principles. (Voss et al 2013: 42-43).

The EU AWR had a different impact in MS characterised by a market driven model of industrial relations where collective bargaining has been taking place only at the micro level at the user company or not at all. Countries with no collective bargaining culture in the temporary work sector and late temporary worker equality support provisions in labour legislation (such as Estonia 2009, Latvia 2011, Lithuania 2011, Slovakia 2007, Romania 2003, Bulgaria 2011, Slovenia 2007, Greece 1999 and 2001, Hungary 2001, Cyprus, Malta,) had to incorporate equal pay regulations in national legislation without any opportunity for derogation.

In the UK case where there is no tradition of national social consultation but company level initiatives instead, the establishment of Agency Workers Regulations at the EU level functioned as the catalyst for the first national-level agreement on temporary agency work between the government, the TUC and the CBI in 2008, and gave some room for derogation from the equal treatment principle.

Greece and UK were chosen because they are at the opposite ends of national legislation on agency work in the EU, with political economies traditionally characterized by limited (UK) to no (Greece) social dialogue and collective bargaining above or at the micro/company level (social dialogue vs market driven models of industrial relations) and weak labour law control and enforcement (Duvell 2006; Wilkinson and Craig 2012).

Temporary Agency Work (TAW) in the UK has been governed by the EU Agency Workers Regulations since October 2011. Under the AWR, temporary agency workers who complete 12 weeks of continuous employment in a client firm are entitled to equal employment conditions with the directly employed permanent contract workers of the firm in equivalent positions. This 12-week qualifying period may be interrupted by up to a six-week break for medical reasons or when work is interrupted beyond the worker’s control. The equality in employment conditions specifically regards pay (including any fee, bonus, commission, or holiday pay relating to the assignment) and working time rights excluding sick pay, paternity/maternity pay, redundancy pay (Acas 2012; Forde and Slater 2014: 13). Concerns among temporary work agencies and employers that AWR would reduce the overall use of TAW and damage the recruitment industry trade (see Forde and Slater 2011) were eventually addressed by the introduction of Swedish Derogation (SD) contracts. The SD is a type of contractual arrangement included in the AWR after negotiations with the Swedish government, according to which an agency offers a temporary agency worker a permanent contract of employment and pays the agency worker between assignments. Agency workers on SD contracts are not entitled to equal pay with the directly employed workers of the client firm but are entitled to annual leave after 12 weeks, can be paid at least the national minimum wage between assignments, and this payment between assignments (PBA) must last for at least four weeks before the contract can be terminated (Acas, 2013). The impact of AWR on
existing schemes of transition from temporary to permanent employment at the company level and agency labour protection is assessed later in this report.

In Greece where there is no collective bargaining on temporary agency employment conditions above the company level and hardly any collective bargaining initiatives at the company level\(^4\), national legislation (L.4052/2012, art.117) stipulated the transition path from temporary to permanent employment. In particular, if an employee works for more than 36 months under one indirect employer then the employee’s employment contract with the Temporary Employment Firm automatically becomes an open-ended employment contract between the employee and the indirect employer. (Eurofound 2009; Voss 2013). Temporary workers employed through Temporary Employment Agencies are not regarded agency employees. Therefore, the transition stipulated in the above law does not apply in their case. Interestingly, the equal pay element is circumvented under this L. 4052/2012 which incorporated the EU Agency Workers Directive. Article 124, in particular, provides Temporary Employment Firms the opportunity not to pay its ‘leased’ employees on a par with permanent employees of the hiring employer. The severity of this law is thus superficial. This law also leaves the worker (as opposed to employee) brokerage activities of Temporary Employment Agencies outside the regulatory framework.

This section has framed the development of agency work national legislation in the two countries and the relevance of industrial relations and law enforcement against the EU experience. The empirical research findings, which follow next, discuss the different forms of TAW developed on the ground against these prevailing national regulatory regimes on TAW. I examine, in particular, how sector-specific political economy features and types of jobs interact with national regulatory regimes and labour mobility frameworks\(^5\) and produce different forms and experiences of TAW. In doing so, I assess how national regulatory regimes work out in practice and establish the parameters under which a cross-fertilization of European policy interventions on TAW would be beneficial. Protecting agency workers’ rights requires taking into account of all the political economy and regulatory frameworks in play.

### Table 1: Restrictions on the use of temporary agency work

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of regulation</th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No restrictions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Restricting the use of temporary agency work in strike situations</td>
<td><em>By law:</em> France, Italy, Spain, the Netherlands, Austria, Slovenia, Romania, Poland, Belgium, Portugal, Slovakia, Czech Republic  &lt;br&gt; <em>By general collective agreements:</em> Luxembourg, Denmark, Sweden, Finland  &lt;br&gt; <em>No restrictions, if specific</em></td>
<td>Bulgaria, Cyprus, Estonia, Ireland, Latvia, and Malta</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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\(^4\) An exception to this rule is the creation of a company based union structure for organising temporary agency workers at the National Bank of Greece (Voss et al 2013: 56).

\(^5\) By the term labour mobility frameworks I mean the migration policy regime and the migration and recruitment industries developed around labour mobility.
**requirements are fulfilled:**
Hungary, Germany, United Kingdom

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Restrictions in other specific situations /reasons justifying assignments</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Italy, Belgium, France, Luxembourg, Spain, Portugal, Romania, Slovenia, Greece, Poland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria, Cyprus, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Germany*, Hungary, Ireland, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Netherlands, Slovakia, United Kingdom</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Restrictions on the maximum length of assignments and/or number of extensions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria, Belgium, Czech Republic, France, Greece, Italy (maximum of 6 extensions), Luxembourg, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovenia, Spain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria, Cyprus, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Germany, Hungary, Ireland, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Netherlands, Slovakia, Sweden, UK</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sector specific restrictions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Construction: Germany**, Portugal
Public administration: Austria (Civil Service), Belgium, Greece****, Hungary, Spain
Other sectors: Austria (public hospitals/nursing institutions***), Belgium (removal firms and furniture warehouses, inland waterways) |
| The remaining EU member states |

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* In Germany, there are broad rights for works councils of the user enterprise to be informed about the use of temporary agency work under the terms of the temporary agency law and the Works Constitution Act. The set of circumstances under which works councils can object to the use of temporary agency work is more narrow, such as an agency’s failure to comply with the law. It should be noted also that in the metalworking sector the collective agreement has established further rights of the works councils in the context of temporary agency work.

** The temporary agency work law in principle prohibits the use of temporary agency work to cover blue-collar work in the construction industry except under the (unlikely) conditions of a collective labour agreement.

*** According to the law, in these sectors there is the rule that only up to a maximum of 15% of the total workforce in the relevant department can be temporary agency workers.

**** According to a circular Directive issued by the Greek Ministry of Employment in 2004, there is a ban on the supply of temporary agency healthcare workers in public and private hospitals.

3. Temporary Agency Work in the UK

3.1. Size

According to the UK Labour Force Survey there were only around 270,000 temporary agency workers in the UK in 2007. The Department for Business, Innovation and Skills (BIS, formerly BERR/DTI) conducted a study which estimated around 1.2 million agency workers in recruitment agencies in 2008 (BERR 2008). In 2012 both the British government as well as the employers’ organisation Recruitment and Employment Confederation (REC) jointly estimated the number of agency workers at around 1.1 million (Voss et al 2013: 21).²

Figures from the Labour Force Survey show that the number of agency temps fell sharply during the recession from 2008, reaching a trough of 245,000 in 2009. However, agency work grew quickly as output showed recovery, albeit haltingly, through 2010 and 2011 (Forde and Slater 2014). In autumn 2011, there were 285,000 agency temps in work in the UK. By winter 2012 this rose as high as 321,165 or 1.27 per cent of the employed workforce. This is ‘the highest that agency employment as a proportion of the employed workforce has been since LFS figures begun to be collated in 1981’ (Forde and Slater 2014).

According to the REC, TAW has increased flexibility in the British labour market and played a significant role in keeping unemployment well below levels experienced in previous recessions. Employers increasingly turn to TAW and other flexible forms of recruitment to cover core rather than ad hoc functions of their business. In the words of an REC representative,

*Employers in the UK have learnt lessons from the recession: the need to be able to respond to fluctuations in demand is now recognised as essential to business competitiveness, and many businesses are now bringing in individuals as temps initially, taking them on permanently after a year or more only after it is clear that demand in the market is sustained and they can afford that permanent increase in headcount (REC 2013).*

3.2. The Research

The Jobs To Rent study investigated 2 labour market niches in the UK food industry which rely substantially on the use of temporary agency workers: agricultural workers employed in farms and workers employed in foodstuff packing firms on or off farms, food processing factories and retailer sorting and distribution depots. All in all, the author of this report conducted 28 interviews (9 British, 19 non-British) with workers in farms, packhouses, food processing factories and large retailer depots; 32 interviews (9 British, 23 non-British) with hotel maids, chefs, kitchen porters and waiting staff; and 26 interviews (2 British, 24 non-British) with nurses, healthcare assistants/workers in hospitals, care homes and home-care businesses in the period between May 2013 and March 2014. All healthcare worker

² For an explanation of the substantial difference between these estimates see Forde and Slater 2011, 2014.
interviewees worked through agencies and some have also been doing Zero-Hour-Contract work in the sector.

The worker interviews were complemented with qualitative interviews with 2 employment agencies in hospitality, 3 agency recruiters in the food industry and 1 in healthcare. I also interviewed employers and additional website search of employers and agencies mentioned by workers, as well as representatives of employer associations (National Farmers Union, and British Hospitality Association), the Association of Labour Providers (ALP) and the Gangmaster Licensing Authority (GLA). In particular, I interviewed 3 hotel HR managers and briefly enquired 10 more about their housekeeping recruitment strategies. One interview was made with the HR manager of a hospital. The interviews conducted with temporary agency workers and recruiters in the food industry involved 4 large retailer depot case studies in the South of England (Morrison’s, Sainsbury’s, Tesco, Marks & Spencer), 2 food packing and food processing firms case studies in the North-East, and 1 packing firm case study in the Midlands, where both interviews with agency and permanent workers were conducted; 1 case study of a packing firm in the North-East of England where the firm manager and TAWs were interviewed; 1 interview with an HR supervisor of a food processing factory in the South.

List of interview categories in the UK:

Food industry:
- 25 interviews with workers in farms, packhouses, food processing factories and large retailer depots (inclusive of the aforementioned case studies where TAWs, permanent workers, and employers were interviewed)
- 3 agency recruiters

Hospitality:
- 32 interviews with hotel maids, chefs, kitchen porters and waiting staff;
- 3 detailed + 10 short interviews with hotel managers;
- 2 employment agencies

Healthcare:
- 26 interviews with nurses, healthcare assistants/workers in hospitals, care homes and home-care businesses
- 1 agency recruiter
- 1 hospital HR manager

Employer associations, authorities:
- National Farmers Union (NFU), British Hospitality Association (BHA), the Association of Labour Providers (ALP) and the Gangmaster Licensing Authority (GLA).
3.3. TAW in the UK Food Industry

The Jobs To Rent study looks at the labour-intensive horticultural sector which accounted for more than 40 per cent of all agricultural employment in the UK in the last decade (Defra 2014; Geddes and Scott 2010) and the food packing and processing industries which stand out as some of the most migrant-dense of all Labour Force Survey (LFS) occupational categories (Aldin et al 2010).

According to Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (Defra) data, the UK horticulture sector contributes to the UK GDP by £3.1 billion and employs around 37,000 people in England on a permanent basis and a further 56,000 seasonal workers every year (Defra 2014).

The UK horticultural sector mainly addresses to a high domestic consumer demand. It is one of the highest-growth sectors in food and drink retail. In the period between 2001 and 2005 the UK market for fresh produce grew by 21.7% (Bridge and Johnson 2009: 29). It is characteristic that, in a context of falling self-sufficiency, the volume of strawberry production was up by 125% in the decade between 1997 and 2006.

Moreover, there is a strong policy drive to build on the domestic demand for high quality, traceable, British food. In 2010 an action plan was developed by the Defra-launched Fruit and Vegetable Taskforce, which aimed to increase the UK self-sufficiency in vegetables and fruit to 73% and 50% respectively (Report of the Fruit and Vegetables Task Force 2010).

LFS data indicate that agriculture has the lowest proportion of agency workers across the sectors of the UK economy (Forde and Slater 2011: 16). The picture from within the agricultural sector, however, suggests that the proportion of mediated agency employment in British agriculture is significant compared to direct permanent employment. The supply of agricultural workers to British farms is organised, on the one hand, by British employment agencies recruiting within the UK or in cooperation with employment agencies based abroad, and, on the other, by overseas agencies and informal agents. The number of directly employed full-time workers has been declining over the years in this labour market (Geddes and Scott 2010: 195). The total number of people working on agricultural holdings in the UK in 2014 is 476 thousand, of which 170 thousand are regular and casual workers with the latter estimated at 66 thousand by Defra in June 2014.

The seasonal casual workforce consists of both directly and agency employed workers. For many years the availability of local seasonal labour has declined and the seasonal horticultural workforce has come from outside the UK (Scott, McCormick and Zaloznik 2008). Directly employed daily harvest casuals can still be found in certain parts of the UK today. However, farmers that need to serve their contracts with retailers and adapt quickly to crop unpredictability seek for a more guaranteed supply of labour and are more likely to resort to agency and SAWS (Seasonal Agricultural Worker Scheme) migrant workers.

> if I’d got a field full of crop, I’d want to make sure I had enough workers to harvest it. I wouldn’t want a field full of flowers wilting because I didn’t have any people. So I would

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7 Between 1988 and 1993, approximately 55% of the fruit and vegetables consumed in the UK were domestically produced. Production fell to 33% in 2006 (Bridge and Johnson 2009: 30)
be much more comfortable with an agency, or a SAWS worker. Somebody who said – I’m going to get you so many workers tomorrow (NFU int.92).

According to the Scott, McCormick and Zaloznik 2008 survey on 268 farmers, 30% of the extra 28,206 workers taken up for the peak season were recruited through agencies (Geddes and Scott 2010: 201). Whether the directly employed agricultural workers appearing in such surveys or Defra data had reached the end-user farmer through agencies is unknown. My research points out that the seasonal migrant workers who come via the Seasonal Agricultural Worker Scheme (SAWS) have in fact reached the UK farms via temporary employment agencies. Existing data, however, treats SAWS workers as directly employed.

Over the recent years around 21,000 workers in UK horticulture were supplied via the Seasonal Agricultural Worker Scheme (NFU 2012). Prospective SAWS workers apply to work in a British farm for a period of up to 6 months every year via agencies in their countries of origin. These agencies usually operate in collaboration with a few GLA-licenced SAWS operator agencies (the larger ones are HOPS and CONCORDIA). My research has found that SAWS workers are practically seasonal agency workers recruited by employment agencies and agents in their countries of origin usually on behalf of SAWS operators. Unlike the typical temporary agency workers, though, the SAWS workers are paid directly by the farmer. For this reason they are treated as directly employed seasonal workers by data.

Farmers usually seek to employ as many migrant agricultural workers as possible through the Seasonal Agricultural Worker Scheme (SAWS) and then top-up with TAW from within the UK or abroad (int.92). The preference for SAWS workers is particularly high because these workers have a 6-month work permit specifically for agricultural labour and are perceived to be a more secure and better quality labour supply. Unlike the workers employed through British gangmasters who may be sent to work under different employers and are not immediately available, SAWS workers come to work for a single employer and usually live on site. They are therefore in a better position to respond very quickly to peaks and troughs in demand as per the requirements of the customer and the crop. On horticultural units the need to harvest during certain windows of the day can be unpredictable (soft fruit ripens very quickly for example) and workloads can fluctuate in response to retail orders which can vary throughout the course of a day. (NFU 2012). Nevertheless, access to larger pools of labour is the main advantage of British agency recruitment, compared to SAWS recruitment where there is always a cap on the number of people that can come. From 2007 SAWS operated only with Bulgarian and Romanian EU nationals who until recently (December 2013) faced labour market restrictions in the UK economy. Farmers opposed to the lifting of these labour market restrictions in 2014 because they feared that they would lose the most secure segment of their workforce. The fusion of a restrictive migration policy with employers’ interests has been evident in the case of the SAWS A2 workers as it has been evident with Polish workers prior to 2004. It is telling that the Fruit and Vegetables Taskforce also identified the need for a new SAWS as being vital part to the future success of the horticulture sector (NFU 2012). As the NFU senior officer interviewed noted ‘instead of being restricted to agricultural work, if they see a job in the nearby town pouring coffees, earning better, with easier hours, then they are likely to move across to it ’. Indicatively, my research found that A2 nationals working....

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8 The British government closed the SAWS on the 31st of December 2013 despite calls from the Competition Commission and the National Farmers Union to extend this scheme.
through the SAWS have been switching to other sectors well before the end of the restrictions. After having worked twice as SAWS workers in British farms, two of my agricultural worker interviewees did not return to Romania after their second season in the UK but found agency work as bogus ‘self-employed’ healthcare workers in care homes (int.4).

My research indicates that SAWS workers pay the recruiting agencies/agents (at least) in their countries of origin for their placement in British farms. SAWS Polish workers paid around £300 before 2004 and £200 after 2004 (int.3, 109, 108). In 2012 and 2013, Romanian SAWS workers paid £300 to the Romanian agency collaborating with HOPS, one of the 12 SAWS operators licensed by UK authorities in 2013 (int.4, 9).

It’s like £30-40 for the HOPS, which is the English part, and the rest was for him, the Romanian part (int.4).

My research thus corroborates the argument held by several scholars (Anderson and Rogaly 2005; Anderson et al 2006; Geddes and Scott 2010; Wilkinson and Craig 2012) that the exploitation of prospective agency workers increases horizontally, when long labour supply chains are involved. The growth of labour supply pools through expanding labour supply chains is a condition that allows agencies to overlook incidents of labour maltreatment despite any pressure from authorities or firms and agencies higher up in the product and labour supply chain. As the recruiter of a Polish agency explained (int.109), when there are more than one or two workers complaining, the preferred strategy by the agency is to find their replacements and move those who have complained to another farm.

The foreign temporary agency work sector supplying the UK food industry and other sectors (for example, healthcare, hospitality and construction) with labour has expanded over the years. The Polish whistle-blower recruiters interviewed for the Jobs To Rent study noted that there has been a proliferation of and increasing competition among agencies in Poland over the years. The agencies they work for and their competitors have expanded their geographical recruitment base beyond EU Member States because they can charge TCNs double to what they charge EU and their fellow nationals.

One approach to controlling this transnational labour supply chain and tackling the labour exploitation involved is to penalise the UK recruitment agencies at the end of the chain. Another approach prioritised by UK authorities and stakeholders is to help agencies or hiring clients detect illegalities in their supply chain. In particular, the Association of Labour Providers in collaboration with GLA and the NGO Migrant Help has produced a booklet for employers and recruitment agencies under the project better2gether.org which gives them advice and signs to look out for in order to prevent labour maltreatment from occurring in their business’s supply chain. The charge rate guidance is an example of a specific measure which builds up the cost of the supply of labour and indicates that below a certain point labour cannot be supplied without either exploitation of the workers or taxes not being paid (Stronger Together 2013).

It is not only the long labour supply chains but also the long product supply chains that contribute to the ‘intensification of workplace regimes’ in British horticulture (Rogaly 2008). The structural characteristics of the food industry play a key part in this respect. The increasing concentration of retail power in a few international companies is one factor. The
few large retailers, on the one hand, are interested in maintaining ethical standards in their supply chains and, on the other, add pressure on the multitude of producers who cannot voice their interests as efficiently. Tesco alone had 30% of the grocery market share in the UK in 2007 (Competition Commission 2007a: 15). Retailers end up squeezing profit margins for growers. The Competition Commission’s investigation of the fruit supply chain found that growers had been taking a decreasing share of the retail price of apples, pears and strawberries during the last ten years (Report of the Fruit and Vegetables Task Force 2010; Competition Commission 2008).

Also, the very features of the horticultural producers perpetuate this concentration of market power out of their hands. New crop varieties, more sophisticated technology and larger farms may all attest to the industrial scale of much of horticulture farming in the UK (Geddes and Scott 2010: 196) and the rise of its productivity (Defra 2007: 94). At the same time, the UK horticulture industry has a larger number of very small and much weaker Producer Organisations (POs) which are unable to negotiate effectively with retailers. In 2010 only 35% of the UK produce went through POs compared to 90% in the Netherlands (Task Force 2010: 18). The weakness of the British POs is not just down to retailer pressure. It is in-built too. First, the reliance of farmers on non-grower owned marketing intermediaries to access many fresh produce markets restricts the marketing autonomy of POs. Second, the existence of large scale grower-packers, who often source produce from other growers, even from outside the UK, can create a situation where one grower exerts undue influence within a PO (NFU int.92; Task Force 2010).

Apart from long product and labour supply chains, the intensification of labour exploitation also happens vertically. This regards cases whereby employees/recruiters of agencies make their own covert brokerage arrangements with co-national ‘candidates’ while their managers are oblivious to what’s taking place (int.92, 111). As GLA puts it, ‘The big issue is not with agencies but within agencies’ (Stronger Together 2013:7).

State migration policy also produces precarious workers liable to several mechanisms of labour control by employers and employment agencies alike, as Bridget Anderson (2010) succinctly notes. The above case of Romanian and Bulgarian workers in the UK is illustrative of the role of immigration regulations in controlling labour. The labour market restrictions these two groups faced up until 31 December 2013 practically resulted in them paying illegal brokerage fees to British and foreign agencies to get work in UK farms, or to become unauthorised workers in other sectors.

Registering agricultural workers as self-employed has been another migration policy-induced practice through which both agencies and British farmers use to extract more profit from labour. Treating their de facto dependent workers as de jure self-employed has helped them avoid payment of national insurance contributions and make several deductions over the workers’ wages. This practice mentioned by most of my Eastern European worker interviewees across the three sectors studied has also been noted by the GLA and the NFU (int. 111, 92).

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9 It is only the greenhouse farms that consistently show good returns on their capital spending (Defra 2010: 10).
Another common entry and work channel into the British labour market is to be invited by a sponsor. Workers have endured harsh working conditions in order to maintain their sponsorship certificates which are issued for work under a specific employer (Anderson 2010). Also, migrant healthcare assistants have been at the mercy of care homes who extended the probation periods after which workers could register with the Nursing and Midwifery Council and get paid on the nursing pay scale (Anderson and Rogaly 2005: 35). Most of the interviewed migrant healthcare workers had to work under the NMW, and be on call 24/7, for care providers and agencies to pass probations and get their qualifications upgraded.

Inadvertently, the supply of unauthorised temporary agency labour in UK industries has also been facilitated by the EU Posted Workers Directive (96/71/EC). This legislation aims to promote intra-European labour mobility and the freedom to provide services in the European single market. In theory it gives employers the opportunity to post (ie rent out) their personnel working in one member state to another one to perform work on their behalf.

However, in practice the boundaries between cross-border subcontracted work and TAW are blurred. Drawing on cases of labour-only recruitment via fake letterbox companies, Cremers (2013) argues that posting in practice regards direct workforce supply by a recruitment agency rather than a service contract of a genuine business based in one MS providing its services to a contractor or client in another MS. My study shows that Romanian agencies have been illegally posting workers to work in British farms outside the SAWS as well as in healthcare and hospitality businesses, in breach of the British labour market restrictions for A2 nationals between 2007-2013. Indicative of the scale of the abuse of posting and immigration rules is that the SAWS Romanian agency workers I interviewed (int. 4,9), who first came to the UK in 2012, mentioned 36,000 work placements in UK farms advertised by one Romanian agency partnered with HOPS. This was at a time when the official yearly cap of SAWS placements shared between all 12 SAWS operators in Bulgaria and Romania was around 21,000 workers.

The Jobs To Rent study could not establish whether the agency practice of charging workers with illegal brokerage fees, the abuse of the EU posting directive and the self-employment window have crept higher up into the supply chain of the UK food industry. Further evidence is needed in order to verify whether such practices take place in the supply of TAW to packhouses and distribution depots of large UK retailers. However, the study did identify other practices that employment agencies and end-user companies employ in order to decrease their labour costs and bypass existing regulations.

In particular, my interviews with permanent contract workers and TAW working in packing and distribution depots of four large UK retailers (Tesco’s, Morissons and Sainsburys, M&S), and operated by a third international company reveal the ways in which the European Union Agency Worker Regulations are circumvented.

Case studies on client firms and temporary work agencies (Forde and Slater 2011; Forde and Slater 2014) have indicated that hiring clients using large numbers of temps on a long-term basis were keen to encourage agencies to take up workers on Swedish Derogation (SD)
contracts\textsuperscript{10}. These arrangements equally seem to work for agencies (especially large national agencies) who have long term contracts of supply with the client; since the risk of guaranteeing some hours of work, and paying workers between assignments is reduced (Forde and Slater 2014: 27). The Jobs To Rent study corroborates these findings. All four retailer depot case studies indicated that a proportion of agency workers are offered SD contracts by their agency after 12 weeks of continuous assignments to the depot. However, agencies stick to the minimum of 1hr per day guaranteed Pay Between Assignments (PBA) provisioned by the 2011 Department of Business, Innovation and Skills (BIS) regulatory guidance (int.1-3, 10-13, 24). This is just enough to avoid it being regarded a zero-hour contract job that would have to come under the payroll of the hiring client. Such practices may be within the sphere of legality but they lack integrity, because SD agency workers may have a permanent contract which pays them between assignments but their pay and working time rights are still less than agency workers who fall under the AWR. Last but not least, even though SD agency workers may be assigned to work for years in the client firm they do not enjoy the employment rights to sick pay, redundancy pay, maternity, paternity or adoption leave pay, and pension included in the permanent contract of a directly employed worker within the client firm.

Another way circumvent the AWR is to give discontinuous assignments to agency workers so that they never fulfil the regulatory criteria. As an agency worker who lost her job at one depot after 2 months remarks ‘’They offer 3 days a week, sometimes 4. Not more’’ (int.2).

The other strategy applied extensively by the companies operating the retailer depots studied is to discharge the agency workers before they reach their 12\textsuperscript{th} week of continuous assignment. Existing literature mentions ‘’systems for triggering that companies put in place when workers were close to the 12 week period where they would be entitled to equal pay’’(Forde and Slater 2014: 31-2). My research explains what systems companies develop on the shop-floor in order to circumvent the Agency Workers Directive regulations. Workers in retailer depots are given a certain pick and pack task to be fulfilled in a certain time. Any delay decreases their ‘pick percentage/rate’. However, client firm managers in collaboration with agency managers routinely allocate tasks that cannot be met in the given time to agency workers when they reach closer to 12 weeks continuous employment, when they complain, when they get sick and miss assignments (int.2, 12).

‘’Trust me, the agency managers will find for you the most heavy tasks like for two or three weeks so that you cannot do this job. You make yourself the decision to leave the company’’ (int.3).

Although it is difficult to give an exact percentage, it is clear from all the relevant interviews (int. 1-3, 10-13, 24) that this practice of tampering task assignments and twisting performance rates occurred to a significant extent in all four of the retailer depots studied. All interviewees in these cases noted that the majority of the new agency workers are ‘sacked after a few weeks or months’ (int.1).

\textsuperscript{10} The SD is a permanent contract of employment that an agency offers a temporary agency worker and pays him/her between assignments. Employers and agencies using the SD contracts can derogate from the equal pay element of the AWR.
My findings indicate that the degree to which food industry businesses and labour providers conform to AWR depends on a combination of the characteristics of client firms using agency labour and their position in the food supply chain. My case studies on client firms at the intermediary stages of food processing, packing and the penultimate stage of product sorting before distribution to retailer outlets show that the size of the firm is not the decisive factor as regards regulatory compliance. Competing on labour costs and demarcating wage differentials between temporary and permanent staff is not ‘the territory’ of only small and medium size firms (Forde and Slater 2011: 43). As the retailer depot case studies indicate, larger size agencies and client firms do not endorse equal treatment provisions as well. More important seems to be the seasonality and just-in-time character of the client firm and its position in the product supply chain. For example, in my study, packing firms with fewer than 100 workers on their payroll and characterised by a seasonal business cycle are much more dependent on agency workers than the depot operators to which they send their packed products. But they do not need to push agencies to take up SD contracts or devise strategies to dismiss agency workers before they accrue 12 weeks continuous employment (int. 15-18, Employer int. 87). Because their agency workers are rarely employed continuously for more than 12 weeks. On the contrary, product sorting and distributing depots are connected with a multitude of product suppliers and producers, and therefore have a constant flow of goods and work to be done throughout the year.

The locality of the client firm and the labour provider also influences their strategies as regards SD contracts. The local and regional agencies which operate in the North-East of England would take up a significant risk if they introduced a pay between assignments model as it would be hard to find alternative assignments for their agency workers in a region with one of the highest unemployment rates in the UK. On the contrary, locality would be a supportive factor for a similar character agency in the South. Therefore, corroborating qualifications from the Forde and Slater study (2014: 43), my research points not just to the long-term contract with a client but also to the existence of strong economic conditions as two determining factors in the agencies’ room for manoeuvre in negotiations with employers.

Scholars have noted that industrial relations on the company level play a significant role in the treatment of agency workers and the development of ‘temp-to-perm schemes’ (see Forde 2001). In the case of the Sainsbury’s depot, it has been the union which pushed for an agreement between 65-35 use of permanent vs agency workers. This follows another example cited by Forde (2014:32) where a union pushed for a move from temporary to permanent contracts in a car plant, not the agency worker regulations. All in all, the AWR have instigated strategies of agency labour dismissal that seem to dilute the importance of company-level industrial relations.

How does TAW work for the workers?

Interestingly agency workers are willing to pay to get work in British farms. ‘Big money, here in England maybe £100 is nothing much. But back home it’s a big amount. It’s a whole salary’ (int.4).

Workers also tolerate harsh and exploitative working and living conditions on farms. In this case there is a financial trade-off because they work almost every day. Migrants, especially at
the bottom of the food supply chain (farm work), endure agency work conditions since they can make good savings and go back home (see also Geddes and Scott 2010: 205).

The situation differs when migrants leave farms and move to cities to work in depots or other businesses and prolong their stay in the UK. In light of the agency practices identified above, these workers are likely to reach up to 2.5 or 12 weeks continuous work through agencies and then lose it, have fewer rights and benefits through SD agency contracts or endure the uncertainty of irregular agency and bank/zero-hour-contract employment in other sectors (see sections 3.4 and 3.5 below).

The picture in packhouses and depots shows that labour performance is, in practice, not correlated with reward, be that in a bonus, or in the promise of more stable working hours or a more long term prospect of work. The likelihood of losing one’s agency placement rather depends on the overall balance that the company wishes to achieve between permanent and agency staff. Getting sick is also no option for agency workers. Three of my respondents lost their agency placement because they got sick from the very harsh working conditions they endured (int. 2, 12, 24).

Agency-only workers across the sectors studied face uncertain, rather than flexible, working hours and generally cannot live off the work offered on a random basis by agencies. Several interviewed Eastern Europeans living on the 2-3 weekly assignments given by the agency during their first months in the UK had to stay in overcrowded accommodation and could hardly afford their share on the rent. Some of them had to take working tax credits during the first 6 months of their agency placement at a large retailer depot in order to avoid getting deeper into debt to fellow nationals, landlords or the agency. As a couple of young, educated Eastern Europeans explained why they applied for working tax credits ‘’we could not afford to pay rent [for a room in a house shared with others] with only 2 or 3 days a week work from the agency. We had to do something’’ (int.10).

Benefits assist agency workers in surviving and practically provide a stepping stone into coping under temporary agency employment in the short-term. AWR, on the other hand, do not succeed in setting a clear pathway for the transition from temporary to sustainable permanent employment for workers. Firstly, the criteria for switching from TAW into SD permanent agency contracts under which workers are offered a minimum pay between assignments are blurred and are not necessarily down to worker performance. Secondly, those on SD agency contracts waive any rights to comparable employment rights with permanent workers and would have to live on an unsustainable 7hrs paid work every week in the eventuality that assignments are disrupted.

All in all, my research findings indicate practices of temporary agency work in the food industry by agencies and end-user employers that intensify employment insecurity for agency workers. With the exception of the financial trade-offs for migrant workers who work for some months in UK farms and return to their countries of origin, overall, the experiences of TAW of the food industry workers’ who decide to stay in the UK point to employment insecurity.
The horticulture industry requires large inputs of seasonal labour who are eventually sourced through long migrant labour supply chains by British and foreign agencies. Farmers who need to fulfil their contracts with retailers and adapt quickly to crop unpredictability seek for a more guaranteed supply of labour than local casuals and therefore resort to agency and SAWS migrant workers. Foreign agencies charging prospective workers for a placement in UK farms is a common practice in these supply chains. Unlawful charges for accommodation, transport, and bogus national insurance deductions from de jure self-employed workers are other practices applied by both farmers and gangmasters. Migration policy restrictions in labour mobility have also played an instrumental role in retaining labour under these exploitative conditions.

The strong domestic demand for British horticultural produce has led stakeholders to take bold steps in regulating the labour supply chains in this sector. The operation of the Gangmaster Licensing Authority, in particular, has had a positive impact in mitigating labour exploitation at the British end of the labour supply chain. However, the growth of the labour recruitment industry and the lengthening of the labour supply chains limit GLA’s impact in tackling labour exploitation. The agencies’ and producers’ practices of accruing profit from workers are also related to certain structural features of the horticulture industry. The political economy of the UK horticulture is characterised by product supply chains dominated by large retailers and non-grower marketing intermediaries squeezing profit margins for growers and, consequently, labour providers. While the uneven features of the growers and their weak collective organisation (see weak Producer Organisations) further prevent them from being able to effectively promote their group interests in the product supply chain.

Higher up in the product supply chains of the food industry, where employers (packing firms and distribution depots) tend to rely on a core segment of workers under permanent full-time contracts and on regular flows of agency labour for long assignments, industrial relations have had a regulatory impact on temporary work. Scholars have noted the development of transition schemes from temporary to permanent forms of employment negotiated at the company level. My research has noted that the advent of Agency Worker Regulations blurred rather than consolidated the criteria of such schemes. Strategies of agency labour dismissal have been developed by employers and agencies instead. As a result, for many agency packers who are dismissed before they accrue the AWR-right to equal pay and fall out of any mid-way arrangements (namely, the SD contracts), the main ‘option’ out of unemployment is to be on the move from one temporary assignment to another.

3.4. Temporary Agency Work in the UK Hospitality Sector

The Jobs To Rent study enquired the use and practices of temporary agency work in the following labour market niches of the UK hospitality industry: hotel maids and housekeeping staff, kitchen porters, waiting staff and chefs employed in hotels, restaurants, cafes and pubs.

As regards kitchen porters, waiting staff and chefs, my findings show that hospitality sector employers resort to TAW mainly as top-ups for big events, cover for staff on holiday or sick leave. Agencies also provide workers for the interim periods until the hiring client finds replacement for workers that leave the job (int.88-90, 93, 105-106). This corroborates the
picture formed by LFS data, according to which the hospitality sector seems to rely less on TAW (see Forde and Slater 2011) even though it is characterised by a high labour turnover and a large temporary workforce (Lucas and Mansfield 2010).

Employers manage not to rely heavily on agencies in order to cover their volatile demand for labour in two ways. First, they rely on zero hours contract workers instead. This is more common in hotels. In the words of a hotel HR manager:

*Roughly 30% of our staff is on ZHC. It’s for depts with a lot of flexibility with hours that vary each week.* (int.90).

Secondly, in the case of high street restaurants, cafes and pubs, there is a widespread trend of reliance on informal direct employment. For low skill casual labour (kitchen porters) the informal pay rate is usually half the National Minimum Wage (NMW). In the case of chefs, employers agree with them on a yearly salary and may employ them without a contract. Due to the long hours that they work (70-80 hours per week is the average), chefs in this case may end up being paid even less than the informally employed kitchen porters paid by the hour. Characteristic is the case of a sous chef (second in command) who ended up working for £2.90 per hour (int.34).

When agencies do supply restaurants, cafes and hotels with workers, they tend to maintain a gatekeeping role. Before they send an agency worker to a hospitality industry assignment, the agencies check whether he/she has a minimum of 6-months work experience in the UK, a sufficient command of the English language and eligibility to work in the UK. Hospitality employers generally want to see value for the money they pay to agencies for labour as the option of direct informal employment of cold-callers is widespread in their very just-in-time trade.

Characteristic of the agencies’ strict gatekeeping is that up until the lift of labour market restrictions on 1 January 2014 Romanians and Bulgarians were routinely rejected by high-street agencies (int.39-43). Nevertheless, these migrants would get through to agency work in the hospitality industry if they held a self-employment permit.

In violation of the AWR, workers are sent to a temporary assignment for more than 12 weeks without a rise in their pay consistent with other employees in the same position. As a British agency chef working every day for more than 4 months in a central city canteen-café notes.

*‘I am on a lower pay grade than the guy I have replaced but nobody said anything to me about this. He gets eight I get seven [pounds per hour]. I might look into that, thanks for telling me’* (int.53).

However, long placements are not as common as in the other sectors. Agencies are more likely to send chefs for long placements in tourist resorts or remote locations and for the duration of the tourist season. AWR is likely not to apply in these cases since the agency chef is usually the only chef employed there (int.36, 37).

A typical agency practice which increases their profit and reduces the workers’ financial independence is the bogus deduction of national insurance contributions. Agencies also routinely deduct emergency tax from the workers’ wages even if the latter had a national insurance number in the first place. These deductions are usually withheld by the agencies
until the workers notice and complain about it. These illegal bogus deductions weigh a lot on agency workers’ low incomes.

They did it cut a lot from me. 200 out of the 800 and I told them what is this? This is too much. And they told me the more you work the more tax you pay. This happened in the hotel in [both of the hotels she recently worked] (int.40).

Holiday pay is usually not included in agency workers’ wages unless they ask for it (int. 40, 57, 37). Another dubious agency practice is the offer of workplace insurance schemes to agency workers for an extra charge (int.53).

Then again, cases of extreme labour exploitation by UK based agencies, such as asking the prospective workers for money in order to send them to work, are not common. Nevertheless, our research has identified one such case whereby the agency takes money from workers in order to send them to work as kitchen porters and waiting staff in several clients. The agency worker who reported this practice in 2013 was a Romanian with limited employment rights in the UK at the time (int.41).

The effect of the global economic crisis and unemployment on agency strategies in the hospitality sector does not seem to be particularly significant. On the one hand, my interviews with hospitality sector agencies and employers indicated that there has been a reduction in the permanent assignments turnover of the agencies, as it is easier for clients to recruit directly in periods of unemployment (int.90).

On the other, contracts with clients for temporary placements have not been affected as much. The impact of the crisis is felt more by the agency workers:

before there were more chefs in catering for this amount of people, but it went down. So we need less chef so that is not too much work. There will be work but not like 15 days in a place. (int.37).

Challenging the agency, the contractor or the employer is not an option when people depend on this work. Traditionally migrants are portrayed as the ones who are more vulnerable. After all, their families’ survival back home often depends on remittances sent. However, my research in hospitality indicates that agency workers are pressured by agencies and contractors regardless of ethnicity.

All of the interviewed British and non-British agency-only chefs noted that they cannot afford to deny or negotiate the terms of agency placement offers because these come irregularly. The younger they are and the less alternatives they have for earning an income, the more likely they are to discipline themselves in agency work arrangements. It is no coincidence that agency chefs under 30 years old tend to be more submissive than their older colleagues in the trade. In the words of a White British agency chef in his mid twenties,

‘you can say to the agency these people are crap don’t send me there any more. But I’ve never said that but I don’t know how the agency would respond. They will probably send someone else and maybe not pick you for the next jobs to come up if you’re being fussy. I always need work so I am not likely to do that. (int.34 British agency chef in his mid twenties).
People also tolerate bad working conditions and abuse due to structural sectoral reasons. Chefs, kitchen porters and waiters/waitresses are, for example, disciplined by the prospect of ‘dead’ touristic periods when work assignments are scarce.

*in a busy period I would be working like for a full week, but in the quiet period have gone before with like two weeks with no work.* (int.33).

Existing research also suggests that moving from work in remote places to cities is associated with better earnings, job security and upward socio-economic mobility. However, my research on agency workers suggests that settling in a city does not correlate with socioeconomic mobility.

Interestingly agency chefs, kitchen porters and waiters who cannot travel far from the city to work, find it hard to get enough assignments to live off. They spend a lot of time and energy waiting for a call from the agency.

Agency hospitality workers, on the other hand, may build a good reputation and relationship with hiring clients who would want them back. This is more likely to occur with agency workers in more skilled roles like chefs, or in long or permanent agency assignments. My research indicates that moving on from temporary agency work to permanent employment contracts is quite common in this sector which is characterised by a high labour turnover rate. Agencies agree on different charging rates with businesses that wish to take an agency worker on a permanent contract.

However, moving to a permanent contract in hospitality is not the obvious choice for agency workers. Chefs, kitchen porters and waitresses/waiters are also disciplined by the informal employment conditions, the low pay and the long working hours that usually await them if they switch to a permanent post. They either face long periods of unemployment and insecurity by doing agency work or are paid below NMW for the hours they work getting on a contracted or undeclared direct employment.

*I think it is mainly because in the hospitality industry people have to work more hours than in any other business and places cannot afford to pay people properly for the work they do. That’s why a lot of time you get dodgy contracts or cash in hand.* (int.54).

Furthermore, kitchen porters and waiters/waitresses are often not interested in taking up a permanent full-time job in a hotel or a restaurant because they may have other commitments (for example, students) or entirely different career plans. Agency jobs work for them as a temporary solution at the stage they are in their lives.

### 3.4.1. Recruiting hotel maids: a hidden agency labour

As regards hotel cleaners, all of the hotel HR managers contacted and interviewed (23) for the purposes of this research explained that they either outsource their cleaning function to subcontractor cleaning companies or directly employ their hotel maids and housekeeping staff. Using an agency for the supply of housekeeping staff is not preferable, first, because of the higher cost per worker. Agencies cannot supply as large a number of workers to single
clients in this industry as they do in the food industry, and therefore better offers based on economies of scale are not possible. Second, the high labour turnover within agencies is counterproductive as a lot of time is lost in induction (int. 90, 93).

Although all of the hotel maids and cleaners interviewed identified themselves as temps working in hotels through agencies, an online cross-checking of the details of these ‘agencies’ revealed that they were actually cleaning contractor firms. These firms send workers to hotels either on zero-hour contracts with no guarantee of work, as self-employed or without any contract just like agencies (int. 26-28, 39, 40, 42, 43, 44). In all those cases, the workers stay in one assignment for more than 3 months, but the employment relationship under which they are working goes under the radar of AWR. This is because they formally are workers of the contractor companies.

One common practice held by subcontractors (and, mostly in the past, by agencies; see int. 26, 27) supplying hotels with cleaners is to pay them for the rooms they clean, not the hours they actually work (see also Knox 2010 and Puech 2007). This has been reported by all of the hotel maid interviewees who have worked in different hotels in England and Wales.

Moreover, contractors have devised another strategy in order to circumvent legal obligations and decrease the overall labour costs even further. When the workers are formally ZHC workers of the contractor, they are set to work as part-time workers and get maximum 4 hours pay to clean the rooms; although they spend much longer working in order to qualify for this pay.

Breaks are practically inexistente for these hotel maids who are forced to clean as many rooms as they can in order to be paid for the hours they actually spend at work.

No break: If you wanted, you closed the room, you put key in the outside, you make for yourselves coffee. No, they don’t give you break (int. 28).

Under these conditions it is hard to make sure that workers will keep coming to work. My study similarly to existing research in the agricultural and hospitality sector has shown that the workers tendency to bend to employers’ and contractors’ demands, and be more ‘flexible’, is also related to the fact that ‘a high proportion of migrant workers have accommodation provided for them and a high proportion live in’ (Lucas and Mansfield 2010:172).

The above contractor strategies require constant labour rotation. Effectively this is realized thanks to the continuous flow of the main pool of exploitable and self-disciplined workers; migrants. These subcontractor cleaning companies source labour either directly via internet job-search engines and word-of-mouth or in cooperation with employment agencies based in the UK and abroad. These large contractors have been recruiting from abroad batches of Romanian- and Bulgarian- only cleaners and hotel maids during the labour market restrictions. Since these workers did not come under the umbrella of SAWS, the illegal fee they paid to brokering agencies has been £1000, whereas the A2 nationals who came through SAWS paid £300 to agencies The labour market restrictions for A2 migrants in the period 2007-2013 therefore intensified the degree of exploitation for those workers who came in the UK to work outside the Seasonal Agricultural Worker Scheme.
Interestingly, in the case of hotel cleaning the labour exploitation practices do not differ by size of contractor or hiring client and other features of production as they do in the food industry. Charging hotel maids/cleaners with illegal fees, paying them per room and not per hour, withholding holiday pay and coercing them not to take breaks and days-off are practices followed by large commercial cleaning companies providing full nationwide service (int. 26-28, 39-40, 42-44). This is an indicative excerpt featuring in the website of a large contractor who recruited mainly ‘self-employed’ Romanian and Bulgarian workers to work in UK hotels in 2012 and 2013 “We can offer anything from a single site cleaning service (from 2hrs to 1,000 hrs per day) to a robust multi-site national cleaning service”.

To conclude, according to my research, chefs, kitchen porters and waiting staff either face long periods of unemployment and insecurity by doing agency work or are paid below NMW for the hours they work on a contracted or undeclared direct employment. Hotel maids constitute a particular category of invisible agency labour. They are usually sourced from abroad through similar exploitative recruitment channels to agricultural workers, but unlike the latter they are severely underpaid.

My research findings on agency chefs, kitchen porters and waiting staff indicate that it is not so much the features of the labour recruitment chains that discipline agency workers in the hospitality sector. The political economy of the hospitality sector has a stronger impact on agency workers’ experiences instead. First, the informal employment conditions, the low pay and the long working hours that usually await agency chefs, porters and waitresses if they switch to a permanent post exercise a self-disciplining effect on them. Second, agency assignments are more infrequent compared to other sectors because hospitality employers rely more on informal direct employment and zero hour contracts (ZHC) rather than TAW. Third, the intensively seasonal character of the demand for agency labour compels workers to take up any assignment offer and work consecutive shifts in order to make up for the long stretches out of work during the quiet touristic periods. Workers (mainly chefs) with less attachments to a place and no family obligations who are prepared to move out to assignments in remote and distant locations during the non-busy periods are the only ones who face less financial insecurity.

My study found that the case of the hotel maids is rather different. The main reason behind this is that the demand for ad hoc catering staff is much smaller compared to that of hotel cleaners and therefore can be easily covered by local labour pools (mainly settled migrants, students and other locals). The labour supply chains for hotel cleaners, on the other hand, have similar characteristics with the ones channelling migrant workers in British horticulture. Hotel cleaners are often recruited from abroad in big numbers by foreign agencies and put to work in UK hotels mainly by UK commercial cleaning contractors. Agencies have been largely driven out of hotel housekeeping due to the high costs in induction caused by the high labour turnover characterising their workforce. The contractors’ labour recruitment strategies are also strongly influenced by the contingent migration and labour regulatory regimes. Sourcing EU migrant workers who have the right to stay but a limited or no right to work in the UK is a low-risk and high-profit strategy. First, the risk of being caught and fined for labour law infringement is small in a country with stark discrepancies in investment in immigration law and labour law enforcement (see Anderson 2010). Up to date the GLA has
no jurisdiction in this sector. Second, hotel maids/cleaners are set to work on self-employment permits, zero-hour-contracts or informally. The profits accrued from recruiting workers with limited rights under these arrangements are substantial. Workers with limited employment rights are also less prone to switch employer or sector. Last but not least, the A2 migrant workers who were brought to work outside the Seasonal Agricultural Worker Scheme had to pay 3-4 times higher brokerage fees to the agencies for a temporary work placement. The level of these workers’ debt bondage to moneylenders and agencies at home and/or contractors or agencies in the UK rendered them more vulnerable and expanded the room for their exploitation.

Ameliorating the employment conditions of hospitality temporary workers is not so much related to switching to permanent employment. As indicated above, permanent employment in this sector is not so desirable. When it happens, the main criterion for taking on agency workers as permanent staff is set at the company level and is generally down to worker performance. Equating the pay of temporary with permanent workers makes no sense either since the hourly pay of temporary agency workers is higher than that of the permanent workers. Anyway AWR tend not to apply in this sector since agency chefs, porters and waiting staff are needed for short assignments while hotel maids go under the radar of AWR as employees of cleaning contractors. The creation of support funds for temporary workers and/or the top-up of their hourly pay as the French do, would be more effective measures as they would support these workers through the long off-peak periods when they are struggling to get some hours of work. Finally, the extension of the GLA’s remit to this sector would strengthen the much needed labour law enforcement, particularly in the case of the hotel cleaners and the extent of undeclared work overall in the hospitality sector.

3.5. Temporary Agency Work in UK healthcare

Research indicates that nursing is one of the occupations where agency workers earn more per hour than permanent workers (Gray 2002; Tailby 2005; Forde and Slater 2011). In particular, Tailby’s study on NHS nurses who switched to agency and bank work shows that opting for the better hourly paid TAW is a response to the intensification of work for permanent staff in British hospitals. As my case study shows below, this does not translate in workload decrease for agency healthcare workers.

Unlike Tailby’s, my sample consists of nurses and healthcare workers under agency-only employment who try to obtain a permanent contract in an NHS hospital. These agency-only healthcare workers combine in some cases agency with ‘bank’ (Zero Hour Contract) employment in hospitals, care homes and the home care sector. Permanent full time contracts with a hospital were desirable by my sample of agency-only healthcare workers despite the long work hours and increased workloads that lead the NHS employees to the opposite direction (see Tailby 2005, Kirkpatrick and Hoque 2006). However, such permanent contracts have been very difficult to obtain over the recent years due to government cuts (int. 60-67, 71, 72-78, 80, 91). The criterion for taking on agency workers as permanent staff is mainly the overall balance of the budget that is available for labour cost. Agency Worker Regulations tend not to apply in this sector since agency workers are needed for short
assignments. Several of the interviewed healthcare assistants and workers have managed to switch from temporary agency to direct contract employment with private care providers. These contracts that agency healthcare workers move on to mainly with care homes and home care businesses are not necessarily full-time permanent employee contracts but ZHC and self-employment arrangements. Direct informal employment, on the other hand, is not as common in healthcare as it is in hospitality. To an extent this is due to the operation of the Care Quality Commission conducting auditing controls to healthcare providers.

One of the biggest challenges in managing the British healthcare workplaces since the 1980s is seeking to accommodate statutory worker protection regulations (see in particular Section 3 of the Health and Safety at Work Act 1974) and the contingent government performance targets (see for example DoH 2000) with the Value-for-Money (VfM) agenda of healthcare policy restructuring (EC 2013). The VfM policy framework under which the performance of private providers is assessed has been guiding healthcare provision management for quite some time now (Smith 2009). In this policy environment the outsourcing of the Human Resources function to external or in-house (‘bank’) employment agencies is a key strategy through which healthcare managers try to develop a cost-efficient pattern of labour input whilst maintaining the required staffing levels. In fact, Human Resource Management policies have been prescribing working time flexibility as a means of improving staff recruitment and retention since the early 2000s (Tailby 2005: 372, 386). Today the British healthcare sector is one of the biggest users of TAW in the UK according to LFS data (Forde & Slater 2011; see also CIPD 2013 and BIS 2013). The experiences of temporary agency work discussed in my case study reflect the impact of the VfM-led healthcare provision management as it interacts with state restrictions on labour mobility and the recruitment industry channels and practices.

The VfM policy trajectory has affected the way caring is directed and organised. Healthcare providers (meaning public and private hospitals, private care homes and home care businesses) are increasingly pressurised by government cuts and Public Private Partnerships (PPP) which move funds away from clinical care to paying for capital (see Pollock and Price 2013a). In the case of hospitals, the budget that is available for clinical care is restrained on the one hand by contingent government cuts and, on the other, by the private financing of healthcare provision – a certain percentage of hospital budgets is directed to paying off private capital. In the case of private care providers (namely care homes and home care businesses), government cuts to local authorities lower the budget ceilings and thus squeeze the profit margins in the contracts that care providers bid for. In this context, achieving balanced budgets that do not threaten payments towards the invested private capital or limit profit margins is further challenged by the need for providers to abide by specific government performance targets and health and safety workplace regulations. Strategies to make a more efficient use of labour resources constitute one of the main paths in this direction. However, they often transform into labour cost-cutting and overstretching practices. Existing research on social care indicates that the VfM pressure on care providers to offer local authorities cheaper services leads them to client overbooking (Moriarty 2010: 136). All of my interviews with healthcare workers pointed to understaffing as a very common strategy particularly amongst care homes and home care providers. Eventually this practice impacts on the way caring is done. Less staff translates in less time dedicated to the care of every patient. Most
interviewees in my case study noted several instances where they single-handedly provided patient care in breach of health and safety regulations (int. 60-62, 64-65, 69-73, 75-85).

As with the sectors discussed above, the state migration policy (Anderson 2010) and the dynamic temporary agency work industry play a crucial role in ensuring a constant flow of labour willing to take up these emotionally and physically labour intensive jobs and stay in them.

By subjecting the migrants’ entry, residence and terms of employment to restrictions, migration policy has constructed categories of workers with subordinate or no employment rights, ready to fill in ‘unwanted’ jobs. The case of Romanian workers in the UK is indicative of the role of migration policy regulations in controlling labour within the labour market of healthcare. The UK labour market restrictions that Romanians and Bulgarians faced up until 31 December 2013 practically denied them the right to work outside the Seasonal Agricultural Workers Scheme and resulted in them working informally or as bogus self-employed workers in care homes and home care agencies (int.60, 64-65,77, 80, 82, 83, 85).

British recruitment agencies, in collaboration with overseas ones, have been bringing groups of workers intended to supply healthcare providers with low- (and high-) skill labour force for decades (see Glucksmann 2008; Moriarty 2010). The Jobs To Rent study indicates that paying ‘booking fees’ to the agency prior to arrival is usually the first step in a series of labour control practices. The payment is made to the overseas agency and part of this fee ends up at the British agency.

There are many ways in which British care employment agencies increase their brokerage profits and undermine the workers’ ability to save to cushion themselves while they are working, when they seek another job, or when they are not offered enough or appropriate placements by the agency.

Healthcare agencies, and care service providers in particular, reduce their labour costs and exert total control over migrant healthcare workers by offering them accommodation either for a short start period or indefinitely. In those cases accommodation fees (£250-300 for a bed in a shared room) are deducted directly from the workers’ salaries, and workers are made available to work on a 24/7 schedule for the employer or agency.

When it comes to payment, it is very common for healthcare agencies to deduct national insurance contributions from the salary of migrant workers even when they are informally employed and lack a national insurance number. This practice is also followed by private care providers taking up these agency workers on direct self-employment arrangements or zero hour contracts (int.64-65, 80, 82, 83). Furthermore, agencies and care providers tend to deduct emergency tax from the (British or foreign) agency and ZHC workers until they find out and complain (all healthcare worker interviews).

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11 See Tailby 2005 on the exodus of NHS permanent staff from their stressful jobs; and Ruhs and Anderson 2010 on the limited appeal of care work among the British.
Travel-to-work costs can be substantial for home care agency workers who spent 3-6 hours on the road every day driving from one placement to another. Agencies either cover a small fraction of these costs or not at all, and pay these workers only for the time allocated in private homes. As a result these workers end up being paid well below the NMW since they are ‘at work’ during the whole day and are paid for only a fraction of it.

Agency healthcare workers both seek and are pushed to work for long hours or even consecutive shifts by the agencies. The pressure to take up work for agency-only and bank-only employed healthcare workers has led several interviewees to go to work even when they are ill, jeopardising their own health and infringing health and safety regulations (int. 60-62, 64-65, 67, 70-73, 77-80, 82-83, 85).

The combination of understaffing (Moriarty 2010) in a framework of increasing workloads (Tailby 2005) leads in practice to the speeding up of the work process across healthcare workplaces. Moving to agency work may involve better hourly wages compared to equivalent work on a permanent contract but the workload does not decrease. In fact working conditions worsen. Five agency workers I interviewed lost part of their working hours for helping patients in need beyond the time allocated. Their employment agencies penalised them for going the extra mile by reducing the number of their placements.

The division of labour on the ground is also diametrically opposed to the safety regulations these agency workers were initially trained to follow. In the words of a Polish TAW and ZHC worker, “had I done things with the pace I was instructed in training, they wouldn’t keep me for a single day” (int.73).

The working tasks increase and the available time gets shorter when the healthcare provider hires temporarily a worker from an agency, as the TAW costs more to the healthcare business per hour than its contracted workers. Also in cases where the agency healthcare worker is not a regular in the premises that s/he is sent to work (more likely to occur in hospitals and care homes) or where there is a high turnover of patients (this is usually the case in hospitals), the pressure to fulfil certain tasks in certain time without having the opportunity to engage with or know basic info about the patient is even greater. Agency workers are delegated an increasing workload by managers and full-time workers alike.

sometimes it’s the permanent workers who see you as agency, or they send you to someplace where they do not want, or you go and do this and in the meantime they escape for a coffee, things like this which are not fair and which happen every single day (int.70)

On a similar note, Tailby also points out that agency nurses sent to non-familiar workplaces are made to feel like ‘outsiders’ (2005:381).
Changing agency or care employer is not as straightforward for all TAW and ZHC workers. First of all, working for long hours without earning much makes it harder to find the energy to look for other jobs or to negotiate on the placement offered for fear of losing working hours. Having dependants and being a newcomer migrant does not help either.

In the case of Romanian and Bulgarian healthcare workers, switching to other kinds of jobs or just starting to work with a different employer or agency did not ameliorate working conditions. The new employers that would take them on also expected to extract more value
out of their labour in return for the risk they were taking for employing workers illegally. The workers’ entrapment in exploitative working conditions was down to the way the market reacted and adapted to policy restrictions.

Nevertheless, many did take such a step hoping that the working conditions under the new agency and/or employer would not be as unbearable. The low working condition expectations of these workers, who either went through extremely exploitative labour market experiences in the UK or treated their condition as a temporary pathway to good savings, have aggravated the exploitation these people endured in the healthcare labour market.

All in all, agency healthcare workers face harsh working conditions even though their hourly pay is usually better than the workers on permanent contracts. Healthcare workers under agency-only employment also face employment insecurity. Should they switch to direct employment contracts with a private care provider they are likely to be underpaid for the long hours they work. These contracts that agency healthcare workers move on to mainly with care homes and home care businesses are not necessarily full-time permanent employee contracts but ZHC and self-employment arrangements. This was especially the case with Eastern Europeans who faced labour market restrictions until the end of 2013. These migrant healthcare workers went through similar exploitative recruitment channels with agricultural workers and hotel cleaners. Their exploitation was exacerbated, on the one hand, by the fact that by working in the healthcare sector they were breaching labour market restrictions. On the other, they depended on care providers and agencies for getting through probation periods; a requirement for their registration with the Nursing and Midwifery Council and the recognition and upgrading of their qualifications. The restrictive state migration policy and the dynamic temporary agency work industry have been crucial parameters in ensuring a constant flow of disciplined labour willing to take up these jobs.

My study has indicated that the political economy and regulatory frameworks of the healthcare sector also have a substantial impact on the intensification of work for all healthcare workers. The private financing of healthcare provision and government cuts combined with government-set performance targets and statutory workplace regulations exercise pressure on healthcare providers’ ability to balance their budgets and not slip away from a VfM policy framework. Understaffing is the most common response to these pressures. Although all healthcare workers face increasing workloads under these circumstances, the working conditions are worse for agency workers who cost more per hour to the end-user employer and who are generally treated by fellow healthcare workers on permanent contracts as relief from their day-to-day workload.

3.6. Conclusion

TAW is a labour strategy that generally reduces the overall cost of labour for British employers and addresses labour shortages. TAW is not necessarily cheaper compared to permanent employment. The hourly cost of agency employment is often higher than the

12 Permanent full time contracts with a hospital are desirable by my sample of agency-only healthcare workers but very difficult to obtain due to government cuts.
permanent. Gray’s (2002) analysis of LFS data on comparative hourly wage rates for different types of employment contract within occupational groups indicates that in some occupations agency workers earn more than permanent workers. The LFS data analysis by Forde and Slater (2011) a decade later indicate a rise of workers in the public sector opting for agency work (25%), which is, interestingly, above the 24% of agency workers who are unskilled (2011:16). Kirkpatrick and Hoque (2006) relate this rise in agency employment to dissatisfaction with permanent roles. Tailby (2005) corroborates this with her case study on nurses who switched to agency and bank work in a context of increasing workloads in the NHS in the early 2000s.

Against this background, my research findings across the three sectors indicate agency and end-user employer practices that intensify employment insecurity for agency workers. With the exception of the financial trade-offs for migrant workers who work for some months in UK farms and return to their countries of origin, overall, the experiences of TAW of other food industry workers, hospitality and healthcare workers point to employment insecurity. Healthcare workers under agency-only employment face employment insecurity. Should they switch to direct employment contracts with a private care provider they are likely to be underpaid for the long hours they work. Similarly, hospitality workers (chefs, kitchen porters and waiting staff) either face employment insecurity by doing agency work (and even longer periods without work than healthcare workers) or are paid below NMW for the hours they work on a contracted or undeclared direct employment. Food industry workers in food processing plants, packing firms and distribution centres are usually trapped in short-term agency work assignments or long-term agency contracts with less employment rights and wages compared to permanent employees of the end-user firm.

The migration policy regime restricting labour mobility and the dynamic temporary agency work industry facilitating this mobility have been crucial parameters in retaining labour under exploitative working conditions. The horticulture industry requires large inputs of seasonal labour who are eventually sourced through long migrant labour supply chains by British and foreign agencies. Foreign agencies charging prospective workers for a placement in UK farms is a common practice in these supply chains. Unlawful charges for accommodation, transport, and bogus national insurance deductions from de jure self-employed workers are other practices applied by both farmers and gangmasters. The labour supply chains for hotel cleaners and healthcare workers have similar characteristics with the ones channelling migrant workers in British horticulture. They are usually sourced from abroad through similar exploitative recruitment channels to agricultural workers, but unlike the latter they are severely underpaid. Also, they may pay 3 times higher illegal brokerage fees to agencies if they are nationals with restricted labour market access under British migration legislation.

My research findings on agency chefs, kitchen porters and waiting staff indicate that it is not so much the features of the labour recruitment chains that discipline agency workers in the hospitality sector. The political economy of the hospitality sector has a stronger impact on agency workers’ experiences instead. First, the informal employment conditions, the low pay and the long working hours that usually await agency chefs, porters and waitresses if they switch to a permanent post exercise a self-disciplining effect on them. Second, agency assignments are more infrequent compared to other sectors because hospitality employers rely more on informal direct employment and zero hour contracts (ZHC) rather than TAW. Third, the intensively seasonal character of the demand for agency labour compels workers to
take up any assignment offer and work consecutive shifts in order to make up for the long stretches out of work during the quiet touristic periods.

The political economy and regulatory frameworks of the healthcare sector also have a substantial impact on the intensification of work for all healthcare workers. The private financing of healthcare provision and government cuts combined with government-set performance targets and statutory workplace regulations exercise pressure on healthcare providers’ ability to balance their budgets and not slip away from a VfM policy framework. Understaffing is the most common response to these pressures. Although all healthcare workers face increasing workloads under these circumstances, the working conditions are worse for agency workers who cost more per hour to the end-user employer and who are generally treated by fellow healthcare workers on permanent contracts as relief from their day-to-day workload.

Ameliorating the employment conditions of hospitality and healthcare temporary workers is not so much related to switching to permanent employment. Equating the pay of temporary with permanent workers makes no sense since the hourly pay of temporary agency workers in these industries is usually higher than that of the permanent workers. Anyway AWR tend not to apply since agency chefs, porters and waiting staff and healthcare workers are needed for short assignments. Hotel maids, on the other hand, go under the radar of AWR as employees of cleaning contractors. The creation of support funds for temporary workers and/or the top-up of their hourly pay as the French do, would be more effective measures as they would support these workers through the long off-peak periods when they are struggling to get some hours of work. Finally, the extension of the GLA’s remit to these two sectors would strengthen the much needed labour law enforcement, particularly in the case of the hotel cleaners and the extent of undeclared work overall in the hospitality sector and social care.

Labour law enforcement has been stronger in British horticulture. The strong domestic demand for British horticultural produce has led stakeholders to take bold steps in regulating the labour supply chains in this sector. The operation of the Gangmaster Licensing Authority, in particular, has had a positive impact in mitigating labour exploitation at the British end of the labour supply chain. However, the growth of the labour recruitment industry and the lengthening of the labour supply chains limit GLA’s impact in tackling labour exploitation. The agencies’ and producers’ practices of accruing profit from workers are also related to certain structural features of the horticulture industry. The political economy of the UK horticulture is characterised by product supply chains dominated by large retailers and non-grower marketing intermediaries squeezing profit margins for growers and, consequently, labour providers. While the uneven features of the growers and their weak collective organisation (see weak Producer Organisations) further prevent them from being able to effectively promote their group interests in the product supply chain.

Higher up in the product supply chains of the food industry, where employers (packing firms and distribution depots) tend to rely on a core segment of workers under permanent full-time contracts and on regular flows of agency labour for long assignments, industrial relations have had a regulatory impact on temporary work. Scholars have noted the development of transition schemes from temporary to permanent forms of employment negotiated at the company level. My research has noted that the advent of Agency Worker Regulations blurred rather than consolidated the criteria of such schemes. Strategies of agency labour dismissal
have been developed by employers and agencies instead. As a result, for many agency packers who are dismissed before they accrue the AWR-right to equal pay and fall out of any mid-way arrangements (namely, the SD contracts), the main ‘option’ out of unemployment is to be on the move from one temporary assignment to another.
4. Temporary Agency Work in Greece

4.1. Size and relevance

It is not certain whether the data in the below table includes temporary agency workers (without any contractual relationship with the Temporary Employment Agency) or temporary leased employees (in a contractual relationship with Temporary Employment Firms) or both. In any case, the number of temporary agency or leased workers mentioned is not representative of the reality on the ground. Employment agencies, as will be explained further below, use illegally resident migrant workers to a significant degree. They also tend to send workers informally to private homes, hospitality sector employers and hospitals. As a result, the available statistical data constitute a substantial underestimation of the number of TAWs.

Table 2: Dynamics and role of temporary agency work in the European Union

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<td>1.4</td>
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<td>1.7</td>
<td>29.6</td>
<td>8.6</td>
<td>- 21.7</td>
<td>- 0.4</td>
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<tr>
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<td>0.3</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>18.4</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>- 2.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czech Republic</td>
<td>36,000</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>6.8</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>- 1.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>18,000</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>162.5</td>
<td>7.4</td>
<td>- 14.3</td>
<td>- 3.4</td>
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<tr>
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<td>0.9</td>
<td>255.6</td>
<td>10.1</td>
<td>- 37.5</td>
<td>- 2.8</td>
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<td>2.0</td>
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<td>6.4</td>
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<td>10.6</td>
<td>- 37.5</td>
<td>- 1.2</td>
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Source: Voss et al 2013: 23

4.2. The Research Scope and Methodology

According to the interview with the President of the Pan-Hellenic Association of Private Employment Agencies (see http://www.pasigse.gr/) and online searching of agencies’ websites in Athens and Salonica, the main field of activity of temporary employment agencies in Greece has been the supply of carers and domestic workers in private homes for the last 2 and a half decades. Other key sectors in which employment agencies have been supplying labour are the hospitality sector, and healthcare (the case of ‘exclusive nurses’ in hospitals). The research presented in this report has focused on the latter two temporary employment sectors in Greece where there is no academic research conducted so far. In fact,
the Jobs-To-Rent project provides one of the very few pieces of research on temporary agency work in Greece (in addition to a small case study, INE-GSEE (2009)).

Agencies are not formally involved in the labour supply of workers to the agricultural sector. However, existing research (Kasimis 2008a; Triandafyllidou and Maroukis 2012) has offered some indication that gangmasters operate in this sector. Kasimis (2008b) and Kasimis et al (2010) identified cases of forced labour among Bangladeshi strawberry pickers in Elia. Triandafyllidou and Maroukis (2012) identified a trend of illegal labour brokerage among Afghan and Pakistani migrants working in pockets of agricultural activity in the regions of Attica and Viotia.

The Jobs To Rent research sought to clarify the role (if any) of labour brokers and agencies in the forced labour experiences of Bangladeshi agricultural labourers in the booming strawberry cultivation of the Elia region; and identify the extent and forms of labour brokerage in other parts of rural Greece through a case study of Afghan and Pakistani migrants.

The practices and experiences of TAW were explored through existing literature, web-search of reported agencies and employer websites and mainly qualitative interviews based on multiple entry points into the sample and controlled snowballing. I conducted a total of 24 in-depth qualitative interviews with agricultural agency workers (11 in the former municipality of Vouprassia in Elia region, and 13 in Thiva, Arta, Attica and Argos), 3 gangmasters and 1 interview with the president of the Labour Centre of Amaliada in the Elia case study. There were two key informants that acted as gatekeepers to my sample of Bangladeshis in Elia and two key informants that facilitated access to Afghan and Pakistani migrants in other local rural economies in Greece. Employers were not keen to be interviewed in the Elia region. Suspicion to outside researchers and journalists was widespread at the time of the research mainly because the fieldwork was conducted two and a half months after an incident where Bangladeshi strawberry pickers were shot for demanding their wages, with particular negative publicity for the strawberry producers of Elia. I collected data on strawberry producers from the Development Directorate of the Regional Union of Elia and online web search of the activities of the sole Group of Strawberry Producers (Producer Organisations) in the Elia region. I interviewed one farmer in the prefecture of Arta in the region of Western Greece.

The case study of TAW in Greek healthcare involved in-depth qualitative interviews with 19 agency and ‘bank’ healthcare workers (‘exclusive nurses’), 3 employment agency managers one of whom is the President of the Association of Private Employment Agencies in Greece, 3 agency recruiters and 2 nursing department hospital directors. The agency and ‘bank’ healthcare workers described their agency work experiences in 7 hospitals in the Greek capital, Athens. There were four different key informants through which I gained access to this sample.

As it became clear through pilot interviews with representatives from the temporary work agency industry and hoteliers’ associations in several parts of Greece, the main users of temporary agency labour are hotels and catering businesses in tourist resort destinations. The project’s hospitality sector case study comprised of 9 in-depth qualitative interviews with agency workers (mainly hotel maids/cleaners and kitchen porters and one chef), the agency managers and recruiters interviewed for the healthcare case study, 4 in-depth interviews with
hotel HR managers, 1 with a café owner and 15 short telephone interviews with hotel managers enquiring about their use (or not) of temporary employment agency labour and the main reasons why. There were 3 key informants/gate keepers used.

The small sample of TAW in healthcare is due to the fear of agency nurses as many have been threatened and warned by agencies not to talk to authorities and trade unions while some of them are undocumented migrants and are likely to be deported should they reach out to Greek enforcement authorities. In the case of hospitality, it has been particularly hard to trace agency workers since the majority come directly from abroad and spend only a few days in the main urban hubs of agency employment (the cities of Athens and Salonica) and then are sent directly to work in Greek islands and other tourist resorts.

4.3. Putting TAW in the context of the Greek political economy

The UK case studies have shown that the political economy of a sector has a differential weight on the forms of Temporary Agency Work identified. In horticulture there is a face-off between the strong domestic demand and regulation of the agency sector (see GLA) on the one side, and the horizontal and vertical growth of the labour recruitment industry activity and labour supply chains and power imbalance in the product supply chain on the other. The political economy of the hospitality sector has generally a stronger impact on agency catering staff experiences. Whereas more impactful for the hotel cleaners who are recruited in bigger numbers is the dynamic of the labour supply industry which grows in tandem with restrictions on migrants’ employment rights. As in hospitality, the political economy and regulatory frameworks of the UK healthcare sector lead to intensification of work for all healthcare workers with agency workers in the worst position of the hierarchy of employment relationships at the workplace. While the expansion of the labour supply industry activity in the sector accentuates worker experiences of exploitation and insecurity.

In Greece, on the other hand, the relevance of migration in the temporary agency sector and the country’s political economy is dominant. Understanding the Greek political economy and the role of migrant labour - and, more specifically, the undeclared and undocumented type - in it is a necessary step in order to account for the forms of labour brokerage identified on the ground.

The undeclared and preferably illegal immigrant labour was a ‘key factor in maintaining a low cost for the reproduction of the familistic welfare regime’ (Papadopoulos and Roumpakis 2009), which characterised the development of welfare capitalism in Southern Europe as well as other semi-peripheral market economies (Ferrera 1996; Papadopoulos 2006). The Greek State and governments had been making concessions to the medium and small family business and paid workers for decades through toleration of undeclared work and tax evasion, contingent tax exemptions, offerings of public sector jobs (Tsoukalas 1986) and short-term

13 All interview numbers in Chapter 4 refer to Table 2 (interviewees in Greece) in Annex.
internships, land encroachment and clientelistic redistribution of European subsidies – CAP ones in the case of agriculture (Demoussis 2003). Cheap immigrant labour was used as a protection layer against the drying up of the Greek medium and small family businesses’ sources of accruing wealth from mid 1990s onwards. The Greek employment agency sector profited from immigration as other sectors of the Greek economy did. The Greek employment agencies devised analogous strategies of informality and thrived off the state corruption, clientestic networks and inflexible migration policies. In a political economy where businesses already benefited directly from undeclared and undocumented migrant labour, the temporary work agency sector, as will be shown in the below sections, developed its strategies more in order to profit from the phenomenon of immigration rather than to profit from the service it provided to the staffing needs of businesses.

Keeping the cost of migrant labour low has been a key condition for the affordability of this familialistic political economy against which the agency sector grew. This has been largely achieved through the restrictive Greek migration policy regime which in combination with poor labour market controls and weak industrial relations kept many migrants in an insecure state as regards the legality of their employment and their residence throughout the 1990s and at least until the mid-2000s (Maroukis 2010). Phenomena of paying brokers/agents to get work may have been limited to certain areas and certain local labour niches14, however, a culture of paying employers and officials to attain and perpetuate legality has been commonplace for migrantsLegal resident migrants working in construction, hospitality, domestic care and agriculture have been buying ‘under the table’ social insurance stamps (in the first 3 sectors) and employer working day affirmations and certificates (in agriculture) from employers and inspectors from the two main social insurance funds (IKA and OGA) for nearly two decades in order to keep renewing their stay permits (see Maroukis 2009; Maroukis and Gemi 2013)

Despite incidents of corruption, the limited effectiveness of labour inspections is also related to severe understaffing, well before the Greek debt crisis (see Maroukis and Gemi 2013). It has not been uncommon for labour inspection controls to be thwarted by local communities seeking to protect their illicit modes of accruing wealth. Such incidents have been reported by media with increasing frequency during the debt crisis. My fieldwork in the region of Elia below indicates how not only employers but also other members of the local community profit from the undocumented migrants working in the strawberry plantations. In the cases of hospitality and healthcare, Greek employment agencies prey on the available groups of precarious migrant workers and seek to claim their turf of wealth acquisition in this political economy of corruption, and workplace informalization.

14 Maroukis and Gemi (2013, 2011) reveal how Albanian migrants lacking strong kin networks in Greece paid their legally resident co-nationals in Greece to help them get registered in the annual quota that Greek governments set for seasonal agricultural workers. The vast majority of these seasonal permits were granted for agricultural work in the region of Central Macedonia.
4.4. Case study of ‘agency’ work and migration in Greek agriculture

The debt crisis with a significant impact on Greek economy and society registered from 2010-2011 onwards in OECD data (see Kasimis and Papadopoulos 2013: 281) has had a mixed effect on local rural economies. As Kasimis and Papadopoulos note, on the one hand, there has been a relatively significant turn of urban dwellers towards the countryside and agriculture (17,000 new entrants according to their estimate), and on the other, agriculture has suffered the main job losses within rural areas compared to the secondary and tertiary sector (2013: 282-5). Interestingly, Labour Force Survey data indicate that unemployment reached 25.5% in the Region of Western Macedonia in 2012 with the Region of Elia – the main case study region of this research – showing 13% unemployment (INE-GSEE 2014). This resilience of the local rural economy of Elia is related not so much to the turn of urban dwellers to the countryside ‘reinforcing the disengagement from conventional agriculture and reinstating a ’new rurality’ associated with local food production and alternative farming’ (Kasimis and Papadopoulos 2013: 287), but to the unabated export-oriented strawberry producing industry in this region over the last 15 years. Workers in the producer group-owned packhouses are mainly local Greeks, as opposed to strawberry plantation workers who are predominantly undeclared and illegally resident migrant workers who do not appear in official LFS data.

Today the region of Elia, and in particular the former Municipality of Vouprassia, is the first strawberry producer in the country. The land for strawberry cultivation (1.600 acres in 2004) expanded by 60 per cent between 2005-2008 as the producer community became more and more export oriented (Kasimis 2008a: 36). The cultivated land for strawberry in the region of Elia increased from 7.000 to 11.000 acres between 2010 and 2013 and the main export countries are Russia, Moldova, Italy, Czech Republic, Poland, Germany and Hungary. According to the Producers Organisation Yrmini, the main group of strawberry producers in the region with a total of 2.000 acres of land, 80% of its production goes to Eastern European countries, 10% goes to Western Europe (mainly Germany), and the rest 10% is directed to the domestic Greek market.

Production line innovations, efforts to produce rather than import varieties of strawberry seeds and packing material, and producer group plans for expansion into organic strawberry cultivation attest to the dynamism of the strawberry cultivation in the area. However, the strawberry production of Elia retains strong labour-intensive features. The yearly cost of labour amounts to approximately 28% of an overall turnover of 95 million euros. As in

15 Data collected on 2013 from the Development Directorate of the Regional Union of Elia (ΔΑΟΚ ΠΕ. Ηλείας)


18 In a letter sent to the Greek government after the Manolada shootings in April 2013, the strawberry producers of Elia claim that daily worker wages amount to 23-25 euros and every acre of the total of their 12,000 acres of cultivated land in the region requires 90 days of work per year (see
other rural localities in Greece, producers rely exclusively on unskilled and predominantly undeclared and undocumented migrant labour.

Several empirical studies have shown the key role of migrant labour in Greek agriculture across local labour markets (Kasimis and Papadopoulos 2005; Kasimis et al 2010; Papadopoulos 2009, 2011). Undeclared employment in agriculture has been one of the main mechanisms for immigrants’ entry into the Greek labour market since the early 1990s when the first substantial flows of migrants were registered. The continuous flows of cheap and mostly undeclared migrant labour over the last 25 years along with European Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) subsidies have been the main two supply- and demand-side externalities which covered up the structural problems of Greek agriculture like the ‘small and fragmented size of land holdings, the ageing of the farm and rural population, the high cost and low competitiveness of agricultural production, the decline of productivity’ (Kasimis and Papadopoulos 2013: 281). These structural problems have re-emerged during the crisis and contribute to the intensification of phenomena of worker exploitation discussed below in this section.

Albanians, the most numerous immigrant group in Greece, have been the first and largest group of agricultural workers throughout the 1990s (Maroukis and Gemi 2013). However, the settled Albanians’ trajectories of professional and social mobility along with changes in their demographic composition, their family needs and eventually their work-related aspirations gradually gave way to other flows of workers in agriculture. In the region of Elia the dominant worker group from 2000s onwards has been Bangladeshis. Groups of Bulgarian and Romanian workers have also been reported to work in the strawberry fields of Elia after the lift of labour market restrictions for these two EU national groups in 2009. Empirical studies have indicated that these groups may be competing for the same manual jobs in the region (Kasimis 2008a, 2008b, Kasimis et al 2010). In other rural parts of Greece, Triandafyllidou and Maroukis (2012) report groups of recent undocumented migrants, mainly from Asia and Africa, working for farmers but often in isolation from the local societies.

My case study on Bangladeshis in Elia and Afghan and Pakistani migrants in other rural locations in Greece identified the following two types of labour brokerage:

1. informal labour gangmasters/agents who work and live alongside the workers but get a cut from them for getting them on the job and being the liaison with the Greek farmer (Bangladeshis, Elia).

2. informal labour gangmasters/agents who work as foremen recruiting, supervising and managing the ‘agency’ workers and live separately from them (Afghans and Pakistanis in Thiva, Arta and Argos).

Geddes and Scott (2010) looking at the development of labour brokerage in British horticulture have come up with an elaborate typology of ‘gangmaster’ recruitment in the UK food industry ranging from independent familial gang labour to independent bureaucratic gang labour and external labour networks and foreign labour providers (Geddes and Scott 2010: 210). The types of micro-brokerage identified in my case study are instigated from

below and approximate the independent familial gang labour where one worker heads a small gang of other workers on an informal basis. In the case of the Bangladeshis this gangmaster works alongside the workers being supplied while in the other cases identified in other parts of Greece, the informal gangmaster does not work alongside the workers and practically performs the duties of a foreman.

A third type of agency labour arrangement that my study came across regards gangs of Romanian and Bulgarian workers, mostly of Roma background, trafficked from abroad straight into the strawberry farms. They are used as ‘warm bodies’, using Peck and Theodore’s terminology (1998), in periods of harvesting when large numbers of unskilled manual labourers are needed most. In my case study these groups of workers were used to substitute a group of 150 Bangladeshis who went on strike demanding their unpaid wages. Triandafyllidou and Maroukis (2012) study also identified illegal employment agencies based in Athens ran by Albanians, Romanians or Bulgarians charging workers with 150 euros per placement in any kind of job including agriculture. My case study could not verify whether these agencies are involved in bringing gangs of Romanians and Bulgarians directly from abroad as the ones mentioned above. More research is needed in order to identify the features of these labour brokers/agents, their operation span as well as the degree to which their labour brokerage activities constitute slave labour and possible links with other forms of organised crime.

The first type of labour brokerage identified in the Elia region is informal and instigated from below, from within the pool of undocumented migrant agricultural workers. There are two patterns followed. As one of my key informants who has worked in the area for the last 10 years explains

One way is when you come and you look out for people like you. First you find a Greek boss and a foreman. And you say to them I can get you this number of workers and agree on the workers’ wages. Then you look out for other people to join you at work (int.1).

This direct pattern used to be more common in the period before 2005. In the last ten years where the strawberry plantations have expanded and the number of Bangladeshis has increased substantially, prospective gangmasters need to get clearance from their co-national gangmasters in the area before they approach the Greek employer and/or his foremen. Here is how both of my key informants in the area described the way the labour broker positions are created.

you have worked for a greek or Albanian farmer and you decide to leave, go back etc. You sell your position to someone else. The new person pays for the introduction to the Greek farmer. For example 1,000 euros. The Greek or Albanian farmer is assured by previous [Bangladeshi] foreman that the new foreman will convince workers to work and wait for the pay. (int.2)

These gangmasters have no real power. They usually buy their gangmaster positions with borrowed money. Other fellow nationals known through social or kin networks lend them this money as an investment in order to earn an extra income. These gangmasters are not paid extra by the farmer for managing a group of workers. They are paid the same with their other fellow-national workers. The way they (expect to) make their money is this:
He makes secret agreement with every worker in his group that 1-3 daily wages (merokamato) will be kept as commission at the end of the season. That’s how the new foreman expects to make his money. Multiply that by 100 workers you make your money (int.2).

However, this type of labour brokerage is not a reliable source of earning an income. Although the interviewed ‘agency’ worker experiences differed, all Bangladeshi interviewees reported that it is common nowadays not to be paid on time, and to be paid only a fraction of what is owed. Payment for the work done in a season usually comes at the start or the end of the next season.

**They say wait until next week, in two weeks, in a month and it goes on like this until the start of the new season (int. 8)**

Under the promise of payment workers remain on site throughout the year, preparing the cultivations and the tolls/greenhouses for the new season. This is the way that producers retain their workforce.

**They keep stalling the payments of one season until the start of the next season and then they give them 1/3 of what is owed to them. They are permanent hostages. Labour trafficking (int. 84).**

Workers, on the other hand, know that this is the only realistic chance they’ve got in finding employment since unemployment among their community and beyond is much higher in urban locations. In the end they are held hostages by the employers out of despair.

If the workers get paid they paid only a fraction of their agreed daily wages. Farmers and producers claim that the daily wage is 22-23 euros. However, the daily wage rarely goes more than 10-12 euro. ‘that’s where it ends up’ (int. 84).

In this scenario where the farmer does not pay or pays very little with a considerable delay, the gangmasters are often in the same position with the other workers; and maybe a worse one given that they owe people money for putting themselves in the broker’s position in the first place.

As it happens with formal tripartite employment relationships, the employers involved in these informal agency relationships do manage to avert their responsibilities towards their workers. These gangmasters become the recipients of all worker complaints.

Their position is aggravated even further by the fact that the gangmasters usually live in the same shacks with the other workers. Employers often try to avoid payments to workers by accusing gangmasters of withholding money from the workers. This is what the workers were told by Greek farmers and foremen in the wages dispute incident I encountered during fieldwork. What may happen is that the employers would give every now and then some ‘pocket’ money to gangmasters (a couple of hundred Euros) for the workers’ subsistence and living expenses (int. 1, 9, 10). Then they claim that money was given to the gangmasters and it is the latter’s responsibility for spending it. However, in most cases, gangmasters are not given anything for subsistence expenses. Farmers make deals with local retailers in order to cover the workers’ living costs. According to these deals, the local supermarkets do not accept any money from the Bangladeshi workers or gangmasters for the purchase of products. Gangmasters are given a code by the employers with which they can only buy food from the
local supermarkets. The price of the products purchased under this code is 2 to 3 times higher than their actual price. The strawberry producer pays the local retailer for these products from the withheld worker wages. At the end, when the payment of wages is due, the farmer pays a small fraction of the owed wages, and in some cases does not pay at all, after these claimed deductions for the workers’ living expenses. As one gangmaster characteristically explains.

*That’s what he [the farmer] tells me: ‘that’s what there is [money]. It’s not my problem. It’s not my fault that you spend all this money on cigarettes’!* (Bangladeshi gangmaster int. 10).

Another common deduction is for ‘accommodation’. The majority of Bangladeshi workers live on-site in makeshift shacks out of plastic and metal rods used for constructing greenhouses and the wooden pallets on which the bins of harvested strawberries are transported onto lorries and trucks. Producers charge rent from workers for these shacks on their land. 100 Euros per head has been the monthly rent deducted from the workers’ wages at the time of the fieldwork.

In the second type of labour brokerage identified through interviews with Afghan and Pakistani migrants in other parts of Greece, the boundaries between the gangmaster and the gang of workers are clearer, more visible. These gangmasters are not working or living together as the Bangladeshi do in the strawberry fields of Elia. Also the gangmasters are paid by the employer for their mediation and brokering role. In this sense this type of brokerage resembles more a tripartite agency work relationship. Their main task apart from finding the workers is to manage them on-site, supervise them, deal with their ‘accommodation’ and subsistence issues, undertake their cash-in-hand payments and generally take the labour management pressure off the farmer-employer.

Still this employer/broker arrangement remains only verbally agreed and the labour agent in many occasions does not know how much he will eventually earn. This is not because he is treated more or less as one of the other workers by the farmer as is the case with the Bangladeshi in Elia described above. The brokers identified in the case study of Afghans and Pakistanis in Arta, Viotia and Argos have been working with the Greek farmers for years, speak Greek and there is a relationship of interpersonal trust with the farmers.

In the Bangladeshi’s more recent case the trust between the broker and the farmer is thinned down since the broker is either being introduced to the farmer through another broker or does not meet the top producer at all but his Greek foreman. The expansion of the strawberry cultivated land in Elia has been achieved either through the two existing producer cooperatives or through non-farmer big land owners, retailers and other capitalists who rent plots from independent small land-holders for strawberry cultivation (interview with Labour Centre of Amaliada). The small producers cultivate their land according to the requirements set by their big-capital leaseholders and usually work as foremen for them on their own plots of land. Bangladeshi gangmasters come in contact with these ‘foremen’ whose profits depend on managerial and marketing decisions taken by the lead-producers above them. In the case of the Afghans and Pakistanis in Viotia, Arta and Argos, the brokers are in direct contact with the main producers.

Small land-owner farmers across several rural locations in Greece have been experiencing profit margin decreases for decades by mediators who often own large warehouses or fridges
and who link the production to large retailers (Kasimis and Papadopoulos 2013; Maroukis and Gemi 2011; int. 60). As product supply chains grow with marketing intermediaries and small farmers’ assimilation to large capital holders, the wages for gangmasters and workers at the bottom of these chains are squeezed. On top of this structural squeeze on smaller producers’ margins and labour wages, the austerity measures enforced by Greek governments over the recent years in the form of fuel increases and land and property taxation have plummeted production and pushed many producers off the market and repressed wages further (see Kasimis and Papadopoulos 2013). Under these conditions, the assimilation of small plot farmers by large capital land owners and businesses is likely to increase and lengthen further the product supply chains.

Another variable affecting the earnings of gangmasters is their negotiations with the workers. The broker always negotiates the workers’ wages. As in the case of Bangladeshis in Elia, labour agents in the second case study pay workers less than the agreed due to deductions for substandard accommodation in greenhouses or derelict buildings and warehouses, and subsistence expenses over which workers have no control. Workers rely on the gangmasters for food and other living expenses since they live on-site and have neither means of transport nor the time or energy to go and buy food from the local villages or towns. The gangmasters either overcharge the workers for these purchases or as in Elia buy without cash but under certain farmer/retailer arrangements where products are overpriced. In some occasions Afghan workers have been told by their Pakistani or Afghan brokers that the whole of their wages were set off the accommodation and subsistence costs (int.12-22). After 3 months of working and living under harsh conditions these people could not even afford to buy their coach ticket to return to Athens where their families were waiting. In other occasions the broker fails to deduct more money from the workers’ wages at the end. He has power but his power can be challenged by the workers. In one case an Afghan worker managed to get some money from the labour broker who initially was not going to pay him and his fellow workers (int. 19).

4.5. Temporary employment agencies in Greece

Immigration has played a key role for the growth of the employment agency sector in Greece. It is no coincidence that the size and turnover of the employment agency sector in Greece grew with the advent of unprecedentedly large and illegal immigration flows in the early 1990s (interviews with President of Private Employment Agencies in Greece; and 3 agency recruiters). Agencies’ labour pool traditionally consisted of newcomer migrants that had limited social capital in Greece or were undocumented.

The restrictive and malfunctioning migration policy regime (Maroukis 2013) played a functional role in this respect, first, by keeping Greece’s immigrant population in illegality for most of the 1990s. Then through a series of amnesties from 1998 to the last one in 2005 many migrants legalised their residence status. However, the discrepancy between the predominant undeclared work offers made to migrants and the strict legalisation criteria demanding evidence of formal work (mainly work contracts and social security contributions) created more pathways out of rather than into legality for migrants (Maroukis 2010; Triandafyllidou and Maroufof 2011). Improvements in migrant legislation from 2005
onwards for stay permit holder migrants were mitigated with the bursting of the economic crisis which increased unemployment and informal employment (Maroukis and Gemi 2013).

All in all, the restricted legal entry avenues and the insecurity of the obtained legal residence status have had a disciplining effect on agency workers as they did with directly employed migrant workers who have been struggling to obtain or remain in legality for almost 2 decades. In the words of one agency recruiter, ‘agencies used this legal system and they made fortunes’ (int.55). A typical practice of employment agencies throughout the 1990s and up to mid-2000s was to withhold the workers’ passports (int.55, 58, 59). One of the agency healthcare worker interviewees was sexually assaulted and beaten by the agency manager when she did not bring enough money to the agency from her work. However, she could not go to the police to report this incident because she was afraid that she would be deported (int.33).

Greek employment agencies have been bringing workers from abroad (mainly EU and non-EU Eastern European countries) over the last 25 years either in collaboration with foreign agencies or through their own recruiters’ activities and networks. In the former scenario they pay the foreign agencies for their brokerage after deductions on the workers’ earned wages in Greece. Alternatively, migrant agency recruiters publish an ad in newspapers at their countries of origin or use their personal networks back home or amongst the newly arrived immigrants to source workers directly. The three whistleblower agency recruiters (int. 55, 58, 59) interviewed have worked in the Greek temporary agency industry from 2000 to date. They started as agency workers who would be paid an extra bonus for every new worker that they would bring to the agency. When the business kicked-off they were working mainly as recruiters for the Greek agency owners and were paid monthly salaries. Although two of them never had a contract with the agency and one only a part-time contract, they were treated as employees by their respective agencies and had a stable non-negotiable income.

The main arrival points for prospective migrant agency workers from Eastern Europe have been Athens or Salonica. The majority and especially those from non-EU countries would come by coach. Agency recruiters would collect them upon arrival and place them temporarily in flats or even the agency premises under overcrowded conditions. The nature of the work that they were going to do was determined there and then by the agency managers and end-user employers.

Agencies were particularly active in service sectors that relied heavily on cheap, undeclared migrant labour. These were mainly tourism and the care sector; in particular, the domestic labour industry and, to a lesser extent before the crisis, the niche of exclusive nurses in Greek hospitals. Agencies have also been directly or indirectly involved in sourcing workers for the sex industry. The Eastern European women who ended up being trafficked for sex have gone more or less through the same entry paths into the Greek labour market with the agency hotel cleaners, domestic workers, and healthcare workers. In the transcript below an Eastern European agency recruiter describes how agencies struck deals with employers throughout the 2000s until the first signs of the financial crisis were shown in Greece. Reflecting also the scale of the temporary agency sector turnover prior to the crisis, she explained:
Our coaches would come full with girls. For example 40 persons. The office knew how many are coming. And for whom: restaurant, hotel, private home, hospital or something sly... you know... bars, brothels. We [recruiters] didn’t know that. And the employers would come to a room where the girls were locked and pick. I was translating. That’s how we closed 40 jobs per day. The following day, another bus, 40 more jobs to be arranged (int. 55).

Corroborating international literature on TAW, TAW in Greece grows and contracts following the economy. Scholars indicate that it even has a pro-cyclical character (Coe, Johns and Ward 2007; Ward 2003; Forde 2001; Forde and Slater 2011). Agencies are the first to be hit in the early stages of a recession because businesses first start cutting their external costs and then may move part or the whole of their economic activity underground or close down. It is characteristic that during the current recession the employment agencies of Salonica providing labour in Northern Greece tourist resorts have been slashed. According to the president of the hoteliers association of Halkidiki, the main tourist region in Northern Greece, there are only 2-3 agencies left in the market supplying Halkidiki hotels with extraordinary labour (int.65). A similar impact has been noted for agencies in the whole of Greece by the President of Greek Association of Private Employment Agencies as well as individual agency managers interviewed (int. 57, 54, 56). The increase of informal direct employment and the closure of businesses during the economic recession has driven a substantial share of agencies out of the market.

In all types of agency employment identified in my research, agencies have been accruing profit more or less by cutting deep into their workers’ wages.

1. There are employment agencies that charge only the workers for a placement, not the client. When workers cannot pay the whole sum upfront they are asked to pay a minimum deposit and the rest is collected from their wages with interest. In this scenario the employer gives the worker’s wages to the agency until the whole brokerage sum is collected. The worker is not paid or paid very little in the meantime.

2. Employment agencies that charge both. When agencies charge employers they either do it off the books or charge them for the minimal amount so that they are taxed on a low scale. For the same reason the agencies also tend to employ part of their office staff (i.e. recruiters) informally. In many such cases, end-user employers are likely to underpay or not pay the agency workers.

More important condition than the difficult to measure developments on the demand-side (rise of the informal economy, closure of businesses) affecting the agency activity seem to be developments in the supply side. Any changes in the labour supply are bound to have a direct impact in an industry where profits are primarily borne out of labour exploitation. It is characteristic that the slashing of the turnover of agencies during the crisis has coincided with the flight of Greece’s settled immigrant population and the decrease of the migrant flows from Eastern European countries (see Maroukis 2012). Also Greek households in rural and tourist local economies are going back to jobs predominantly done by migrants over the last 20 years. All the interviewed hotelier associations and hotel managers in tourist destinations noted that they found a long lost labour pool among the local Greek population during the crisis. Also the integrated segments of local immigrant communities who had successfully interconnected their employment trajectories and livelihood with the Greek familistic version
of welfare capitalism\textsuperscript{19} saw their coping strategies and wider mobility compromised and to a certain extent reversed (Maroukis 2013). Locally integrated immigrants turn back to undeclared and low-status work but, unlike the agency workers, are paid for this. As a Greek key informant who had been working as hotel receptionist in several hotels in Santorini, one of the most famous tourist island destinations in Greece, explains.

\textit{Those [immigrants] who were there for many years were paid. Cash-in-hand. But they were paid. Those who came from the offices [employment agencies in Athens] were paid nothing.}

All in all, the shrinking of the pool of exploitable migrant labour and its substitution by less exploitable local labour is the decisive parameter which drove many Greek agencies off the market. Their main survival strategy was to dig deeper into the agency workers’ earnings. The illegal fee that the worker pays to the agency was 250-300 Euros in 2013-14 for a guarantee of 1 to 3 months work whereas this deposit lasted for 6 months before the crisis.

Below I analyze more in detail the agency practices and the integration of agency employment in the Greek hospitality and healthcare sectors. The case of healthcare in particular shows how agencies forcibly carved out a demand niche for their services.

\textbf{4.5.1. Temporary agency work in the Greek hospitality sector}

One of the most important market niches of the agency sector is the seasonal labour demand that is hard to cover from local labour pools. Medium-small, family owned hotel enterprises form the biggest segment of the Greek tourist industry (Mourdoukoutas 1988). The bulk of agencies’ hospitality sector clients are these small and medium size family owned hotels and catering businesses in tourist destinations. This is what the interviews with hotel owners/managers, hotelier associations, agency managers and recruiters all indicated. And these are the types of businesses that the study’s sample of agency workers worked for.

Particular effort was made to find agency workers in bigger, corporate hotel establishments in Athens and main tourist destinations. However, large luxury hotels parts of international chains tend not to use TAW. Quick access to pools of labour is equally essential for them. But they generally avoid the unskilled labour that the Greek employment agencies usually offer. These hotels usually need to strike the right balance between access strategies to labour and internal business service standards. The waiting/waitressing and housekeeping staff (hotel maids) need to follow certain procedures that are centrally set across the hotel chain or franchise.

However, it is not only the size and corporate features of the hotels that affect their mix of labour market strategies but also the demand niche that they target. Hotels whose day-to-day demand is greatly affected by their location and not just the season, say in metropolitan urban

\textsuperscript{19} Settled immigrants moved from badly paid jobs to self-employment over the years (for example, see Albanian contractors and farmers in constructions and agriculture, increased their clientele and wages within low status jobs (for example see live-out domestic workers) (Triandafyllidou and Maroukis 2013; Maroukis, Iglika and Gmaj 2011; Maroukis and Gemi 2011; Kasimis 2008), evolved demographically and started looking more like Greek families, pushed their young into further education.
airports, need flexible labour arrangements that can address this demand. Temporary agency employment may offer solutions in this respect. As a hotel HR manager explains their decision to try the collaboration with employment agencies in the past.

_We had a great volume of extraordinary staff because we are talking about an airport hotel here with a fluctuating occupancy. For the next month, November, we are 20% booked but this November may close with 80% occupancy. People come literally at the last moment. So you must have flexibility under these circumstances_ (hotel HR manager, int.61).

But there are limitations. The most important of which is the high labour turnover of temporary employment agencies which increase the labour management costs at the end of the labour user, the hotel. Similarly to hotel managers contacted in the UK, large luxury hotel HR managers in Greece reported that one of the reasons for which they do not resort to agencies for their needs in labour is the increased investment in induction and training to agency labour which is characterized by a high turnover. Also, agency workers tend not to show the same commitment as bank or permanent workers in following the set routines of every hotel.

_They don’t stick to what they were shown five minutes ago during the induction because, in the end, they know they will not be here tomorrow_ (hotel HR manager, int.75).

All the luxury hotels contacted employ their own banks of ad hoc labour in order to find a balance between the fluctuating market demand and the cost of permanent, full-time employed labour. A precondition for such arrangements to work is to have labour regulations that permit flexible fixed-term contract arrangements. Several of the hotel managers interviewed employ their own banks of ad hoc labour under ‘framework contracts’ according to which workers are on-call and can do from 0-4 days’ work per week. This ‘framework contract’ is practically the Greek labour regulations equivalent of the UK Zero Hour Contracts.

However, the efficiency of a labour bank strategy may vary according to the intensity under which the hotel’s demand niche fluctuates. The Athens airport hotel manager interviewed used to work with a mix of permanent and bank labour for the first 4 years of the hotel before he tried TAW for a period of 4 years which started with the 2004 Athens Olympic Games. However, the labour legislation at the time challenged the hotel’s bank labour strategy.

_For every day’s work that these people were doing, we had to issue an individual contract, declare them at IKA (the main Social Insurance Fund for paid workers in Greece)...and since we were particularly fussy with the law because we are at the airport, this was a humongous volume of work, thousands and thousands of registrations for this ad hoc labour_ (hotel HR manager, int. 61).

Flexible forms of contracted labour need to be accompanied by regulation and registration systems that can be processed just-in-time without a heavy administrative cost for the business. As the same HR manager explains the U-turn in the hotel’s own bank labour strategies.

_Now it is much easier in administration. With the new electronic submission to IKA from March (2013) onwards, we have electronic submissions to IKA and we got away from the_
Another strategy of big hotels is to source the additional seasonal labour that they need from vocational schools specialized in tourism. Chefs, kitchen porters and waiting staff are often students from these schools who do their practice in the hotels at a much lower salary compared to those on standard contracts.

*Students are cheaper in the collective agreements. And you avoid paying several extras to the state. Interns get paid 300-400 euros. However, in Greece you have thousands of beds. The schools in Greece are only a few. So there is great demand and small supply. And that’s why we, as employers, have turn to the foreign schools from abroad* (int.62).

In most cases these hotels collaborate directly with these schools without the mediation of agencies. This is especially the case with Greek tourist schools who sent their students directly to the network of hotels that they collaborate. On the contrary, ‘*Agencies are involved for bringing students from schools from abroad*’ (int.62, 65). These words coming from a hotel manager and representative of a regional hoteliers association corroborate the main ‘business strategy’ of the Greek employment agency sector identified by my research: the fact that Greek agencies mainly work with foreign migrant workers rather than native workers. They thus take most advantage of labour exploitation opportunities in a political economy with inflexible policies around labour mobility, clientelistic concessions and poor labour law enforcement.

The way that TAW is mostly used by their principal hospitality end-users, the medium and small hospitality businesses in tourist destinations, on the other hand, reverses the main rationale identified for the use of agency labour among large corporate hotels. The latter may resort to agency employment because in an *economy of scale* it may prove to be a cheaper option compared to taking up full-time permanent contracts or the administrative and managerial costs of ad hoc bank/ZHC contracts. For medium and small hospitality businesses, however, TAW is a labour market strategy which cuts the actual labour cost. Almost all of the interviewed hotel maids, kitchen porters and waiting staff that worked through agencies in Greek island resorts reported that they were not paid or paid a fraction of what was initially agreed.

Similarly to certain occupational groups in British hospitality, working from early in the morning till late at night with hardly any days off is the norm for all seasonal workers in the Greek tourism, whether employed through agencies or directly (Mourdoukoutas 1988). The main differences between agency or directly employed workers is, first, that the directly employed may be working under contract for some hours and illegally for the rest of their working time whereas the agency workers’ labour is routinely undeclared (int.45, 49-51). Second, the agency workers are given the hardest tasks to do, live in the worst conditions and are often not paid. Similar to the UK hospitality and healthcare case studies, agency workers in Greece are at the bottom of the workplace labour hierarchies given heavy workloads by managers and fellow permanent workers alike. However, differently to the UK case where TAWs are paid more per hour than the formal or informal directly employed workers, TAWs in Greek hospitality are at the bottom of the pay scale or not paid at all (int. 44, 46-53).
A common theme across the interviews with agency recruiters and workers in Greece is that agency workers become all-around workers. They may be working as hotel maids and kitchen porters in the hotel and its restaurant and when they finish their duties they are called in to clean the house, the car of the employer.

17 hours a day working. It wasn’t such a big hotel but it was a big family having the hotel, and after I finished the hotel, I was doing ironing and dishwashing for the family. All day. I stayed there not even a month (int. 47).

All interviewees reported difficulties in claiming their pay. Salaries are not paid monthly or weekly and if they are paid at all that would be at the end of the season. The subsistence costs for the agency worker are covered in the meantime by the employers. Agency workers are usually given food in the restaurants and hotels that they work. There have been several cases where kitchen porters and hotel maids were given left-overs from clients. In cases where hotel cleaners were given hardly anything to eat all day, they would eat the breakfast left-overs from clients in their rooms.

The hotel didn’t have a restaurant so I couldn’t eat there. And they didn’t give me any money to buy any food either. There was nothing in the hotel. It was a hotel where young English would come. It was just rooms and a swimming pool (int.50).

Only one Polish agency worker managed to claim the salary for the actual days she worked when she threatened that she would report both the hotel and the agency to the police. She managed to do so and leave though only when the agency sent a substitute to the hotel. This was a case where the agency got paid both by the worker and the hotel for the agency worker.

I said to the agency if they don’t bring me back to Athens, I’ll go to the police in Patmos and I’ll say what happens. When I said that to the agency, the agency spoke with the owner and they did not want to let me go because there was no replacement, and after I told the agency that about the police they sent the next day a replacement and the owner paid me the money... I later found out that they were double charging. I would pay 200 euro and the boss hiring me would also have to pay money and I think it was 350 (int.47).

Due to the harsh working conditions of seasonal jobs and the degrading experiences, agency workers are likely not to last in one hospitality employer for the whole season. This is why these businesses tend to pay the agency; as guarantee that they would have labour throughout the season. Of course this means that when it is difficult to find a replacement, agency workers are trapped in abusive working conditions. All of the agency workers had experiences where they had to leave their employers earlier often without being paid. Some had to flee from their jobs in secret. In the worst position are migrants who have no legal residence status in Greece. Such is the case of an undocumented Ukrainian young woman who had to run away from her employer when he sexually assaulted her. Denouncing him at the police was not an option for her.

I could not go to the police. You know when I came to Greece it was not legal (int.52).

Cases of extreme exploitation that transpire into forced labour definition are identified in the UK in cases where the agency or the employer controls the workers’ living conditions, for example, by providing accommodation. In Greece cases of total exploitation is the norm for hospitality sector agency workers. This is particularly related with the fact that these workers
are sent to work in small and remote destinations where help comes from nowhere. Exception is the case of the agricultural workers who retrieve their determination to claim wages due to their sheer numbers. In the small family businesses in tourist destinations (for example Greek islands), it is more difficult to find support from fellow workers.

As regards mobility, migrant agency workers tend not to return to the same employers. Where they do, it is usually without the mediation of the agency (int. 45, 48, employer int. 65). All in all the labour turnover is very high in these jobs. Partly this is down to the seasonal features of these tourist sector placements. Partly it is due to the short-term profit strategies of small and medium businesses seeking to earn a year’s profit during the summer season. In the words of an HR manager of a chain of luxury hotels in Athens and certain Aegean islands,

*Business-wise long term, it [switching labour regularly] makes no sense. I would like to have the same staff every season. But the turnover is high. And the timetables are crazy. The seasonal worker works day and night for 6 days and 7 and 15 days in a row and then stops. For some this works. But why should the worker work for you? Are you a big hotel? What do you offer? If you are small, say, with 20 rooms, why would the other guy want to work for you? If you are big hotel, a chain it is different….you have to invest in your employees, give incentive. Otherwise you lose both the staff and the client. The small details in service jobs make the big difference (int.62).*

### 4.5.2. Temporary agency work in Greek healthcare

Up until 2014 (and in particular the voting of the Law 4254/2014), the private sector market was not formally recognised as a provider of healthcare services in public healthcare establishments. In fact, private employment agencies were banned from supplying hospitals with exclusive nurses from 2004. In that year, the Greek Ministry of Employment issued a circular to all hospital administrations stipulating that it is against the law to resort to private employment agencies for their needs for exclusive healthcare workers. However, due to insufficient supply of permanent, full-time contracted healthcare staff, self-employed healthcare workers were allowed to offer healthcare services within the premises of Greek public hospitals to meet staffing demand. These were the ‘exclusive nurses’ (apokleistikes nosokomes), the Greek hospital equivalent ‘bank’ pool of ZHC healthcare workers in the UK. The nursing directorate of every hospital had until recently its own list of bank healthcare workers and managed the relevant rota. This reserve healthcare staff was paid by the client, who would be reimbursed 41.21% (36.6% after 2012) of what he paid for a night shift by submitting the transaction invoice to his/her Social Insurance Fund. The ‘bank’ nurses in turn gave 30.51% (29.85% in 1995 to 30.51% in 2011) of what they earned to

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20 I refer to these exclusive healthcare workers that hospitals collaborated with as bank nurses or bank night nurses or bank healthcare workers in the text.

IKA (their Social Insurance Fund, practically since 1995). At the same time, hospital administrations would, despite the above ministerial circular, resort to external private employment agencies for the supply of such exclusive healthcare workers when all bank nurse resources were exhausted. However, prior to the crisis this was a less important market niche for agencies when compared with the seasonal tourist industry and the supply of mostly live-in domestic workers in private homes.

During the crisis, there were two developments that made the reliance on bank night nurses untenable. First, an increasing number of people became uninsured and could therefore not claim their expenses on night nurses back from IKA. As a result, more and more Greek families circumvented the hospital’s list of healthcare workers by bringing in their own domestic workers to attend their hospitalised members. The large informal migrant domestic labour market that Greek families resorted to thus came into direct competition with the hospitals’ internal ‘bank’ labour. But this discussion is beyond the scope of this report. My report focuses instead on the employment agencies which gave the decisive blow to hospital ‘bank’ healthcare workers. Below I discuss the practices under which employment agencies crowd out the hospitals’ in-house ‘bank’ supply of healthcare workers and gradually take over the control of the hospital’s workplace.

In particular, the agencies devised strategies to:
1. either circumvent or directly control the existing rota of the hospital’s registered bank healthcare workers
2. ensure that the agency workers would cooperate and give almost half (or more than half) of their wages back to the agency, and

Bank nurse lists were, first, taken over ‘from above’. These are cases where hospital or nursing department administrations sell out the ZHC workers’ rota to an external agency. In these cases, hospital directorates get an informal commission from the agency.

Nevertheless, corrupt hospital administrations have not sufficed in replacing a hospital’s list of ‘bank’ healthcare workers with unauthorised agency workers. Hospital administrations need to follow certain rules stipulated by the Greek state for their bank night nurses recruitment. The documents that bank nurses are supposed to submit to the hospitals’ nursing directorates for registration to the relevant lists are nursing degrees, professional license issued by IKA and yearly certificate of payment of social insurance contributions. Every year IKA renews the exclusive nurses’ licenses provided that they pass health exams, obtain a health certificate, and have their contributions paid. The agency workers have to provide the hospitals’ nurse directorates with the above legal documentation in order to enter in the hospitals’ bank supply lists. They manage to do so because, in practice, IKA does not control the validity of nursing degrees. In the words of many of the bank and agency nurse interviewees ‘IKA would give the exclusive nurse license to anyone. All they want to see in IKA is social insurance contributions, cash’ (int.31). Stepping on this informal policy of revenue collection of IKA which violates labour law and health and safety legislation, exclusive nurses with licenses based on counterfeit nursing degrees have been infiltrating public and private hospital bank nurse lists for years either on their own initiative or via the

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23 Uninsured Greek workers 2012-11-10 according to controls made by Labour Inspectorate
http://www.imerisia.gr/article.asp?catid=26516&subid=2&pubid=112997843
mediation of agencies (all Greek and Albanian female bank nurses; Ukrainian female agency worker, age 40; agency recruiter int. 55).

Phenomena of corruption from hospital administrations and IKA proliferated at the time of the fieldwork, when the Minister of Health replaced hospital bank nurse lists with a national nurse list and loosened the criteria for registration in this list in August 2013. According to the Ministerial Decision 1944/B/8-8-2013, nurses may register in the national list without the need to provide any nursing degrees.

Well before the Ministry of Health facilitated the agency take-over of hospitals’ internal pools of bank nurses, agencies were already claiming the hospital bank rota ‘from below’. There are several practices under which agencies place its ‘nurses’ in the hospital wards and eventually erode the hospitals’ bank nurse lists. Several of my agency recruiters, agency and bank workers mentioned cases where permanently contracted hospital nurses were operating their own agencies. One of them, who also happens to run one of the biggest employment or nursing employment agencies in Athens, ‘has his agency in the name of his wife, El Greco it is in Omonoia square, and he distributes his business cards to patients in the very hospital that employs him’ (int.58, corroborated by int.31 and 29). In a context of crisis of the familistic welfare model and the slashing of their turnover, agencies aggressively carve their market and appropriate state resources.

There are several ways in which agencies exert their control on the workers and the workplace. The working conditions that arise in this setting have a severe impact on the operation of the hospital wards.

In particular, permanent hospital staff taking a cut from the agencies for keeping an eye on agency and illegal directly employed healthcare workers in hospital wards has been a common practice of labour control and workplace governance. Their duties towards the agency are three. First, to check whether the agency worker secretly strikes deals with other patients in the hospital, and to threaten and exploit directly employed night nurses; so that the agency claims extra fees from any ‘unauthorised’ arrangements that informal workers makes in the wards. Second, he/she finds clients and books new shifts for the agency nurses. Third, the hospital employees colluding with the agency notify the agency people when the worker leaves the hospital. Thus, in one case the agency removed the brokerage fee from the workers’ earnings in vans waiting outside the hospitals at the end of the shifts.

The agencies who supply hospitals with workers take part of the workers’ pay after the placement. The latest informal rate that the patient pays is 50 euro for a 12-hour day shift or an 8-hour night shift, 20 to 30 Euro of which is taken by the agency (int. 55, 58, 59, 25-28).

Agencies also turn agency workers against each other in two ways. First, they ask them to pay more money for more shifts. The current rate is around 300 euro for 10 shifts per month.

Secondly, agencies send their workers in big groups in hospitals to find clients. In such conditions of labour over-supply, strategies of aggressive vending of labour take place in the hospital wards. Agency workers end up fighting with each other over clients, as a bank nurse describes her everyday reality in the hospital wards (int.29).

Being pushed to work consecutive 12-hour shifts, having to give away much more than half of their earnings in order to be given shifts, illegal agency nurses can hardly survive on their
wages and cannot afford accommodation. Some even sleep in the wards and eat the patients’ food in order to survive (int. 25-28).

The legal hospital bank nurses, on the other hand, lose their jobs to the illegal agency nurses. With the rotas taken over from above or below by the agencies, professional bank nurses cannot afford to pay their yearly social insurance contributions to IKA and are effectively driven out of the hospitals (int. 25, 29, 31, 35-37).

4.6. Conclusion

By and large, TAW in Greece, with the exception of certain niches of the hospitality sector, is not necessarily a labour market strategy that is developed as a means of cutting down the labour cost of formal, full-time, permanent employment. Using undeclared labour instead is the most common approach in an economy where the cycle of the informal economic activity has been estimated steadily at more than a quarter of the country’s GDP in the period between 1997 and 2013 (Maroukis, Iglicka and Gmaj 2011; Schneider and Williams 2013). TAW is a strategy that rather decreases the cost of this undeclared employment.

Moreover, TAW develops its own dynamic that is not necessarily in tune with the end-user employer interests. Being part of the Greek shadow economy in terms of both undeclared labour and tax evasion, the Greek employment agencies have been a meso-structure facilitating and profiting from migration, a key externality that contributed to keeping the Greek familistic welfare capitalism afloat over three decades. At times being in competition with the Greek family (as a direct employer) seeking to accrue and enhance resources for its members and activities, agencies devised analogous strategies of informality and thrived off the state corruption, clientestic networks and inflexible policies around labour mobility. In fact, in a political economy where businesses widely benefited from undeclared and undocumented migrant labour, the temporary work agency sector developed its strategies more in order to profit from the phenomenon of immigration rather than to profit from the service it provided to business.

Keeping the cost of migrant labour low has been a key condition for the affordability of the familistic political economy against which the agency sector grew. Greek employment agencies were able to prey on groups of migrant workers due to the absence or malfunctioning of state regulation which reproduced the informalisation of workplaces and kept workers in a state of precariousness. Firstly, by turning a blind eye to undeclared work and tax evasion (see for example, the understaffed labour and health inspectors, and the corrupt revenue collection of IKA from prospective night nurses). And secondly, by developing a migration policy regime which produced a pool of illegally resident unprotected workers. Both have been part of the concessions made for the reproduction of a familistic welfare regime which, in retrospect, masked the structural problems of the Greek economy, and principally its dependence on labour-intensive and exploitative strategies.

The identified cases of informal brokerage in agriculture indicate how the very victims of this ‘political economy of informalisation’ (see Slavnic 2010) devise practices to exploit their own. In this sector labour brokerage is informal and instigated from below by the co-nationals of undocumented migrant agricultural workers. Domestic and foreign retailers alongside intermediaries in the supply chain and rentier farmers lengthen the product supply
chain and squeeze not only worker but also gangmaster earnings. Whereas local retailers profit directly from the delayed payment or non-payment of workers’ wages.

In both hospitality and healthcare, labour brokerage is done by formal or informal employment agencies and relies on a pool of both legal and illegal migrant labour which is mostly undeclared. Employment agencies always charge workers for a placement. End-user employers may or may not be charged.

In hospitality, and in particular in small and medium size family owned hotels and catering businesses, temporary agency employment provides the seasonal labour supply that is hard to cover from the local labour pools. However, the contraction of the Greek economy during the current economic crisis has decreased the activity and turnover of urban-based agencies that traditionally supplied businesses in tourist resorts with seasonal staff. A significant segment of the migrant population has fled while the local communities seem to turn to jobs that they previously avoided. The turnover of the UK hospitality agencies, on the other hand, has been affected more by changes in demand (employers’ increased reliance on informal direct employment and zero-hour-contract labour) rather than changes in the composition of the available labour supply.

The decreased turnover of the Greek agencies in a context of crisis of the familistic welfare model led them to more aggressive tactics of appropriating state resources. The case of agency nurses in Greek public and private hospitals indicates how agencies take a slice from the reinstated state-capital nexus now that the recession and austerity measures decreased the demand for agency services from the other two main sectors in which they are active.24

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24 As already mentioned, the demand for domestic and hospitality agency workers has fallen substantially during the recent years.
The European Commission directives on Temporary Agency Work dating as far back as 1982 culminated in the EU Agency Worker Regulations 2010. These intended to support the liberalization of the outsourcing capacities of enterprises by coupling it with labour market inclusion priorities. In particular, the workers’ entry and mobility in the EU labour markets had to be steered through the regulation of the practices of temporary employment agencies. Yet the legality and quality of TAW working conditions in the sectors that these agencies operate, remain largely ‘grey’ areas. On the one side, there is research with a focus on migrant labour which brings up cases of labour trafficking next to labour exploitation and poor working conditions (Allan et al 2004; Anderson & Rogaly 2005; Ruhs & Anderson 2010; Anderson 2010; Smith & Mackintosh 2007; Puech 2007; Gray 2002; Knox 2010). On the other side, the positive impact of agency working for flexible work-life arrangements and for bringing people into employment is often maintained by governments, employers and recruitment industry representatives (see for example, DoH 2000; Directive 2008/104/EC; REC 2014) and statistical survey data on a national level (Storrie 2006; Pedersen, Hansen & Mahler 2004; Arrowsmith 2006; Eurofound 2009; see an overview in Voss et al 2013). The picture of the working conditions of TAW in the EU as is presented from these studies does not go deeper into the analysis of the several variables that influence the experience of TAW.

Nevertheless, there is research looking specifically at the temporary agency sector which point to a mix of practices towards agency workers (Peck and Theodore 1998; Ward et al 2000; Forde 2001; Forde and Slater 2010; Forde and Slater 2011; Forde and Slater 2014). Case studies in specific niches also indicate people who switch to agency work out of dissatisfaction with their permanent jobs (see for example Tailby 2005; Kirkpatrick and Hoque 2006).

The contribution of the Jobs To Rent study consists in its use of in-depth qualitative research to explore worker experiences of temporary agency employment across 3 sectors and 2 countries. In particular, this project empirically examined the social, economic and political processes and structures framing the development of agency work relationships against actual experiences of TAW. Jobs To Rent addressed the question of TAW in a comparative political economy setting across labour markets with different settings of work and across two EU MS characterized by distinct industrial relations, welfare and migrant integration regimes. It identified the ways in which these interact and produce different forms and experiences of TAW. In doing so it sought to reflect the synergies that are needed between different policy actors on an EU and national level in order to protect the fundamental employment rights of TAWs (see policy briefs in particular).

Greece and UK were primarily chosen because they are at the opposite ends of national legislation on agency work in the EU, with distinct welfare regimes and political economies.
traditionally characterized by limited (UK) to no (Greece) social dialogue and collective bargaining above the micro/company level and weak labour law control and enforcement.

Existing studies in the UK have explored TAW as a whole via analysis of large survey data on workers (LFS) and employment agencies as well as smaller scale qualitative research on employment agency, employer and worker strategies. In Greece there are hardly any studies focusing on TAW, with the exception of a study on ‘agency’ cleaners in urban public transport (INE/GSEE 2009). Apart from the clear imbalance of TAW research on a national level, the comparative cross-country and cross-sectoral picture of TAW experiences on the ground is missing. This project aimed to fill this void by exploring, in particular, the way the labour cost-cutting practices of agencies and employers in UK and Greece fold around existing policies, regulations and institutions and unfold for agency workers.

My research has shown that TAW in Greece is not necessarily a labour market strategy that is developed as a means of cutting down the overall labour costs of formal, full-time, permanent employment. Using undeclared labour instead is the most common approach in an economy where the cycle of the informal economic activity has been estimated steadily at more than a quarter of the country’s GDP in the period between 1997 and 2013. TAW is a strategy that rather decreases the cost of undeclared employment in Greece.

Moreover, TAW develops its own dynamic that is not necessarily in tune with the end-user employer interests. Understanding the centrality of the variable of migration in the Greek political economy is key in explaining the growth and the character of the temporary agency sector. The undeclared and preferably illegal immigrant labour has been a key externality that contributed to keeping the Greek familistic welfare capitalism afloat over three decades. Exploitable and cheap immigrant labour was used as a protection layer against the drying up of the Greek medium and small businesses’ familistic and concessionary sources and patterns of accruing wealth from mid 1990s onwards. The Greek employment agency sector profited from immigration as other sectors of the Greek economy did. Being part of the Greek shadow economy in terms of both undeclared labour and tax evasion, the Greek employment agencies have been a meso-structure facilitating and profiting from migration. At times in competition with the typical medium and small (family) business, agencies devised strategies of informality and thrived off the state corruption, clientestic networks and inflexible policies around labour mobility. In fact, in a political economy where businesses widely benefited from direct employment of undeclared and undocumented migrant labour, the temporary work agency sector developed its strategies more in order to profit from the phenomenon of immigration rather than to profit from the service it provided to business.

The case study of TAW in the Greek NHS indicate the most recent aggressive market-carving tactics employed by agencies after their turnover slashed amidst the contraction of the Greek economy and the dismantling of its familistic welfare regime. The decrease of the agencies’ activity in family care and tourism and, more importantly, the shifts in the composition of their labour pool which is no longer as exploitable as it was (the flight of a significant segment of the migrant population and the turn of local communities to until recently
‘migrant’ dominated jobs) threatened temporary work agencies with extinction. As a response, these agencies sought to take a slice from the reconfiguration of state resources in healthcare with detrimental effects for the quality of care in Greek hospitals.

Looking at the UK case, TAW is a labour strategy that generally reduces the overall cost of declared labour for employers and addresses labour shortages. The hourly cost of agency employment is often higher than that of permanent direct employment. In some occupational groups, according to LFS data analyses, agency workers earn more than permanent workers (Gray 2002; Forde and Slater 2011). Studies have also pointed out to TAW as a getaway of public sector workers dissatisfied with the long hours, increasing workloads and poor remuneration of permanent roles. (Forde and Slater 2011; Kirkpatrick and Hoque 2006; Tailby 2005). The Jobs To Rent research suggests that agency-only employment is not a sustainable alternative for either skilled or unskilled workers. TAW seems to work only for those who do not depend on it for their main income. These tend to be skilled (nurses, chefs) and combine agency work with permanent contract employment. Nevertheless, the extra money that these groups may earn do not necessarily compensate for the harsh working conditions they face as agency workers (see also Tailby 2005).

Looking into the food industry which relies on big numbers of contingent unskilled labour, or the low-skill labour in hospitality and healthcare the overall experience of agency workers points to employment insecurity. Hospitality and healthcare workers either face long periods of unemployment and insecurity by doing agency work or are paid below NMW for the hours they work on a contracted (or undeclared in the case of hospitality workers) direct employment. Or do both for as long as they can endure the increasing workload and long working hours. Agency workers in food packing firms, food processing factories, and retailer distribution depots face uncertain, rather than flexible, working hours while the majority keep roaming from temporary to temporary assignment in lower salaries to their fellow permanent workers despite the coming into force of the Agency Worker Regulations.

It is argued that agency work is a stepping stone into more secure forms of employment. Research has pointed to both low-road agency practices relying on labour exploitation and agency-employer collaborations which set routes to permanent employment for temporary agency workers (Peck and Theodore 1998; Forde 2001; Gray 2002; Forde and Slater 2011). UK is country with a tradition of collective bargaining at the micro/company level with temp-to-perm schemes for TAWs negotiated between agencies and end-user employers. The response of British employers and agencies to the recent AWR, this study suggests, did not facilitate the transition of TAWs to more secure and permanent employment. Regulating the agency work relationship from above seems to have brought ambiguity, if not a drawback, as regards previous temp-to-perm initiatives at the company level. The route to more secure employment seems to go less through worker performance and business turnover and more through managerial decisions setting a cap on agency labour reward schemes according to the AWR legislation\(^\text{25}\). In this framework, companies have developed in collaboration with agencies more systems to discard labour than to keep it.

\(^{25}\) Firstly, the criteria for switching from TAW into Swedish Derogation permanent agency contracts under which workers are offered a minimum pay between assignments are blurred and are not down to worker performance. Secondly, those on SD agency contracts waive any rights to comparable employment rights with permanent workers and would have to live on an unsustainable 7hrs paid work every week in the eventuality...
In both countries studied, migration policy regimes have contributed to producing precarious categories of workers (see also Anderson 2010). Following from a close angle the contingent restrictions on labour mobility, the temporary agency industry has also grown and developed its own dynamic in perpetuating worker exploitation.

In Greece the relevance of migration in the temporary agency sector and the country’s political economy is dominant. The Greek agency sector is preoccupied with findings ways to control and profit from vulnerable groups of migrants. The service provided to businesses is more like a deflection from where the agencies devote most of their resources and energy. The UK case studies, on the other hand, have shown that the political economy of a sector weighs differently on Temporary Agency Work forms and experiences.

The political economy of the hospitality sector, for example, has generally a stronger impact on agency catering staff experiences. First, the informal employment conditions, the low pay and the long working hours that usually await agency chefs, porters and waitresses if they switch to a permanent post exercise a self-disciplining effect on them. Second, the intensively seasonal and non-regular character of the demand for agency labour compels workers to take up any assignment offer and work consecutive shifts in order to make up for the long stretches out of work during the quiet touristic periods. The dynamic of the labour supply industry affects more the hotel cleaners’ circumstances who are recruited in bigger numbers and are needed for longer placements.

As in hospitality, the political economy and regulatory frameworks of the UK healthcare sector lead to intensification of work for all healthcare workers with agency workers in the worst position of the hierarchy of employment relationships at the workplace. The private financing of healthcare provision and government cuts combined with government-set performance targets and statutory workplace regulations exercise pressure on healthcare providers’ ability to balance their budgets. Resorting to in-house banks of ZHC labour or temporary agency workers under conditions of understaffing is the main response to these pressures. Although all healthcare workers face increasing workloads under these circumstances, the working conditions are worse for agency workers who cost more per hour to the end-user employer and who are generally treated by fellow healthcare workers on permanent contracts as relief from their day-to-day workload. At the same time, the expansion of the labour supply industry activity in this sector in a context of labour market restrictions for EU migrants has accentuated worker experiences of exploitation and insecurity.

In horticulture there is a face-off between the strong domestic consumer demand and regulation of the agency sector on the one side, and the growth of labour supply chains and power imbalance in the product supply chain on the other. Specific initiatives such as the operation of the Gangmaster Licensing Authority in the UK have raised awareness about labour maltreatment in British agriculture during the last decade. In the light of the limited...
effect of AWR on agency workers treatment, the positive experience of the GLA and its cooperation with employers (NFU and large retailers) and labour providers (ALP) and trade unions (for example, Unite) indicate that effective enforcement of industrial cooperation may work better than additional national legislation.

On the other side, the comparative overview of employment and working conditions of temporary agency workers across other EU member states by Voss et al (2013) illustrates the positive impact of an active role of social partners and collective bargaining in TAW regulation and practice. The strong influence of social dialogue and bargaining on regulatory framework conditions in countries like Netherlands, France, Italy and Belgium have resulted in initiatives and concrete action to improve working and employment conditions of temporary agency workers (2013: 82). The work satisfaction among temporary agency workers indicated by surveys in these countries is not surprising in the light of the Dutch phase system or the French “flexibility premium” that agency workers’ pay is topped up with. In countries where data show comparatively more people satisfied with TAW, there are also extra income support funds supporting agency workers. Notable examples are the bilateral funds that have been established in those countries for the purpose of monitoring compliance with regulation and collective agreements, providing for equal treatment and equal pay as well as additional social benefits/security and/or fostering further training and qualification of temporary agency workers (Voss et al 2013: 82).

The impact of such social partner initiatives that go beyond wage and working time regulations indicate toward the critical role of collective bargaining above the company level for the protection of the agency workers’ rights. The momentum from the national level negotiation of AWR between social partners in the UK and the operational platform that GLA provided for agencies and employers to work together towards worker protection needs to be sustained and to expand across the sectors of the British economy. Also the development of social and income support funds and mechanisms for agency workers needs to be considered by British policy stakeholders.

In countries with a poor culture of social dialogue both above and at the micro/company level like Greece and poor labour market enforcement mechanisms, the path for the protection of temporary agency workers is even harder. Rather than looking at each other, both capitalists and workers (trade unions) in Greece have been looking towards the state and the contingent governments for concessions that would ameliorate their respective positions. The Greek familistic welfare regime has been characterized by a segmented welfare state and a private sector with a high share of small businesses where social balance was achieved by informal concessions made by state authorities, rather than dialogue and collective bargaining between social partners. Clientelistic concessions to both employers and workers undermined and shifted the attention away from social dialogue. During the crisis this culture of state and government concessions and transactions has shifted further than ever from families and workers. In this context, the agency sector is making its advances on one of the principal areas where the state concedes resources to capital, the healthcare sector.

For Policy Recommendations see Relevant Policy Briefs (Appendixes)
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EU Posted Workers Directive (96/71/EC)
Annex:

Table 1: list of interviewees in UK (temporary agency workers, ‘bank’ workers, employment agencies/agents, end-user employers, labour enforcement authorities)

<table>
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<th>Type of work</th>
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<th>Nationality</th>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<td>Agric + pick &amp; pack</td>
<td>Farms + NV operating retailer depots 1&amp;2</td>
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**HOSPITALITY SECTOR**

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**HEALTHCARE SECTOR**

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<td>93</td>
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### TEMPORARY EMPLOYMENT AGENCIES

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<tr>
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<th>Location</th>
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<td>UK and intl.</td>
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<td>National</td>
<td>UK and intl.</td>
<td>GR</td>
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<td>National/UK</td>
<td>PL</td>
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<td>8/11/2013</td>
<td>Southwest England</td>
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<td>FI</td>
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<td>Intl</td>
<td>PL</td>
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### OTHER INTERVIEWS

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**Table 2: list of interviewees in Greece (temporary agency workers, bank workers, employment agencies/agents, end-user employers, trade union)**

### AGENCY WORKERS

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<th>Int. no</th>
<th>Sector employment type agency type</th>
<th>Type of work</th>
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<td>Cleaner + kp</td>
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<td>Cyclades island</td>
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**TEMPORARY EMPLOYMENT AGENCIES**

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<th>Position</th>
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<th>Recruit.base</th>
<th>Nationality of interview</th>
<th>Date of int.</th>
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<td>UKR</td>
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<td>GR/UKR/PL/BG</td>
<td>UKR</td>
<td>7/10/2013</td>
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<td>Athens</td>
<td>GR/Eastern European</td>
<td>GR</td>
<td>17/5/2013</td>
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<tr>
<td>57</td>
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<td>HS, domestic care, Healthcare</td>
<td>Athens, Greek islands</td>
<td>GR/Eastern European</td>
<td>GR</td>
<td>16/5/2013</td>
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**EMPLOYERS**

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<td>61</td>
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<td>Salonica/ Regional</td>
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<td>68-83</td>
<td>Hotel managers (short tel. intvs)</td>
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**OTHER INTERVIEWS**

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<td>All sectors</td>
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<td>8/9/2013</td>
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