Auctions vs negotiations: Optimal selling mechanism with endogenous bidder values

In this seminar, Dr Mengxi Zhang from the University of Bonn will examine the design of the revenue maximising selling mechanism.

  • 3 Oct 2018, 2.15pm to 3 Oct 2018, 4.05pm BST (GMT +01:00)
  • 3 East, 3.5, University of Bath
  • This event is free

Dr Mengxi Zhang's paper studies the design of the revenue maximising selling mechanism, when bidders can make costly investments up-front to enhance their valuations. Unlike in the case where bidders’ values are exogenously fixed, it may be profitable for the seller to discriminate among ex ante symmetric bidders.

The speaker will first identify a sufficient and almost necessary condition under which symmetric auctions are optimal. When this condition fails, the optimal selling mechanism may be discriminatory. She further finds that the optimal mechanism in general follows a structure which I call a threshold mechanism. Two extreme examples of the threshold mechanism are symmetric auctions and sequential negotiations. In any other case, a threshold mechanism can be implemented by a dynamic selling scheme which uses auctions and negotiations alternately.

Speaker profiles

Dr Mengxi Zhang is a postdoctoral researcher at the Institute for Microeconomics, University of Bonn. Her primary research interests are in the areas of applied microeconomics theory and mechanism design.

Location


3 East, 3.5 University of Bath Claverton Down Bath BA2 7AY United Kingdom

Enquiries

If you have any questions, please contact us.