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A proposed exploration of adolescents’ perceptions of creativity in their school

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Abstract

Since the 1990s, both student voice and creativity in schools have received increasing attention in national systems of education although they have remained surprisingly elusive areas for research within the context of international schools. In an attempt to explore adolescents’ perceptions of creativity in their school, a Grounded Theory (GT) approach is suggested. In justifying this approach, I describe how a critical realist personal philosophy directs me to a post-positivist paradigm of inquiry which in turn lends itself to using Strauss’ version of GT. Although GT is commonly used in the social sciences, including educational research, it has been criticized for both its philosophical and methodological inconsistencies. My responses to these concerns aim to broaden understanding and address misperceptions of what GT is and how it has potential to provide an effective methodology for analysing the perceptions of young people in a school setting. There is limited discussion of student voice, and there is no attempt to describe the current status of creativity in schools, to suggest specific methods of data collection and coding, and to address the ethical dimensions of conducting research with young people. Instead the focus is on offering an overview of what GT is and justifying its use for the study in question.
Introduction

This essay explores the rationale for adopting a grounded theory approach when exploring adolescents’ perceptions of their international school experiences. More specifically, grounded theory is justified as an appropriate approach to exploring adolescents’ perceptions of creativity in a school context. The increasing importance attached to student voice has resulted in an increased tendency for adults, including researchers, to ask students to describe their experiences of schooling. Only too often do we come to realise that what is forefront in the mind of a teacher is far away from that of the students, with the result that disinterested responses are given to irrelevant questions. The same dilemma faces researchers. Discovering what young people think forces researchers to consider the assumptions they make when seeking their perceptions. What we ask and how we ask influences the answers young people will give us. Therefore, a research approach which empowers participants to help the researcher ask the right questions and for them to respond in authentic fashion can only help lead to valuable insights. Obviously for the researcher, this requires adequate tact, planning and analysis. The topic under study, adolescents’ perceptions of creativity in international schools, is hardly irrelevant and yet it has received little attention in the context of international schools. Elsewhere, it has been an area of interest as governments, schools and organizations increasingly view it as something worth teaching for, albeit for a diversity of reasons (Craft, 2006, Kaufman & Sternberg, 2007; OECD, 1998; Tan & Gopinathan, 2000).

This essay begins with a short overview of student voice because research with young people can potentially help empower them in school-wide decision-making as well as develop our current understanding of how schools can develop teaching and learning (Rudduck & Flutter, 2000). Adolescents’ perceptions of creativity provide the focus of the study although no attempt is made in this essay to provide a literature review of what is already an area of great interest in schools (Sternberg, 2003; Lucas et al, 2013). The reason for not addressing creativity in this way is twofold. One, grounded theory raises questions on whether such a review is at best useful and at worst a hindrance when starting the research (Glaser & Strauss, 1967). Second, the focus of the paper is on grounded theory methodology, rather
than the topic of creativity. Indeed, the essay would require few changes if the area of research was for example changed to students’ perceptions of physical activities or of internationalism.

As a critical realist, I then describe my ontological and epistemological beliefs and describe how my tendencies towards critical realism lead me to a post-positivist paradigm of inquiry. This then leads to a discussion of the origin and development of grounded theory (GT) and its links with critical realism and post-positivism. Although different versions of GT methodology have come about, the discussion centres on that developed by Anselm Strauss, who along with Barney Glaser wrote the seminal book *The Discovery of Grounded Theory: strategies for qualitative research* which introduced GT to the world in 1967. The final and longest section aims to respond to some common criticisms of GT as well as provide further clarification of what GT is. These criticisms are wide-ranging and, in some cases, complex in the foundation and scope of their arguments.

**The Rise of Student Voice**

Since the early 1990s, consulting students about their experiences has become a prominent and widespread focus for school improvement in teaching and learning. There were various reasons for this new focus. In response to the perceived failure of authoritarian styles of schooling and teaching, there emerged significant support for more participatory pedagogical, organizational and leadership frameworks in schools (Fullan & Hargreaves, 1991; Sergiovanni, 1992). As teachers found themselves more empowered and involved with school wide decision-making, and as the move towards more democratic styles of school became common in economically established nations, so began a more concerted effort to seek input from students on how schools could improve. Another probable contributing factor to the prominence of student voice was the increasing emphasis on student-centred learning, enabled by pedagogical models such as constructivism (not to be confused with the philosophical paradigm of the same name described later in this document) which places special emphasis on young peoples’ experiences and
Many have attributed the adoption of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child in 1989 as a likely and significant catalyst for the rise of student voice, although it is difficult to gauge to what extent this might be so. This convention stated that children and young people should be given the right to express their opinions on matters affecting their lives (Flutter, 2007; Lundy, 2007; Whitty & Wisby, 2007). Educators also began to appreciate the diversity of cognitive, social and affective dispositions that young people can develop from democratic participation and dialogue. Apple and Beane (1999) question how students could learn to behave democratically in an institution that does not give you the experience of democracy (1999). Flutter and Rudduck add that experiencing and enacting democratic principles allow students to learn valuable dispositions for active participation in a democratic society in later life (2004). Similarly, Bohler asserts that international schools ought to actively involve students in decision-making so that they develop their disposition and skills to become advocates for a just society (2008). The inclusion of students in schoolwide decision-making seems to match well with the aspirations that international schools have for young people. Yet, there is a startling lack of research into students’ perceptions of their experiences in international schools. Furthermore, it is not at all apparent how best to collect such potentially rich feedback.

As expectations rise to promote student voice work and to involve young people in schoolwide decision-making, new dilemmas have arisen in educational research concerning this area. How do adults conducting educational research in this area ensure that they genuinely listen to (and act upon) what students say? How do researchers know what questions to ask? Does student voice imply one voice? If so, whose voice? This development of student voice from an uncontested plea for more democratic norms of schooling into a more critical conceptual analysis has potential in, as Rudduck and Flutter poetically refer to as, “carving a new order of experience” (2000: 75) for students in international schools. In responding to these questions, it is necessary to explore underlying assumptions when seeking to find out what young people think. This exploration involves two steps. Step one is to clarify the language associated with student voice. Step two is to clarify the nature of this communication with young people.
A variety of terms are being used to describe the engagement of young people with adults in the context of school. We have student ‘participation’ (Frost, 2008), ‘empowerment’ (Sullivan, 2002), ‘involvement’ (Lodge, 2005), ‘consultation’ (Flutter & Rudduck, 2004) and ‘voice’ (Lensmire, 1998). Reflecting perhaps this relatively new evolving field of educational research and practice, there is considerable overlap in the meaning of such terms. However, it appears that ‘student voice’ is becoming increasingly accepted terminology (Fielding, 2008) to describe this alternative approach to school improvement. The term ‘pupil voice’ is also frequently used, especially in the UK. However, it has been pointed out that the term ‘pupils’ tends to be more frequently used to describe children in primary while ‘students’ is a more general term for young people from primary to even university (Robinson & Taylor, 2007). ‘Voice’ is potentially more problematic a term for several reasons. One, the use of the singular may give the impression that students are united in their voices which would rarely be the case (Robinson & Taylor, 2007; Whitty & Wisby, 2007). Second, the use of ‘voice’ may imply that it only includes the words spoken by students, and yet it is obvious that students can communicate their feelings, perspectives and ideas effectively in a wide variety of modes such as through writing, drawings, and actions. Even words carry distinct meanings according to how they are said (Robinson & Taylor, 2007). Thus ‘voice’ is understood to have multiple modes of expression. As a result, student voice research ideally encompasses a wide variety of methods.

Paradigms of inquiry - my position

In justifying the methodology chosen in any area of education, it has become popular and advisable for researchers to clearly state their ontological and epistemological beliefs, and then to define their paradigm of inquiry (Guba & Lincoln, 1988, 1994; Huberman & Miles, 1994, Crotty, 1998). There is not agreement on this approach however and some authors have argued that a researcher’s philosophical beliefs are not what are relevant but the wise choice of methodology and methods are. For example, Muijs insists that researchers can start out wanting to solve a particular problem or find out about a particular
phenomenon and then pragmatically choose suitable methods to address it without having strong philosophical beliefs about the nature of reality and knowledge (2004).

It seems useful however to put forth a philosophy in which the reader then has an opportunity to examine the relationships between methodology, methods and analysis. In that way, there are no unnecessary conflicts perceived between the underlying philosophies of the researcher and the corresponding research approach. From this, my choice of methodology is expected to reflect what I want to find out (Berg, 1995), how I treat the data, and my beliefs about the world. Methodology is a general term which refers to how we go about studying some phenomenon and is not to be confused with methods, which are specific research techniques for gathering and analysing data (Silverman, 2001).

Ontological assumptions are based on the nature of reality (Guba and Lincoln, 1994) or “what is?” I am a realist in that I believe that the world of material things has an objective, independent existence and that if there were no living organisms in the universe, matter would or could exist (Landesman, 1997). However, contrary to direct or naïve realism, I believe that because of my physiological make-up, my senses are not capable of being stimulated by all the properties of matter and that the stimuli I experience give me a subjective and prejudiced view of reality (Schrödinger, 1958; Landesman, 1997; Gould & Purcell, 2000). The explanation for this is that humans have evolved biases of perception that reflect our evolutionary past. Thus, humans have a remarkable ability to empathize with humans and other animals (Gould & Purcell, 2000). Yet, humans struggle with sensing the infrared radiation emitted by a tree. My ontological belief is that truth is out there. Knowledge of this truth is theoretically achievable, but it is a real challenge because of our inevitably biased observations of reality and the complexity of causes and effects. There are so many layers of causes and effects, and these are interconnected in ways that are extraordinarily complex. As a result, our analysis of observations lead to hypotheses and theories that aim to make the best sense of what the reality is although these can and indeed ought to be challenged by others who may reject or refine them, or try to define their limits of application (Dunbar, 1995).
research, the researcher’s observations will not match exactly the actual experiences of the research participants, and the assessment of these observations will depend greatly on the expertise of the researcher to distinguish between descriptions that range in their authenticity and accuracy (Oliver, 2011). This fits with critical realism, which describes both ontological and epistemological beliefs (Guba & Lincoln, 1994). Critical realism draws on the nature of research in the natural sciences and owes much of its theoretical foundation to Karl Popper (Watson, 2010). Critical realism however clearly delineates ontology and epistemology in as far as epistemology is evidently secondary to ontology because knowledge of the world depends on the nature of the world (Hedlund-de Witt, 2013). As a critical realist, I assume that phenomena exist independent of an individual and that reality reflects causal powers (Kempster & Parry, 2011). Patomäki and Wight put these causal powers into what I believe an accurate context:

According to critical realism the world is composed not only of events, states of affairs, experiences, impressions, and discourses, but also of underlying structures, powers, and tendencies that exist, whether or not detected or known through experience and/or discourse. For critical realists this under-lying reality provides the conditions of possibility for actual events and perceived and/or experienced phenomena

(2000: 223)

As a critical realist, I am also aware that the nature of humans and their interactions with each other influence what knowledge has and will be produced (Sayer, 1992). For example, the language we use and the way we communicate dictate to a great extent what is known and what is communicated, and the researcher needs to be aware of this when evaluating knowledge (Sayer, 1992). In summary, the critical realist has an obligation to search for and outline the account that comes closest to explaining what is real (Oliver, 2011).

Epistemological assumptions are based on what can be known and the relationship of knower and known (Guba and Lincoln, 1994). My relationship with the “known” in a study of students’ perceptions of creativity will be one of data collection
instrument, in the same way that a barometer is a data collection instrument for measuring air pressure. Like the barometer, the methods I use have potential for bias and with describing misleading cause and effect relationships. However, my aim will be to reduce such bias and be objective as much as possible. Like all data collection instruments, the reality I report will only be an approximation of what occurred. Rather than aim to find the truth, I will try and represent reality as best as I can. Again, this corresponds to the critical realist’s view of knowledge as inevitably subjective because of our biological and cultural evolution. But subjective does not mean wrong or bad, and neither does it imply a relativist view of all knowledge claims.

My ontological and epistemological beliefs therefore come under the umbrella of post-positivism (Guba & Lincoln, 1994, Hartas, 2010), one of four competing paradigms or basic set of beliefs about the world identified by Guba and Lincoln (1994) and which are widely recognized amongst social scientists (Oliver, 2011). Critical realism shares with post-positivist approaches a commitment to methodological and epistemological pluralism (Patomäki & Wight, 2000) in natural settings. Thus, post-positivists recognize that qualitative research is especially useful to address questions that are not appropriate for quantitative methods and vice-versa (Paul & Marfo, 2001). Unfortunately, post-positivist approaches are sometimes associated directly with qualitative research (for example, Creswell, 2012). Methodologically, Critical realism and post-positivist approaches fit in with both qualitative and quantitative methods in natural settings where the participants’ views on how they make sense of their worlds are elicited and analysed by the researcher (Patomaki & Wight, 2000). This data analysis is not merely descriptive. As researcher, I will do all I can to remain objective with the data gleaned. One methodological approach that can be taken is grounded theory which allows a researcher to finely tune the research question as data is collected and which provides a framework for analysing student-driven data.

The background to this approach, and how it fits in with research in students’ perceptions and with my ontological and epistemological beliefs, now follows.
Grounded theory

From relatively early on, grounded theory (GT) methodology was encouraged by educational researchers (Richer, 1975; Babchuk, 1997) and it has indeed proved popular with researchers in education (Haig, 1995; Strauss & Corbin, 1998; Thomas & James, 2006). More specifically, GT studies of the perceptions of young people in educational settings have been widely promoted (Morrow & Richards, 1996; Lloyd-Smith & Tarr, 2000) and practiced (Piggot, 2010).

GT was developed in the 1960s by Barney Glaser and Anselm Strauss and was a measured response against sociological methodologies at the time, especially in the USA, which relied heavily on scientific deductive methods and with its corresponding hypothesis testing and verificative techniques (Glaser and Strauss, 1967; Babchuk, 1997, Oliver, 2011). During this era, ethnomethodology and other qualitative approaches were becoming increasingly popular, although the status of these remained low compared to quantitative tendencies, and so GT was seen to fit comfortably in between these two approaches to take a high middle ground (Thomas and James, 2006). As an alternative approach, GT emphasises theory generation instead of generation testing (Glaser & Strauss, 1967). The ultimate goal of grounded theory researcher is to develop theory which is grounded in the data collected, this data being systematically gathered and analysed, and, unlike other methodologies such as phenomenology and ethnography, went beyond thick description (Glaser & Strauss, 1967). In GT, the researcher approaches the data with as few preconceptions as possible in order to see what is going on. This means that data is continuously being analysed leading to further data collection and thus renewed analysis. This interplay continues until a moment when further data collection is judged not to provide any new insights, a point of ‘theoretical saturation’ (Glaser & Strauss, 1967). Therefore, in GT research into students’ perceptions, I would not only share the perspectives and voices of the students but I assume the further responsibility of interpreting the data. Strauss and Corbin clearly view GT a powerful and pragmatic way of understanding the world:

*Theory derived from data is more likely to resemble the ‘reality’ than is theory derived by putting together a series of concepts based on experience or solely through*
speculation..... Grounded theories, because they are drawn from data, are likely to offer insight, enhance understanding, and provide a meaningful guide to action.

(1998: 12)

GT is clearly a methodology (Strauss, 2004; Creswell, 2012), rather than merely a method, which takes on board the idea that with so many unknown variables in social phenomena, it is naïve to formulate an ungrounded hypothesis and try to falsify it through testing (O’Boyle, 2005). Indeed, it is not only naïve but likely to be unhelpful, impractical and irrelevant. A central feature of grounded theory is its method of constant comparative analysis (Glaser & Strauss 1967), in that data collection and analysis occur simultaneously and each item of data is compared with every other item of data. These largely inductive methods, although there is interplay with deduction during this process, seek similarities and differences within and between sets of data (Lodico et al, 2006). As a result, categories are generated, connected and integrated to form an overarching theory that explains the situation under study. Unlike many other approaches to qualitative studies, attempts are made by GT researchers to generalize the findings to other similar settings (Lodico et al, 2006). This makes it useful as a research approach where the nature of international schools are such that although there are a rich diversity of types, there is a need to search for commonalities.

Richer, nearly 40 years ago, lamented the lack of rigour of educational research which focused on learning in the classroom and to this end promoted GT (1975). In his article, Richer argues that simple cause and effect conclusions, with scant regard for the rich contexts that learning in schools were imbedded in, were too simplistic and “virtually impotent in recommending policy change” (396). Richer justifies GT with clarity in the following:

we point to the lack of a meaningful, conceptual-theoretical structure guiding and focusing the research. We suggest that the construction of such a framework is best approached from knowledge of the world views, the definitions of reality manifested by teachers and students. Such data are necessarily derived from observation in the natural settings of the classroom, the staff room and the playground.
In consulting students instead of merely having discussions, GT offers an encouraging framework. In listening and re-listening to what young people say, and embracing a collaborative approach to seeking clarity of how creativity manifests itself in schooling, the researcher can sift through the fundamental assumptions of all (including that of the researcher) and so offer “the possibility that the oppressed will produce a ‘countersentence’ that can suggest a new historical narrative” (Alcoff, 1991/92 in Fielding, 2004: 23). Furthermore, the pragmatic nature of the research dictates that recommendations are made, and it is through dialogue with and between students that fruitful suggestions are likely to arise.

Although I am suggesting GT as an effective approach to my research, there is a need to clarify which type of GT (Babchuk, 1997; Denscombe, 2010) since a variety of GT versions now exist to the point that they represent quite distinct processes. What follows is a summary of these versions and a justification of how one of these approaches best fits with my philosophical beliefs and area of research.

**Versions of GT**

Since their original work in the 1960s and the publication of ‘The Discovery of Grounded Theory: strategies for qualitative research’ in 1967, Glaser and Strauss began to develop their own versions of GT with the result that two somewhat distinct approaches to GT emerged by the end of the 1980s (Babchuk, 1997; Gibson, 2000). This divergence became solidified upon the publication of “Basics of Qualitative Research: Techniques and Procedures for Developing Grounded Theory” written by Strauss and Juliet Corbin, a health researcher who studied under Strauss. This version, in what the authors considered a refinement of GT, aimed to address concerns about validity and reliability by insisting on an open, explicit and densely codified framework of data analysis to create a more prescriptive and systematic form of GT (Strauss & Corbin, 1990; 1998).
Strauss and Corbin’s first edition of their work (1990) was strongly critiqued by Glaser as he urged researchers to place less emphasis on their rigid rules and procedures and to take a more flexible approach to analyzing data (Glaser, 1992). Glaser also strongly condemned Strauss and Corbin’s approach because it allowed, too generously in his view, previous knowledge to enter the field of analysis which according to Glaser, then guided attention in specific directions and thus stifled creativity (Babchuk, 1997; Bryant, 2003). In essence, Glaser was emphasizing a positivist approach to GT whereas Strauss emphasized a post-positivist perspective (Denscombe, 2010) which saw the researcher as inevitably showing bias in their analysis of data. In other words, Strauss and Corbin were more of the opinion that researchers interpret data rather than extract truth from it. To minimize the risk of misleading or biased induction in research, Strauss and Corbin recognized the necessity to outline systematic guidance to this interpretation or analysis of data.

In challenging the positivist and post-positivist procedures in both of these approaches, more recent versions of GT emphasize to a greater extent the subjective nature of the researcher as an interpreter of the data (for example, Clarke, 2005 and Charmaz, 2006). Charmaz called her version of GT the constructivist approach and thus reflected an ontological viewpoint that reality is constructed by individuals as they find meaning to the world through their interactions with objects within it (Crotty 1998). Its basic premise is to reveal the stories, experiences, meanings and views of the research participants and thus “offers an interpretive portrayal of the studied world” (Charmaz, 2006: 10). As a result, there is no one external reality and there may be more than one reality presented in the analysis of data. It can therefore be seen that constructivist grounded theory takes for granted the relativism of multiple social realities and of multiple truths and concerns (Charmaz, 2006).

As an inexperienced researcher, Strauss and Corbin’s clear, although flexible, systemic set of procedures for analysing data and developing theory is arguably more suitable than Glaser’s intuitively-based (Babchuk, 1997) approach to data analysis. In addition, Strauss’ more explicit approach to data analysis may make criticism of my research easier, which will allow me (and possibly others) to learn
from and improve on my methods and emergent theory. Charmaz's approach is difficult to reconcile with a critical realist's philosophical framework.

Potential drawbacks of GT

The legitimacy and practicality of GT have been criticised. Early criticism of GT focused on the feasibility of researchers to suspend their theoretical perspectives, as prescribed by Glaser and Strauss's 'The Discovery' (1967), in the early stages of their studies (Bulmer, 1979). In other words, in practice GT fails to acknowledge the implicit theories which guide research in its early stages (Denzin, 1994; Silverman, 2001; Robson, 2002). As a result, instead of theories being grounded in the data collected, they may be partially grounded in these pre-research theoretical perspectives, resulting in the objective ideal and approach to data analysis of GT being open to question.

One response is that even in scientific research, and in line with critical realism, objectivity is an ideal rather than an expectation when doing research. In physics, the 'observer effect' means that observing quantum particles affects the nature of the particles themselves. Unlike quantum physics, where the observer effect appears to be an unavoidable aspect of reality, the observer effect in other branches of science means that inserting a thermometer into a glass of water or an animal (including humans) will inevitably change the temperature of the water or animal. For the social science researcher, it is understood that people may not behave or communicate in the same way when they are being observed or listened to. To reduce this perceived subjectivity, the observer effect can often be minimized by improvements in data collection instruments such as preparing adequately the mindset of a GT researcher. However, as yet another living creature connected in a complex web of connections involving living and non-living matter (leaving aside non-matter for simplicity), it is impossible to be objective. Whether we are conducting research or not, our presence in this web influences the web itself and its development in the past and future. Scientists studying swallowtail butterflies know their own physiology, personal histories and active engagement with the
butterflies influence what is observed and how these observations are reasoned inductively. Scientists acknowledge this unavoidable subjective (or the more neutral ‘ecological’) element to research and usually aim to minimize it as much as possible so that the natural world out there, the one they engage with, can be explained and predictions tentatively made or theories supported. In practical terms, this means that butterfly researchers will often study them in their natural surroundings and may use camouflage to hide their presence. However a scientist studying animals more similar to them such as chimpanzees may strive to engage with them in an effort to learn more about them, as exemplified by Jane Goodall’s approach in Gombe Streams, Tanzania (Jane Goodall Institute, u.d.). Indeed, her approach to becoming emotionally attached to chimpanzees and naming individuals (instead of numbering them as was typical at the time in the 1960s) brought criticism from the scientific community but her approaches have become increasingly accepted as a worthy scientific approach (Frans de Waal, 1997). De Waal argues that without emotional engagement in animal research, we run the risk of underestimating their emotional intelligence and their fundamental make-up (1997). Because GT requires interpersonal interaction, the researcher is inevitably part of the world they are studying (Cutcliffe, 2000), emotionally engaged and their personal histories will inevitably influence what they see and interpret. This is to be expected because GT is an interpretive mode of inquiry (Piantanida et al, 2004) and not a logico-deductive one and so avoidance of the observer effect, common in the positivist model of inquiry, is not so firmly held.

Therefore the criticism that GT fails to acknowledge these unavoidable implicit theories which guide research in its early stages is exaggerated. More significantly, these criticisms fail to acknowledge the flexibility of approaches open to the researcher and how these implicit theories can actually guide instead of stifle creative inquiry, as forcefully communicated in ‘The Discovery’:

"Some men seem to handle the precarious balance between the two sources by avoiding the reading of much that relates to the relevant area until after they return from the field, they do this so as not to interfere with personal insights. On the other hand, some read extensively beforehand. Others periodically return to or the other source for
stimulation. There is no ready formula, of course: one can only experiment to find which style of work gives the best results. Not to experiment toward this end, but carefully to cover “all” the literature before commencing research, increases the probability of brutally destroying one’s potential as a theorist. 

(Glaser & Strauss, 1967: 253)

Admittedly, the criticisms seem more directed at Glaser’s later interpretation (1992) of ‘The Discovery’ than Strauss and Corbin’s (1990) and yet such criticisms seem to confuse bias with sensitivity to data. Strauss and Corbin (1998) reiterated what was presented in ‘The Discovery’ and they recognise that despite the dangers of bias, background reading in the technical literature can make the researcher more theoretically sensitive, meaning that they have greater insights into and give more meaning to the events and happenings in the data (Strauss & Corbin, 1998). Strauss and Corbin (1990) stress that although there is no need for GT researchers to review all of the background literature beforehand, they need to strike a balance between some pre-reading or previous knowledge to ensure they are sensitive to the data, and excessive pre-reading that will stifle their efforts to discover theory. Indeed, this familiarity with the context of the study may help the researcher analyse creatively and see causal connections.

Ironically, another common criticism of GT is how it stifles creative interpretation of data (Thomas & James, 2006). In their article, Thomas and James highlight and quote prominent Nobel-winning scientists such Einstein in their attempt to claim that it is intuition that fosters creative analysis rather than logic in scientific research (2006). However, these intuitive methods used by brilliant scientists may not be accessible to lay researchers (although one wonders if a consistent and perhaps even logical strategy is an underlying process in these talented scientists’ subconscious workings), and what these scientists are metacognitively aware of does not necessarily describe what they do. Another Nobel-winning scientist, Beck, is also quoted by Thomas and James in order to bring to the reader’s attention the rather mute point that the process of discovering a novel theory is not known and that one cannot ignore the emotional dimension (2006). They summarise:
One must be careful, in other words, that in creating something called ‘theory’ (together with a set of procedural accompaniments for finding it) one does not inhibit rather than liberate discovery. One must be careful that fertility is not sacrificed to orderliness. Theory, if Einstein is right, does not give birth to discovery: it patterns, systematizes and tidies cognitive leaps, having painstakingly employed the ‘inference tickets’ of Ryle ...; it cannot act as a vehicle for creativity.

(Thomas and James, 2006: 773).

There is some confusion here between calling the methodological approaches of GT a theory, and with naming the emerging discovery a theory as well. Strauss, in conversation with Heiner Legewie and Barbara Schervier-Legewie, assures us that GT is not a theory but a methodology (2004), a point missed by some GT researchers (for example, Cox & Orford, 2004) but confirmed by others (Bryman, 2012). In stating that theory does not give birth to discovery, the authors may be equating theory with methodology, which is not the case. More significantly, let us examine Thomas and James’ assertion that the orderliness of data analysis stifles creativity.

Although this seems to make intuitive sense, it may do so because of misperceptions of what activities foster creativity and even of what creativity actually represents. Most definitions of creativity focus on two elements: novelty and effectiveness. For example, Robinson describes creativity as “imaginative processes with outcomes that are original and of value” (2001: 118). Similarly, Robert Sternberg, a pioneer in this area of research, has defined creativity as the “ability to produce work that is novel (that is, original, unexpected), high in quality, and appropriate (that is, useful, meets task constraints)” (2003: 89). Another element of a creative product is ethical and one which is increasingly promoted as an essential third ingredient of creativity (Cropley, 2001). This clarification of the dimensions of creativity (novelty, effectiveness and ethics) inform us that free thinking without barriers do not necessarily promote creative thought and may in fact do the very opposite if all that is created is a novel idea with little value and questionable ethics. Stepping back from the analysis itself, Wilson (1998), quoting Nobelist Herbert Simon, claims that creativity is enhanced when we are willing to accept vaguely defined problem statements which we then gradually structure over
a long period of time. This gradual ongoing structured approach corresponds to a GT approach to data analysis. In providing a step-by-step guide to analysing and interpreting data so that theory can slowly emerge, GT ensures that creative thought and the emerging theory are grounded in the research data, making valid its authenticity and usefulness. However, Strauss and Corbin were well aware that blind allegiance and mechanical application of GT methods of data analysis without imagination would likely lead to poor theory:

An unimaginative analysis may in a technical sense be adequately grounded in the data, yet be insufficiently grounded for the researcher’s theoretical purpose. This occurs if the researcher does not draw on the complete resources of data or fails to push data collection far enough.

(Strauss & Corbin, 1990: 19)

They confirm this approach eight years later: “These procedures were designed not to be followed dogmatically but rather to be used creatively and flexibly by researchers as they deem appropriate” (Strauss & Corbin, 1998; 14). From the beginning, both Strauss and Glaser were well aware of this dilemma of over-prescribing procedures for data analysis and ignoring existing theories in ‘The Discovery’ (1967). In response, they argue that although new insights needs to be grounded in the research data, old insights from existing theories and personal histories can enhance this creative pursuit and that “a combination of both is definitely desirable” (Glaser & Strauss, 1967: 253).

Therefore, a balance is required between rules-focused methods and intuitive approaches in order for creativity to flourish, the balance of which will depend on the experiences and dispositions of the researcher (Strauss & Corbin, 1990; Glaser, 1992). For creative thought, it is important to be theoretically sensitive to the data, which can be brought about not only by knowledge of the relevant background literature and through professional experiences, but also by the methods of GT:

Through these alternating processes of data collection and analysis, meanings that often are illusive at first become clearer. Immersion in the analysis leads to those
sudden insights, “aha” experiences so familiar to those of us who do qualitative research. But insights do not just occur haphazardly, rather they happen to prepared minds during interplay with the data... It is amazing how insight sparks more insight and how discovery builds.

(Strauss & Corbin, 1998: 49-50)

Indeed, it has been argued that this emphasis in GT on the challenge of theory generation ensures a creative focus:

... an advantage of grounded theory is that it directs the researcher immediately to the creative core of the research process, and facilitates the direct application of both the intellect and the imagination to the demanding process of interpreting research data.

Turner (1981: 227)

Others have highlighted how GT promotes creative thought and so helps produce unique insights (Orlikowsky, 1993). Stern (1994; 217) words this viewpoint with conviction:

... it is the creativity in the act that brings the real truth of a social situation into being, and following grounded theory techniques is one way to approach this creative process.

Another common criticism is that many so-called GT studies are not (Benoliel, 1996; Thomas & James, 2006) or are to widely varying degrees (Becker, 1993; Wilson & Hutchinson, 1996; Suddaby, 2006; Denscombe, 2010). Here fault lies not with the methodology but with the academic peer-reviewed journals that publish them. Glaser and Strauss may have contributed in some way to the lack of rigour in the use of GT through their early lack of direction in data analysis in ‘The Discovery’ but this can hardly be the case for the past 20 years or more since the publication of a number of GT texts describing various approaches to data analysis (Strauss & Corbin, 1990, 1998; Glaser, 1992; Clarke, 2005; Charmaz, 2006). Nevertheless, Thomas and James bring to our attention the need to ensure GT methodology is used and labeled appropriately.

In their comprehensive critique of GT, Thomas and James question three assumptions of GT (2006). One, they disagree that GT research can be grounded in
only the data. Two, they disagree that GT research can produce theories. Three, they disagree that these theories are discovered. The first assertion that it is impossible for GT to be be grounded solely in data because of the implicit theories brought into the analysis by the researcher has already been discussed. The summary of this response is as follows: yes, like all research, including that in science, there is both an observer effect and a subjective element to data analysis and so the aim of GT is to minimize these while also acknowledging and taking advantage of them to creatively generate theory. In response to the second criticism, ‘The Discovery’ outlines criteria for what a theory in sociology aims to do, which are that it is explanatory, predictive, applicable and relevant. Although, by default, ‘theory’ based on the data of a GT research should be difficult to refute (assuming appropriate rigour in data collection and analysis), it is rare that the theory would influence the whole field of sociology by its application in multiple contexts worldwide. It is no different in the natural sciences. Although a GT researcher aims to claim that a theory has been generated, it is only so in relation to the data and to the specific context of the study (Glaser & Strauss, 1967). If the researcher is applying it to other contexts, then it is more likely to be a hypothesis in relation to the wider field of sociology, although Glaser and Strauss insist that it deserves its continued status as theory in relation to the data of the research (1967). They clarify that typically, these theories “fall between the ‘minor working hypotheses’ of everyday life and the ‘all-inclusive’ grand theories” (Glaser & Strauss, 1967; 33). Thomas and James however claim that such middle range theories help us understand events but do not explain them, adding unhelpfully that “theory in a loose, vernacular sense —to go back to ‘I have a theory why my geraniums are dying’ - is indeed about conjecture, and, if you like, about creativity. But this is far from what happens when theory is used scientifically - in natural or social science” (2006: 773). It is also far from what happens in GT research. An amateur gardener’s ‘theory’ that the geraniums are dying because, for example, the soil is poor is obviously a conjecture if the gardener has collected no data on what soil types geraniums prefer in the same way that a researcher claims that uniforms improve academic scores would also be a conjecture if no data is collected to justify this claim or if the data collected is not carefully analysed. Although it is easy to agree that the gardener’s ‘theory’ is a conjecture, Thomas and James’ implication
that this conjecture involves creativity is questionable. Creativity is not simply free-thinking with little regard for applicability and usefulness. The grounded theory, even in a very local or specific context, aims not only to understand and see relationships in a context (Strauss agrees these alone are insufficient for a theory) but also to explain it and make predictions, with the aim that this theory is validated (by comparing theory with the data) and built upon by others (1998). Nevertheless, Thomas and James (2006) raise an important issue with this use of the word ‘theory’, because GT’s use of the term gives impressions of grandeur in its ambitions. In practice, GT researchers rarely produce ‘grand’ theories and the expectations are far less.

Thomas and James also question whether theories are ‘discovered’ (2006). This is a valid criticism and it is evident that there are multiple potential theories arising from a set of data, the creation of which in turn depends on the methods chosen by and the qualities of the researcher. Yet, these created theories may focus on slightly different areas and so such theories may all be firmly grounded in the data. Glaser & Strauss, despite the title, rarely use ‘discovery’ in the main text of The Discovery and instead tend to use ‘generation’: “this book is about the process of generating grounded theory” (1967; 31). Strauss and Corbin (1998) also avoid ‘discovery’ and use a variety of terms such as formulating (21), generating (22) and ‘constructing’ (highlighted in bold on pages 24 and 25 and used throughout the text) for developing theory. From their perspective, Thomas and James (2006) suggest ‘invented’ which highlights their post-modern view of multiple realities, an approach which fits in better with Charmaz’s constructivist philosophy and GT methods.

Another criticism of GT is that it is unclear about the testing of theories (Silverman, 2001). This criticism seems to miss the whole point of a GT study which is to generate, not test, theories. The theory can be tested in another study by the same or a different researcher using an alternative methodology (Strauss & Corbin, 1998). These tests may support or refute a theory, or define its limits of application. Indeed progress in understanding creativity in schools (or any other phenomena)
may be judged by the speed of which theories on it are replaced or refined (Wilson, 1998).

It has also been claimed that there are no clear underlying ontological or epistemological assumptions associated with GT (de Búrca & Mcloughlin, 1996). Although some associate GT with a constructivist philosophy (for example, Bryant, 2003 and Charmaz in Glaser, 2002), it is evident that GT and post-positivism are compatible (Buckley & Warring, 2009), especially with its emphasis on validity, reliability and generalisation. In any case, GT is flexible enough to accommodate a range of philosophical beliefs because of its pragmatic approach (Glaser & Strauss, 1967).

Hammersley (1983) thinks that Glaser and Strauss assume too readily that their theories are validated in the data, and questions the validity of the techniques used to interpret data. I believe this is true for all inquiry and time will tell whether the theories that have emerged from GT in educational research will have an impact on knowledge and the application or predictive powers of this knowledge. The post-positivist perspective recognises that the report of my research gives an approximation of the ‘truth’, but to maximise validity, I will need to describe the context of the study, use and describe multiple data collection methods on students’ perceptions, examine exceptions to test and strengthen the basic findings (Winegardner, 1999), make the study useful and relevant to the school, check my data with the students of the study and with a neutral person, and critically analyse and report on my perceived interactions with the participants (O’Boyle, 2005).

There are also practical concerns associated with the GT approach. The first is that a number of components of GT make it a difficult methodology (Pandit, 1996, Hueser, 1999), so my lack of experience as a researcher will create significant challenges. For example, in my study of transfer and transition from Primary to Secondary (O’Boyle, 2009), it was challenging to know when a category was saturated (this was also reported by Robson, 2002), how to label categories and to find relationships between them. Nevertheless, Strauss & Corbin clearly encourage beginner GT researchers (1998). After 26 years working as an educator in schools,
I can be familiar with the context of the study and I am confident that my experience with schools and with previous GT research in them will enhance creative analysis and help to determine when categories will be sufficiently developed. The second practical concern doing GT research is that it is time consuming (Pandit, 1996; Goulding, 1999; Wu & Beaunae, 2012). The third is that GT has a long period of ambiguity and uncertainty due to a lack of hypothesis or research question (Pandit, 1996). Given the complexity of GT analysis and the need for creative thinking, a fourth concern is that it is better to conduct research with someone else or with a team, although Corbin & Strauss stress that GT can nevertheless be carried out by persons acting alone (1998). Fifth, there is a danger that analysis can degenerate into artificial, abstract or vague categories (Denzin, 1994; Silverman, 2001). Finally, the various methods of data collection common in GT studies in schools may adversely disrupt the learning environment and so there is a need to address this ethical concern, as there obviously is with doing research with young people.

**Conclusion**

The essay aimed to justify Strauss and Corbin’s version of grounded theory as an appropriate approach to research into what students think about creativity in their schooling. From a philosophical standpoint, GT matches well with my critical realist beliefs. From an educational angle, GT offers opportunities for fresh insights into creativity in international schools. Practically, a GT approach has potential to empower young people to help guide these insights and to offer recommendations for school improvement in light of the findings.

In many ways, this paper was perhaps over-ambitious in the scope of its aims, especially in attempting to respond to current criticisms of and debates surrounding the current status of GT. In doing so, the criticisms themselves were perhaps over-simplified and the responses correspondingly too dismissive and overly ambitious. This is especially so in the sections relating to Thomas and James’ paper (2006). For example, the role of abduction in GT, in other words the interplay between induction and deduction during data analysis (Suddaby, 2006), deserved exploration in responding to Thomas and James’ concerns about how data is
grounded through induction, and the role of abduction in creative thought in the sciences may have reinforced how GT encourages insightful analysis. The underlying differences between Glaser and Strauss’ versions have been debated in the literature in terms of their ontological, epistemological and methodological differences and discussion of this would have highlighted points of departure from, and the central premises of, ‘The Discovery’. Such a discussion would also have helped clarify whether the multiple versions of GT describe the refined development or unsystematic progress of a reputable methodology. In addition, it may have been worth exploring the possible feasibility of using Charmaz’, or other post-modern versions of GT (for example, Clarke, 2005), in student voice research and to examine the role of dialogue (instead of the more distant ‘consulting’ or ‘listening to’) where researchers and adolescents might fruitfully engage with “questioning their fundamental assumptions” (Bohm, 1996: 7).

Nevertheless, for what got included, there is the hope that it offers a worthwhile glimpse of who I am as a researcher and the opportunities GT can bring to a study of students’ perceptions in school.

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