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ES30092: Game theory

Follow this link for further information on academic years Academic Year: 2017/8
Further information on owning departmentsOwning Department/School: Department of Economics
Further information on credits Credits: 6      [equivalent to 12 CATS credits]
Further information on notional study hours Notional Study Hours: 120
Further information on unit levels Level: Honours (FHEQ level 6)
Further information on teaching periods Period:
Semester 1
Further information on unit assessment Assessment Summary: CW 20%, EX 80%
Further information on unit assessment Assessment Detail:
  • Coursework (CW 20%)
  • Exam (EX 80%)
Further information on supplementary assessment Supplementary Assessment:
ES30092 - Resit Examination (where allowed by programme regulations)
Further information on requisites Requisites: Before taking this module you must take ES20011 AND take ES20012
Further information on descriptions Description: Aims:
To provide students with:
* an intellectual framework to analyse situations in which the behaviour of agents is driven by strategic considerations;
* a set of analytical tools to interpret a wide range of phenomena in the social sciences.

Learning Outcomes:
At the end of the unit students should:
* be able to use the concept of Nash Equilibrium in simple oligopolistic games, and voting games;
* understand the concept of subgame perfect equilibrium and apply it to a wide set of games;
* understand the logic of Bayesian games and use them to analyse real-world applications.

Problem solving, abstraction, modelling of real-world situations, recognising strategic situations.

I. Introduction: What is game theory; The theory of rational choice.
II. Games with Perfect Information:
II.1 Nash Equilibrium (pure and mixed) - theory and applications (Cournot's model of oligopoly, Bertrand's model of oligopoly, War of Attrition, auctions).
II.2 Extensive Games: strategies and outcomes; Nash equilibrium; subgame perfect equilibrium; applications (holdup game; ultimatum game; Rubinstein bargaining).
III. Games with Imperfect Information
III.1 Bayesian Games: motivating examples, concepts, and definitions.
III.2 Bayesian games - Illustrations: Cournot duopoly with cost uncertainty, procurement, Myerson-Satterthwaite Impossibility of efficient bilateral trade, monopoly regulation.
Further information on programme availabilityProgramme availability:

ES30092 is Optional on the following programmes:

Department of Economics
  • UHES-AFB03 : BSc(Hons) Economics (Year 3)
  • UHES-AAB03 : BSc(Hons) Economics with Study year abroad (Year 4)
  • UHES-AKB03 : BSc(Hons) Economics with Year long work placement (Year 4)
  • UHES-AFB04 : BSc(Hons) Economics and Mathematics (Year 3)
  • UHES-AFB01 : BSc(Hons) Economics and Politics (Year 3)
  • UHES-AAB01 : BSc(Hons) Economics and Politics with Study year abroad (Year 4)
  • UHES-AKB01 : BSc(Hons) Economics and Politics with Year long work placement (Year 4)
  • UHES-ACB01 : BSc(Hons) Economics and Politics with Combined Placement and Study Abroad (Year 4)
  • UHES-ACB03 : BSc(Hons) Economics with Combined Placement and Study Abroad (Year 4)