|
 Academic Year: | 2016/7 |
| Owning Department/School: | Department of Economics |
| Credits: | 6 [equivalent to 12 CATS credits] |
| Notional Study Hours: | 120 |
| Level: | Honours (FHEQ level 6) |
| Period: |
|
| Assessment Summary: | CW 20%, EX 80% |
| Assessment Detail: |
|
| Supplementary Assessment: |
|
| Requisites: | Before taking this module you must take ES20011 AND take ES20012 |
| Description:
| Aims: To provide students with: * an intellectual framework to analyse situations in which the behaviour of agents is driven by strategic considerations; * a set of analytical tools to interpret a wide range of phenomena in the social sciences. Learning Outcomes: At the end of the unit students should: * be able to use the concept of Nash Equilibrium in simple oligopolistic games, and voting games; * understand the concept of subgame perfect equilibrium and apply it to a wide set of games; * understand the logic of Bayesian games and use them to analyse real-world applications. Skills: Problem solving, abstraction, modelling of real-world situations, recognising strategic situations. Content: I. Introduction: What is game theory; The theory of rational choice. II. Games with Perfect Information: II.1 Nash Equilibrium (pure and mixed) - theory and applications (Cournot's model of oligopoly, Bertrand's model of oligopoly, War of Attrition, auctions). II.2 Extensive Games: strategies and outcomes; Nash equilibrium; subgame perfect equilibrium; applications (holdup game; ultimatum game; Rubinstein bargaining). III. Games with Imperfect Information III.1 Bayesian Games: motivating examples, concepts, and definitions. III.2 Bayesian games - Illustrations: Cournot duopoly with cost uncertainty, procurement, Myerson-Satterthwaite Impossibility of efficient bilateral trade, monopoly regulation. |
| Programme availability: |
ES30092 is Optional on the following programmes:Department of Economics
|
Notes:
|