Part 2: Economic Themes - Pricing

13.1 Surface Passenger


Optimization of traffic and Facilities
May 1967, Vol. 1, No. 2, Page 123.
W. Vickrey
What are the costs to others of an extra car in the traffic queue, and how can they be brought home to the individual? The author argues that tolls and differential charges are essential to the efficient use and development of urban transport facilities. He discusses also the husbandry of equipment and allocation of land for transportation.

Congestion Charges and Welfare: Some Answers to Sharps's Doubts
January 1968, Vol. 2, No. 1, Page 107.
W. Vickrey
In the Economic Journal, December 1966 (Vol. 76, pp 806-17), Clifford Sharp questioned some of the benefits to be expected from a congestion tax, as set out in the Smeed Report, Professor Vickrey seeks to answer his doubts, and Dr. Sharp makes his position clearer.

Optimal Congestion Tolls for Car Commuters. A Note on Current Theory
September 1969, Vol. 3, No. 3, Page 300.
J.O. Jansson
The normal theory of congestion tolls follows the conventional lines of general
cost theory, including the assumption that the production period is fixed. Mr Jansson shows that the 'production period' for travel to work can be extended if congestion causes commuters to leave home earlier.


Price Regulation and Optimal Service Standards: The Taxicab Industry
May 1972, Vol. 6, No. 2, Page 116.
G.W. Douglas
In a market of cruising taxis price competition is impracticable, and service
(measured by waiting time) cannot be differentiated by customers' willingness to pay. This article examines the principles governing the setting of efficient prices to attain the maximum use of the service.


A Note on the Distributional Effects of Road Pricing
January 1974, Vol. 8, No. 1, Page 82.
H.W. Richardson
Road pricing is found to be regressive or ambiguous in its effects: the large group of lower-income motorists suffers, while gains or smaller losses accrue to wealthy motorists as well as to non-motorists.

transport Management for London
May 1974, Vol. 8, No. 2, Page 152.
N. Dorling M. Heyes R. Jarvis B. Walpole
The price mechanism has been neglected in transport planning. User costs shoul
be adjusted by road pricing to arrest the decline in public transport. The authors show how the implications of this policy might be assessed.

Optimal Bus Fares
September 1975, Vol. 9, No. 3, Page 280.
R. Turvey H. Mohring
The authors consider how fares can be equated with marginal social costs
including the cost of passengers' time. Fares should be higher on crowded buses to allow for the extra waiting time of would-be passengers.

Optimal transit Prices under Increasing Returns to Scale and a Loss Constraint
May 1977, Vol. 11, No. 2, Page 185.
K. train
Welfare loss might be reduced by requiring total revenues from all units in an urban transport system to meet a proportion of total costs, instead of applying the constraint to each unit separately. This may need an agency to administer prices and cross-subsidisation. Prices are calculated for the East Bay Area of the San Francisco Bay Area.

Management Objectives, Fares and Service Levels in Bus transport
January 1978, Vol. 12, No. 1, Page 70.
C.A. Nash
Commercial operation of a monopoly public transport service would lead to discrimination against some passengers. Pareto-type social welfare is a complex aim. London transport seeks to maximise passenger mileage subject to a budget constraint.

Marginal Cost Pricing of Scheduled transport Services. A Development and Generalisation of Turvey and Mohring's Theory of Optimal Bus Fares
September 1979, Vol. 13, No. 3, Page 268.
J.O. Jansson
The conclusion reached in this paper is that optimal pricing of scheduled transport services in any mode will result in a financial deficit, especially in passenger transport.

A Rational Alternative Fare Structure for British Rail's London and South-East Commuter Passengers
September 1981, Vol. 15, No. 3, Page 269.
J.G. Gibson
Rational and equitable commuter fares would be highest for the few passengers travelling long distances, and lowest for the short congested stages to the terminus.

A Rational Alternative Fare Structure for British Rail's London and South-East Commuter Passengers: A Comment
January 1982, Vol. 16, No. 1, Page 95.
C.A. Nash
A comment on the article by J.G. Gibson in the September 1981 issue of this Journal.

A Rational Alternative Fare Structure for British Rail Commuters: A Comment
September 1982, Vol. 16, No. 3, Page 305.
A. Grey
The comment is on the article by J.G. Gibson in the September 1981 issue of this Journal. The author of the article replies to this, and also to an earlier comment by C.A. Nash published in January 1982.

The Price-Discriminating Public Enterprise, with Special Reference to British Rail
January 1985, Vol. 19, No. 1, Page 41.
S.D. trotter
This article combines consideration of the possible objectives of a public enterprise with a discussion on price discrimination. British Rail is well placed for discriminatory pricing, but there are limits to what is practicable and desirable.

Road Congestion Pricing: When is it a Good Policy?
September 1992, Vol. 26, No. 3, Page 213.
A.W. Evans
This paper makes use of a model to investigate two objections to road congestion pricing: it may be inequitable and it generates perverse incentives for governments. The paper investigates how different congestion delay functions and different mixes of traffic affect these objections. The first is sensitive to these features; the second is more pervasive.

A Simulation of Price Discriminating Tolls
September 1993, Vol. 27, No. 3, Page 225.
S. Shmanske
A computer simulation is used to compared uniform tolls on a congested facility against a price-discriminating toll scheme. The simulation illustrates that consumers would gain from discriminatory tolls. Price-discriminating user fees on crowded facilities with rationing by queues should be given due consideration.

The Welfare Effects of Congestion Tolls with Heterogeneous Commuters
May 1994, Vol. 28, No. 2, Page 139.
R. Arnott A. de Palma R. Lindsey
This paper analyses the welfare effects of an optimal time-varying toll imposed during the morning journey to work, employing Vickrey's bottleneck model and assuming fixed demand.

Second-Best Regulation of Road transport Externalities
May 1995, Vol. 29, No. 2, Page 147.
E. Verhoef P. Nijkamp P. Rietveld
The paper examines the welfare characteristics of second-best alternatives to first-best differentiated road pricing, when it is not possible to achieve optimal tax differentiation. The optimal second-best fee is found to be a weighted average of the first-best differentiated fees, the weights depending on factors such as elasticities and group sizes. The welfare effects of second-best regulation are evaluated.

Optimal Pricing of Urban Passenger transport: A Simulation Exercise for Belgium
January 1996, Vol. 30, No. 1, Page 31.
B. de Borger I. Mayeres S. Proost S. Wouters
First, a simple theoretical model is developed that determines optimal prices for private and urban transport services in both the peak and off-peak periods of the day, taking into account all relevant private and external costs. Second, the model is implemented to study pricing policies in Belgium, using recent estimates of private and social marginal costs. Several applications are then considered.

13.2 Surface Freight

Pricing Rationality and Deficits on the brazilian Railroads
September 1970, Vol. 4, No. 3, Page 326.
A. Abouchar
Professor Abouchar examines the freight schedules introduced on the brazilian railways in 1968. He concludes that they will be more inflationary than the old rates, leading to still larger deficits and to increasing demand in directions that will be harmful to national efficiency.

Pricing and Investment in Railway Freight Services
September 1971, Vol. 5, No. 3, Page 231.
S. Joy
British Rail, now largely freed from government regulation, bases its freight prices on the prices of its competitors and on quality of service. Costs are used to tell whether, and for how long, br can profitably accept traffic at market prices. Assets will be replaced only to the capacity which is justified by traffics which can bear their long-run marginal costs. In the Common Market countries road and rail are both subject to detailed government regulation of charges.

Some Recent Thinking on Freight transport Pricing in France and Switzerland
January 1979, Vol. 13, No. 1, Page 44.
A. Rathery
In both France and Switzerland recent studies have urged freer competition and a minimum of state intervention in freight transport. The author doubts the feasibility of the proposals at present.

Deregulation of Rates for International Road Haulage within the European Community
January 1984, Vol. 18, No. 1, Page 23.
H. Baum
International road haulage between the original six member states is still subject to compulsory forked tariffs. A system of reference tariffs operates between them and Denmark, Ireland and the United Kingdom. The author considers the shortcomings of both systems and the prospects for further liberalisation.

Ramsey Pricing by US Railroads. Can it exist?
January 1984, Vol. 18, No. 1, Page 51.
S. Damus
The author criticises the reference to Ramsey pricing in a recent decision by the Interstate Commerce Commission on charges for transport of coal. He finds that Ramsey pricing is suitable for public finance or for nationalised industries, but cannot be applied after deregulations.

The Effect on Rate Levels and Structures of Removing Entry and Rate Controls on Motor Carriers
May 1987, Vol. 21, No. 2, Page 167.
R. Beilock J. Freeman
Deregulation of the motor carrier industry has led to reduced charges and has not injured those shippers/receivers who were thought to need protection.

Railway Pricing in Developing Countries. A Comparative Analysis
May 1987, Vol. 21, No. 2, Page 189.
N. Mwase
The Tanzania-Zambia Railway (TAZARA) to Dar es Salaam faces competition from road transport and from railway lines to other ports. It is required to cover both capital and operating costs. The author assesses its performance and its prospects.

13.3 Shipping

Economics and International Liner Services
May 1967, Vol. 1, No. 2, Page 190.
S.G. Sturmey
An examination of the system of conferences to control charges by cargo liners. The author concludes that conferences do not maximise profits and that the rate structure is too arbitrary to deter competition; rates based on costs of carriage plus a normal profit would serve the needs of trade much better.

A Model of Liner Price Setting
September 1968, Vol. 2, No. 3, Page 321.
B.J. Abrahamsson
An analysis of shipowners' behaviour as members of a liner conference leads Dr. Abrahamsson to conclude that the price-setting practices of conferences result not only from rising costs and price maximisation but from monopoly power and compensatory increases for "losses" incurred by selling surplus capacity below average cost in the tramp market.

transport Coordination and Distribution Efficiency: Pricing Norms and Profit Potential
May 1969, Vol. 3, No. 2, Page 165.
M.J. Roberts
This article argues that carriers have every incentive to co-operate voluntarily in the provision of coordinated services where these are more efficient than service by a single mode. The largest profits flow from the most efficient services. But there must be efficient pricing and shippers must respond rationally.

Some Financial Aspects of Shipping Conferences
May 1971, Vol. 5, No. 2, Page 173.
R. Goss
Standardisation on cargo liners' voyage accounts is suggested as a step towards the more rational negotiation of scales of charges which encourage efficiency.

Devaluation Surcharges in Ocean Freight Rates
May 1974, Vol. 8, No. 2, Page 148.
S.S. Jayawickrama
Devaluation of a tariff currency is reasonable ground for a surcharge. But surcharges levied have little regard for the actual effect of the devaluation, and are too apt to become general rate increases without the usual notice.

Regression Analysis of Ocean Liner Freight Rates on some Canadian Export Routes
May 1974, Vol. 8, No. 2, Page 161.
I. bryan
Freight rates charged by conferences and monopoly liners vary with unit values and also with bulk. Variations for distance, stowage, quantity shipped and competition show less consistency.

Intra-Tariff Cross-Subsidisation in Liner Shipping
September 1974, Vol. 8, No. 3, Page 294.
J.O. Jansson
Conference schedules of freight rates differentiate between commodities, so that some are uneconomic and there is wasteful service competition for high-rated items, leading to excess capacity. The author advocates a radical change in the rate structure.

A Fork Tariff System for Liner Freight Rates
January 1975, Vol. 9, No. 1, Page 62.
J.J. Evans A. Behnam
The authors believe that the uniform freight rates of liner conferences should be modified by a fork tariff, allowing variation within fixed limits. They set out the advantages and limitations of a fork tariff.

The Structure of Liner Freight Rates. A Comparative Route Study
January 1976, Vol. 10, No. 1, Page 52.
D. Schneerson
Unit values of commodities and the stowage factor are the chief determinants of freight rates on conference lines serving Thailand, Singapore and Israel. The "freight ton" is misconceived as a measure of costs and of the volume of trade: rating by volume should be applied consistently.

Spot and Time Charter Rates for Tankers, 1970-77
January 1981, Vol. 15, No. 1, Page 45.
D. Glen M. Owen R. van der Meer
The authors find that a model based on exponentially declining weights provides a reasonable explanation of the formation of rate expectations. It appears that an explanation still needs to be found for the violent fluctuations in rates.

Economies of trade Density in Liner Shipping and Optimal Pricing
January 1985, Vol. 19, No. 1, Page 7.
J.O. Jansson D. Shneerson
There are economies of trade density in liner shipping, but they are not enough to preclude social optimal pricing. trade density has hardly any effect on freight rates.

Comparisons of Volatility in the Dry Cargo Freight Market Ship Sector
January 1996, Vol. 30, No. 1, Page 67.
M.G. Kavussanos
This paper compares volatility estimates between time-charter and spot rates between different sizes of dry bulk vessels. Time-charters are more volatile than spot rates, and small vessels are less risky than larger ones when spot rates are used. Ship owners who are risk averse should utilise the spot market in preference to time-charters, and invest in smaller vessels.

13.4 Aviation

The Effect of Regulated Competition on Scheduled Air Fares
May 1972, Vol. 6, No. 2, Page 167.
M.H. Cooper A. Maynard
The authors postulate that scheduled airlines react to charter competition by charging lower fares, and a statistical analysis of various air routes from London to Europe does not refute this.

The Optimal Pricing of Freight in Combination Aircraft
September 1973, Vol. 7, No. 3, Page 258.
J.C. Miller III
Where freight is carried in the bellies of combination aircraft which also carry passengers, Professor Miller concludes that the service is in the long run neither a joint product nor a by-product, and that the U.S. Civil Aeronautics Board is right in regulating charges by reference to freighter costs.

The Determination of Airline Fares and Load Factors. Some Oligopoly Models
September 1974, Vol. 8, No. 3, Page 260.
M.R. Straszheim
In a trade-off between prices and schedule convenience too little attention is paid to public preferences. New types of services should be encouraged with peak load pricing and very high density at low prices during off-peak periods.

The Optimal Pricing of Freight in Combination Aircraft
September 1977, Vol. 11, No. 3, Page 284.
P.V. Garrod W. Miklius
The authors differ from the view expressed by J C Miller, in his article in this Journal in September 1973, that belly-freight rates should always be set by reference to costs in freighter aircraft.

Airline Demand Functions in the North Atlantic and their Pricing Implications
May 1978, Vol. 12, No. 2, Page 179.
M.R. Straszheim
The author finds that airline demand is price elastic except for first class. Obstacles to competition and to adjustments of capacity are political rather than economic. He suggests that fares should be based on long-run marginal cost, and reductions should be made only for off-peak travel, density of route, advance payment, and unrestricted group bookings.

Optimal Air Fares and Flight Frequency and Market Results
January 1983, Vol. 17, No. 1, Page 49.
C.C. Findlay
Optimal air fares and frequency may bring profits, but normally a subsidy will be needed. It is also possible for competition to provide the optimal number of flights.

Airline Coupons and Pricing Adjustments
September 1984, Vol. 18, No. 3, Page 253.
S.J. La Croix
By the innovation of using coupon pricing after a strike in 1979, United Airlines effected complex changes in its pricing structure in a manner which gained valuable publicity and a number of other advantages.

Peak-Load Pricing in Aviation: The Case of Charter Air Fares
January 1992, Vol. 26, No. 1, Page 71.
M. Bishop D. Thompson
This paper examines how decisions on pricing and the allocation of capital inputs are determined in the market for charter air travel between the UK and Europe. Charter air fares exhibit a well defined peak-load structure and one which had responded flexibly to the constraints which have recently arisen in airport and airspace capacity. This suggests that the price mechanism is an effective instrument for resolving the allocation of peak capacity in aviation markets.

Modelling and Testing the Effect of Market Structure on Price: The Case of International Air transport
May 1992, Vol. 26, No. 2, Page 171.
M. Dresner M.W. tretheway
A model is developed to test for the effect on international airline prices of a number of market structure variables, most importantly the US liberal bilateral policy implemented in 1978. The results indicate that liberal bilateral agreements reduce discount fares but not full fares. This implies that holiday-makers and other discretionary travellers are the prime beneficiaries from a liberal bilateral policy.

The Effects of Airline Codesharing Agreements on Firm Conduct and International Air Fares
May 1996, Vol. 30, No. 2, Page 187.
T.H. Oum J.-H. Park A. Zhang
This paper measures the impacts of a codesharing agreement between non-market leaders on the market leader's price and volume. An analytical model is developed and applied to panel data from trans-Pacific routes for the 1982-92 period.

Airline Mergers: A Longer View
September 1996, Vol. 30, No. 3, Page 237.
S.A. Morrison
This paper examines relative fares and route competition for several years before and after the mergers. This captures trends that preceded the mergers as well as effects that take longer than a year to materialise. The results, which need to be interpreted with caution, suggest that the effects of some mergers are benign while others can lead to significant fare increases.

13.5 Infrastructure

Optimization of traffic and Facilities
May 1967, Vol. 1, No. 2, Page 123.
W. Vickrey
What are the costs to others of an extra car in the traffic queue, and how can they be brought home to the individual? The author argues that tolls and differential charges are essential to the efficient use and development of urban transport facilities. He discusses also the husbandry of equipment and allocation of land for transportation.

Three Aspects of Highway Efficiency: Amount, Quality and Price
September 1968, Vol. 2, No. 3, Page 349.
K.D. Goldin
A study of efficient pricing of an efficient amount of highway capacity, taking into consideration peaked and stochastic demand and users' diversity of preferences for quality.

Movement Time as a Cost in Airport Operations
January 1969, Vol. 3, No. 1, Page 28.
J.V Yance
Landing fees at most of the larger airports proportional to the gross weight of the aircraft. the author argues that a more efficient basis would be time occupied in landing and take-off. This would mean a large increase in fees paid by light aircraft, which might thus be induced to transfer to less congested airports.

The New Pricing Policy of the British Airports Authority
May 1972, Vol. 6, No. 2, Page 101.
I.M.D. Little K.M. McLeod
The authors set out the new method and scale of charges now in force at Heathrow and Gatwick airports and explain the underlying principles. All-up weight is no longer the sole criterion: fees vary also according to number of passengers, and there is a peak surcharge at Heathrow and a minimum landing fee of £2, increased to £5 at Gatwick during summer weekends. Charter services will pay proportionately more than before. The minimum landing fee is expected to deter some general aviation, leaving more capacity for larger aircraft.

Myopic Investment Rules and Toll Charges in a transport Network
May 1973, Vol. 7, No. 2, Page 194.
S.C. Littlechild
The author differs from the conclusions of Dafermos and Sparrow in this Journal in May 1971. He develops a model and decides that under simple conditions a myopic investment rule is adequate for a road or a network if congestion tolls are applied.

The Economics of Airport Development and Control
September 1973, Vol. 7, No. 3, Page 269.
E.V.K. Fitzgerald G.B. Aneuryn-Evans
The authors present a methodology for airport planning. They conclude that pricing should be based on short-run costs, including congestion; but care must be taken in planning dates for expansion. Airports must not be planned separately from airways and aircraft.

Charging for Port Facilities
January 1974, Vol. 8, No. 1, Page 3.
I. Heggie
Ports rarely price their services on a commercial basis. This article examines some existing tariffs and suggests principles on which charges should be fixed. An appendix sets out an example of a cost-based tariff.

Harbour Expansion and Harbour Congestion Charges. An Application of Nonlinear Programming
September 1975, Vol. 9, No. 3, Page 209.
W.H. Chang L.S. Lee S.J. Yang C.G. Vandervoort
The authors present a model based on nonlinear programming techniques to plan future expansion in the congested harbours of Taiwan. The aim is to secure optimal flows of goods through the harbours, and to consider the interests of the various inland regions.

Peak Load Pricing and the Channel Tunnel. A Case Study
May 1976, Vol. 10, No. 2, Page 99.
S. Glaister
The author contends that large economies can be effected by peak load pricing for transport services. The Channel Tunnel project would have seemed much more attractive if provision has been made for differential charges to transfer some accompanied car traffic to even slightly less congested periods.

Infrastructure Pricing and the EEC Common transport Policy. The Case of Roads and Commercial Vehicles
May 1976, Vol. 10, No. 2, Page 177.
A. Jennings
The EEC proposals for harmonisation of commercial vehicle taxation would require all the proceeds to be spent on the roads, and no regard is paid to congestion and other elements of marginal social cost.

Economic Behaviour of Public Ports in the United States
May 1979, Vol. 13, No. 2, Page 169.
R.P. Wilder D.R. Pender
US public ports charge less than long-run marginal cost; they receive subsidies, especially in the form of capital grants or public bond issues. There is regional competition, and container traffic tends to be concentrated in certain ports, but total demand is inelastic. The authors consider that general price increases would lead to decreased subsidies and would be socially beneficial.

Fitzgerald and Aneuryn-Evans on the Economics of Airport Development and Control. A Re-analysis of the Data
September 1979, Vol. 13, No. 3, Page 338.
S.F. Borins
A comment on an article in the September 1973 issue of this Journal.

The Structure of Landing Fees at Uncongested Airports. An Application of Ramsey Pricing
May 1982, Vol. 16, No. 2, Page 151.
S.A. Morrison
The author suggests that uncongested airports should charge a fixed fee per landing plus a charge per available seat mile.

Peak-load Pricing and the Channel Tunnel. A Re-examination
September 1982, Vol. 16, No. 3, Page 267.
G. Mills W. Cloeman
The authors re-examine the conclusions reached by Stephen Glaister in an article in this Journal in May 1976. They conclude that he overestimated the capacity that would have been required under uniform pricing, and also the price differentials required under peak-load pricing to reduce capacity and increase profit.

Right of Way and Congestion Toll
May 1984, Vol. 18, No. 2, Page 165.
E. Berglas D. Fresko D. Pines
The case for separate lanes or roads for buses and cars is based on the different characteristics of these modes. In certain conditions buses, instead of being subsidised, should pay congestion tolls even when cars do not.

The Economics of Tolled Road Crossings
May 1986, Vol. 20, No. 2, Page 255.
C. Sharp K. Button D. Deadman
The authors examine the different practices adopted by the USA and the United Kingdom in levying tolls on transport infrastructure. Both diverge from economic theory. The British treatment of outstanding debt is found to be in need of reform.

Second Best Problems in Railway Infrastructure Pricing and Investment
September 1992, Vol. 26, No. 3, Page 245.
J.-E. Nilsson
This paper analyses optimal pricing of rail infrastructure use, and optimality conditions for rail and road investment. It is demonstrated that under most circumstances rail charges should be below marginal costs and that investments in both modes should be reduced.

Fuel Taxes and Road-User Charges in LDCs: Some Lessons from Sub-Saharan Africa
September 1994, Vol. 28, No. 3, Page 255.
R. Gronau
The road damage externality is much more important than the urban congestion problem in less developed countries, in sharp contrast to the experience of the developed countries. There is no justification for petrol taxes to exceed the taxes imposed on diesel fuel.

13.6 Other

The Allais Report (translated from the French by E.M. and J.M. Thomson)
January 1967, Vol. 1, No. 1, Page 90.
P. Cottinet
The Allais Report is the work of five professors of economics commissioned to advise the Common Market countries on pricing policy for transport. M Cottinet has produced a summarised outline of what is regarded on the Continent as an important policy document. Various approaches to pricing policy are explored and a clear distinction made between charging for the use of track facilities (roads, railways or canals) and charging for the transport services that use the track facilities. The charging of marginal cost plus scarcity rents is favoured for track facilities, free competition being encouraged in the provision of transport services.

transport Coordination and Distribution Efficiency: Pricing Norms and Profit Potential
May 1969, Vol. 3, No. 2, Page 165.
M.J. Roberts
This article argues that carriers have every incentive to co-operate voluntarily in the provision of coordinated services where these are more efficient than service by a single mode. The largest profits flow from the most efficient services. But there must be efficient pricing and shippers must respond rationally.

transport Management for London
May 1974, Vol. 8, No. 2, Page 152.
N. Dorling M. Heyes R. Jarvis B. Walpole
The price mechanism has been neglected in transport planning. User costs should be adjusted by road pricing to arrest the decline in public transport. The authors show how the implications of this policy might be assessed.

Optimal transit Prices under Increasing Returns to Scale and a Loss Constraint
May 1977, Vol. 11, No. 2, Page 185.
K. train
Welfare loss might be reduced by requiring total revenues from all units in an urban transport system to meet a proportion of total costs, instead of applying the constraint to each unit separately. This may need an agency to administer prices and cross-subsidisation. Prices are calculated for the East Bay Area of the San Francisco Bay Area.

The Practical Determination of a Charge for Noise Pollution
May 1980, Vol. 14, No. 2, Page 205.
A. Alexandre J.-Ph. Barde D.W. Pearce
After reviewing the various proposals for taxing traffic and aircraft noise, the authors suggest a formula aimed at reducing noise at the source and at raising revenue to be used for mitigating noise in the environment.

The Effect of Pricing Policy on the Optimum Timing of Investments in transport Facilities
May 1981, Vol. 15, No. 2, Page 121.
S.F. Borins
The author finds that marginal cost pricing leads to slower expansion of capacity than either higher or lower pricing. transport planners are advised how to find the same optimum expansion dates under common forms of user fees as under marginal cost pricing.

Optimal Pricing and Subsidies for Scheduled transport Services
September 1985, Vol. 19, No. 3, Page 263.
P.K. Else
Building on previous discussion in this Journal, the author suggests that optimum subsidies could possibly be as high as 60 per cent of an operator's costs. But fares and the level of service should also be controlled. travel cards may provide a form of two-part tariff for public transport.

Ramsey Pricing of Inputs with Downstream Monopoly Power and Regulation. Implications for Railroad Rate Setting
January 1986, Vol. 20, No. 1, Page 81.
H. McFarland
The rules of Ramsey pricing should be adjusted where the regulated firm is not selling to consumers or to perfectly competitive industries. Some rail charges should be below Ramsey prices.

The Economics of travel Passes. Non-Uniform Pricing in transport
May 1988, Vol. 22, No. 2, Page 153.
J.C. Carbajo
Pricing rules are derived under different objectives for schemes including travelcards and ordinary tickets. To calculate the effects on revenue of different combinations of fares it is necessary to know the distribution of the population in terms of trip behaviour.

Ramsey Pricing in the Presence of Externality Costs
September 1988, Vol. 22, No. 3, Page 307.
T.H. Oum M.W. tretheway
The authors derive the Ramsey pricing rule in the presence of externality costs. They find that it is based, not on social marginal costs, but on the sum of marginal private costs and a fraction of marginal externality costs. Thus the Ramsey quantity rule does not hold.

Optimal Public transport Price and Service Frequency
January 1993, Vol. 27, No. 1, Page 33.
K. Jansson
Because values of time and passenger behaviour depend on the level of frequency it is found that: (1) in urban public transport there may be one low-deficit local optimum and one high-deficit local optimum, one of which is global; (2) contrary to what might be expected, optimal financial deficit per passenger is typically larger for high frequency services than for low-frequency services; (3) the optimal off-peak may exceed the optimal peak price.

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